ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

DEFENCE

The Secretary of State was asked—

Departmental Budget

Nadhim Zahawi: What steps he is taking to balance his Department’s budget.

Philip Hammond: The Ministry of Defence is undertaking its annual budget-setting process, in which I am personally engaged. I am increasingly confident that we will achieve a sustainable and balanced defence budget for the first time in a decade or more, and I hope to be in a position to make an announcement to the House shortly.

Nadhim Zahawi: I thank my right hon. Friend for that answer and for the good news that we will be balancing the budget. Will he say a little more about research and development co-operation with France on the unmanned fighter drone and on other matters? How will that affect our ability to balance the budget?

Philip Hammond: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his question. As he will know, I was with the Prime Minister in Paris last Friday, when we confirmed that we will take forward the assessment phase of the medium altitude long endurance unmanned aerial vehicle with the French. Clearly, we can co-operate on many areas with France, a country with a broadly similar industrial base and defence budget to our own. Such co-operation will be to the benefit of both countries, and I intend to explore all those opportunities.

Hugh Bayley: The military action over Libya showed that among the European members of NATO there was a shortage of precision guided missiles, of air-to-air refuelling capacity and of airborne drones to identify targets. Clearly we need to acquire more capacity in those fields, so how sure is the Secretary of State that his budget will enable the UK to play its part in building a stronger European capacity?

Philip Hammond: The hon. Gentleman correctly identifies one of the lessons from the Libya campaign. Much of what came out of that campaign was positive, but
	clearly some shortfalls were identified. I must say that the finger must point primarily at those European members of NATO that fail to spend the target 2% of their GDP on defence. We will be looking to them to contribute the additional resources required to make good the shortfalls.

James Arbuthnot: I am delighted to hear that my right hon. Friend is close to balancing the books. Does that mean that we can look forward to an early set of accounts that are not qualified by the auditors, so that we can have confidence in what the books say.

Philip Hammond: Speaking candidly, I can say to my right hon. Friend that it will be a number of years yet, as the Department has made clear, before it is able to get an unqualified set of accounts. As Labour Members will know, that is largely due to a legacy problem associated with MOD inventory and the large quantity of stock items held in a form that the National Audit Office is not able adequately to audit. A solution is being put in place—a new IT system will resolve this problem over the next couple of years—and it should then be possible to get unqualified accounts.

Angus Robertson: Scottish taxpayers contribute more than £3 billion a year to the MOD, but according to its own statistics, nearly one third of that is not spent in Scotland. Why is that?

Philip Hammond: The last time I checked, most of the people we were needing to defend the UK against were not in Scotland. I think that Scottish taxpayers, like taxpayers in the rest of the UK, would expect that we deploy our military forces and structure our military posture to deal with the threats that we are facing.

Contracts (Small Businesses)

Julian Smith: What steps he is taking to help small businesses secure more contracts with his Department.

Peter Luff: Innovative and efficient smaller businesses make an important contribution to defence, beyond the obvious benefits to the wider economy. That is why the “National Security Through Technology” White Paper sets out a wide range of measures to make defence and security procurement as accessible as possible to even the smallest of enterprises. I attach particular importance to the establishment of a new small and medium-sized enterprises forum, which meets regularly under my chairmanship to discuss and inform subsequent action on issues of concern to small businesses.

Julian Smith: What steps are the Minister and his Department taking to engage with Britain’s 3,000 defence SMEs much earlier in the procurement process?

Peter Luff: First, I congratulate my hon. Friend on the part he plays in the Skipton and Ripon Enterprise Group. I know that he takes a close interest in SMEs in general and I am grateful for his interest in defence SMEs. We are taking a wide range of steps to achieve precisely what he asks for, and the SME forum is but one example of that. He is particularly interested in the
	use of pre-qualification questionnaires. Their use is being minimised for procurements of under £100,000, and we are working to simplify or even eliminate them. We are already adopting the new core questionnaire, which is standardised across government. Many steps have been taken to encourage SMEs to engage earlier and more effectively with the Department, but if he has any ideas I would welcome them.

Diana Johnson: A written statement on the White Paper that was recently published indicates that the Government will no longer prioritise UK suppliers when buying defence equipment. For the sake of small companies, and for BAE Systems workers at Brough, 850 of whom face redundancy, ought we not to have a debate on the Floor of the House about that change in Government policy?

Peter Luff: I have to say to the hon. Lady that such matters of debate are largely for the Backbench Business Committee to determine. No one would relish more than me an opportunity to explain the defence White Paper and the gross misrepresentation that she has just given. I would welcome such a debate, and I hope that it happens.

Duncan Hames: The Minister solicits ideas on this front. The Ministry of Defence necessarily requires strict security credentials from its business contractors, but that sponsorship can act as a barrier to competition. Will the Minister consider giving new businesses wishing to seek contracts with his Department the opportunity to apply in advance for security clearance for their personnel entirely at their own cost to level that playing field?

Peter Luff: Actually, I think there is a widely shared misunderstanding in the SME community of the issues that it faces. I refer my hon. Friend to the box on page 61 of the White Paper, which explains in detail the security requirements and how the obstacles that I accept some small and medium enterprises think they have experienced can, in practice, be dealt with.

Mr Speaker: Order. I do not think that the House has access to the box in question, but we are immensely grateful to the Minister.

Alison Seabeck: In view of the important role that SMEs play in some of our bigger programmes, and their need to be confident in the process and to have security of outcome, will the Minister give the House some clarity on the intention for the F-35 programme? In particular, given rumoured reductions in orders from the USA, Australia and Canada, does he expect the price that the MOD pays for each F-35 to rise, and does he have a view on the exact point at which they become unaffordable for the UK?

Peter Luff: First, I apologise unreservedly to you for my earlier answer, Mr Speaker, but you have encouraged me to be pithy in the past, and it would have been quite a long answer to give the details in full.
	Addressing the concern of the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Alison Seabeck), the honest answer is that we do not know. The Americans are not
	reducing the total numbers for the purchase of the joint strike fighter, but they have changed the profile of those purchases. Other partner nations have indicated that they will reduce their offtake. That is likely to have implications for JSF prices, particularly those acquired in the early stages of the process, which is when this country intends to acquires its JSFs. We are watching those implications carefully, and I am happy to talk to the hon. Lady separately about the implications for the UK.

Medical Emergency Response Team (Helmand)

Madeleine Moon: How many times the medical emergency response team has been called out in Helmand province in the last year.

Nick Harvey: The UK Forward Aeromed capability, commonly referred to as the medical emergency response team, has been called out around 480 times in Helmand province in the past year. As air evacuation assets like this are shared between coalition nations, not all call-outs will have been for UK personnel, as the team provides medical evacuation for UK and other international security assistance force troops, as well as Afghan security forces and civilians when appropriate.

Madeleine Moon: I am sure that the House will want to put on record its appreciation for the dedication and professionalism of the members of the medical emergency response team, many of whom are civilians who risk their lives helping personnel who have been injured. One of the issues I am greatly concerned about is the capacity to rescue people who may have suffered spinal injuries from heavily armoured vehicles, and whether appropriate rescue and cutting equipment and release mechanisms for doors and roofs are available so that when people are removed further damage to their spine is limited. Will the Minister confirm that such equipment is available for MER teams?

Nick Harvey: It certainly has not been put to us that there is a problem in that respect, but in the light of the concerns expressed by the hon. Lady, I will take that issue away, look at it in detail and write to her.

Andrew Bridgen: Will the Minister explain what efforts have been made to improve the capacity and efficiency of medical emergency response teams over the past 12 months?

Nick Harvey: We are not aware that there are any specific capacity problems. In fact, calls on the service over the past 12 months have been rather reduced from the level experienced in the previous 12 months. That reduction reflects both reduced kinetic activity in the area of operations and improved efficiency in the way in which the task is shared across Regional Command Southwest. I believe that the position has improved significantly, and that there are no specific capacity difficulties at the moment.

Jim Murphy: On Helmand, up until 2 February the UK Government had a clear position in Parliament, in NATO and with the country
	about a conditions-based withdrawal, and for the medical emergency teams and all our forces to return home and for the Afghan forces to take the lead on security by 2014. On that date the US Secretary of Defence announced a 2013 timetable for Afghan forces to take the lead and within hours the UK Government followed that timeline. What changed on the ground in Afghanistan in that week for the UK Government policy to change so dramatically?

Nick Harvey: There has been not been a dramatic shift of policy on the part of the US, ISAF or the UK Government. What the American Secretary made clear, as have the French, is that they will be accelerating the pace at which they hand to Afghanistan forces the lead responsibility, but there is no suggestion that the commitment of the ISAF countries is reducing or that the numbers are necessarily reducing. Simply, the speed at which the Afghan national security forces are developing is enabling them to take the lead more. The shift will therefore be more into a training, support and mentoring role, but that does not affect the overall strategy, and the Lisbon agreement among ISAF countries remains in place.

Defence Exports

Charlie Elphicke: What steps he is taking to promote defence exports.

Gerald Howarth: We have made exports a high priority and are supporting the UK Trade and Investment Defence and Security Organisation through an active and innovative defence diplomacy initiative. I have recently returned from a successful visit to India where I led a delegation of some 25 British defence companies to promote the best that Britain has to offer. The White Paper “National Security Through Technology” published this month by the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Worcestershire (Peter Luff), reaffirms our support to defence and security exports.

Charlie Elphicke: Over the past few months we have heard much concern expressed about the Typhoon contract. Will the Minister tell the House a little more about the exports that he is working on so that buyers are not gulled into buying second-rate outdated equipment?

Gerald Howarth: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the question. It is important that we recognise that in the United Kingdom we are fortunate. We do not rely just on major defence companies such as Thales, BAE Systems and QinetiQ. We have a raft of medium-sized companies such as Cobham, Ultra, Chemring and Martin Baker, well known for its ejector seats, and those companies have a rich supply of high technology to offer other countries. I can assure my hon. Friend that we are working hard to promote those companies as well.

Bob Stewart: However successful civil servants may be in trying to get defence exports, will the Minister reassure the House that they will not get bonuses in excess of what a colonel might make in salary every year?

Gerald Howarth: I thank my hon. and gallant Friend for that extremely helpful and gallant question. If I may say so, looking at the shadow Secretary of State, that was a scheme set up by the current Opposition, who were then in government. It was a three-year scheme. They believed in performance-related pay and so do we.

Bob Ainsworth: There is a belief in industry that we will lose at least 30,000 jobs in the defence sector over the coming period. Although people in that sector applaud the Government’s stated export support, they fear that it has no substance if it is not backed up by a strategy, no matter what title the Government choose to use for that. There is not a free market. If the Government do not develop some kind of defence strategy, other nations will gain at our expense, as they are potentially doing in India with a product inferior to that which we have to offer. Will the Government think about the need for some kind of defence strategy, which they clearly do not have, despite what they say?

Gerald Howarth: It is pretty rich for a former Labour Secretary of State for Defence to criticise us when his Government did not have a defence review for 13 years. We have undertaken that defence review and indicated that we have a strong policy of support to industry. The Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Worcestershire (Peter Luff), has set out his White Paper in which we support British industry. This Government, led by the Prime Minister, have done more than any previous Labour Government to support British defence exports. That is a strategy. The 16 visits that I have made overseas are beginning to bear results. Just to give one example, BAE has sold three offshore patrol vessels to Brazil.

Russell Brown: The Minister’s good friend the Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions, the right hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Chris Grayling), has urged employers to give the nation’s unemployed priority for new positions. How exactly does that square with the Department’s White Paper, which states:
	“The MOD does not consider wider employment, industrial, or economic factors in its value-for-money assessments.”?

Gerald Howarth: Our job as Defence Ministers is to get the best equipment for our armed forces, but it is also true that we have a thriving defence industry, to which the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth)referred. There are some 300,000 British Defence jobs and it is important to ensure that while we have to make savings as a result of the appalling budget deficit that we inherited from the previous Labour Government, we give support to British industry to export their goods overseas. I have heard from British industry that it has never had such strong support from Government as they are getting from this coalition Government.

Olympics (Security)

Stephen Hammond: What contribution the armed forces will make to security at the London 2012 Olympics; and if he will make a statement.

Philip Hammond: In support of the police and other civil and Olympic authorities, the armed forces will provide up to 13,500 regular and reserve personnel to ensure the Olympic and Paralympic games are safe and secure. Up to 7,500 will support the smooth running of Olympic sites, while the remainder will use their specialist capabilities and equipment to contribute to the delivery of Olympic security.
	I announced to the House earlier today by written statement that an order has been made under section 56(1A) of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 to enable up to 2,000 reservists to be called out to support Olympic security.
	The Army will apply its policy of intelligent selection for the Olympics. Only those reservists who volunteer and who have the support of their employers will be called out in connection with the Olympic games.

Stephen Hammond: I thank my right hon. Friend for the scale of support that he has announced. I recently visited the regional fire control centre that is opening in my constituency, which will provide emergency fire control at the Olympics. Will my right hon. Friend offer some insight to the House about who might be in overall command of an emergency or of security, and what procedures he is putting in place to ensure that both the civil and military authorities concerned with the Olympics security will work together?

Mr Speaker: I thank the Secretary of State, who had intended to group Question 5 with Question 11. He did not, so I do so on his behalf. I know he will be grateful.

Philip Hammond: I had understood that Question 11 had been unstarred. Perhaps I misunderstood.

Mr Speaker: I think the Secretary of State did, and I did too. However, the hon. Member for Pudsey (Stuart Andrew) says that he never withdrew it in the first place. A gremlin got into the system.

Stuart Andrew: What contribution the armed forces will make to security at the London 2012 Olympics; and if he will make a statement.

Philip Hammond: I am sure we look forward to my hon. Friend’s supplementary question.
	In answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond), I can say that the safety and security of the games is the responsibility of the Home Office and will be police led. The national Olympic security co-ordinator is the principal co-ordinating police officer for the delivery of national safety and security operations. Military personnel will remain under military command and control arrangements. Defence is working closely with the police and other civil authorities to ensure that that co-ordination between them is effective and that the games are safe and secure.

Stuart Andrew: I fear that the House will be sorely disappointed.
	Will my right hon. Friend confirm that if reservists are deployed for Olympic security, the services will work with employers to minimise as much disruption as possible to those businesses?

Philip Hammond: I am delighted to see my hon. Friend here. His exercise in expectation management was not required.
	In my initial response I said that we thought long and hard about whether it was right to call out reserves for the Olympics and the decision was that we would call out reserves only where both the reservists themselves are willing volunteers and their employers have signified that they are willing and able to release them for that period. This call-out will be on an entirely voluntary basis for both the employer and the reservists.

David Hanson: How many troops does the Secretary of State expect to be in London for the Olympics, as opposed to regional areas, and could he clarify for me what military command and control is, as related to Home Office police responsibility?

Philip Hammond: We do not yet have numbers for the final distribution between the different locations, but clearly the major venues will be in London and I would expect the majority of armed forces personnel deployed to be at those venues. With regard to command and control, the police are in overall control. The specific arrangements for integrating the military into the command structure will vary from place to place and task to task. A series of exercises is now taking place, one purpose of which is to test the proposals for integrating military and police command and ensure that they are robust.

Redundancies (Armed Forces)

Mark Lancaster: What criteria his Department uses when determining individual redundancies in the armed forces.

Andrew Robathan: Personnel are selected for redundancy by selection boards that are convened by each service. The boards assess evidence contained in individuals’ appraisal reports against selection criteria, which include performance, potential experience, qualifications and the relevance of their skill sets to the future needs of the service. The services will select applicants where possible, but they may select non-applicants where that is necessary to ensure that the right balance of skills is maintained across the rank structures.

Mark Lancaster: I commend the Minister for the resettlement package that the Government are putting together, but I would like to highlight one anomaly. Some servicemen and women serving in Europe—for example, in Norway, Italy and France—and administered by the European support group have no access to funding for travelling back to the United Kingdom for their resettlement packages. I ask him to look into the matter and ensure that all our servicemen and women are treated equally.

Andrew Robathan: I thank my hon. Friend for raising this important matter. I think that exceptions can be made. If he would like to write to me on the matter, I will write back with the details. I understand that a small number of people are affected, and we should certainly look after them properly.

Susan Elan Jones: Will the Minister be kind enough to tell us how many military service personnel who have been made redundant were within a year of pensionable age?

Andrew Robathan: I do not have the numbers at my fingertips—

Jim Murphy: Why not?

Andrew Robathan: In answer to the shadow Secretary of State, it is quite complicated. However, I can say that the immediate pension that people might have earned after 22 years is now available after 18 years, so anyone made redundant within four years of the immediate pension date will receive the immediate pension straight away.

Bob Russell: As the Army is reduced to the size it was at the time of the Boer war, although there is to be no reduction in the number of Ministers, does the Minister accept that it would be untenable for any member of 16 Air Assault Brigade, who could have served in up to three deployments to Helmand province, to be made compulsorily redundant?

Andrew Robathan: The decisions made on 16 Air Assault Brigade and elsewhere are quite rightly made by the individual services, not Ministers. Also, we believe that our fighting capabilities are somewhat greater than they were during the Boer war.

Kevan Jones: An internal MOD document states that the Department considers the UK force structure to be
	“out of proportion with modern working practices”.
	With the reduction in the number of armed forces personnel, why is the Minister doing nothing to correct the top-heavy force structure and the imbalance by making cuts across all ranks?

Andrew Robathan: I know that the hon. Gentleman is an avid reader of Hansard. If he goes back to about 1994, he will see that I raised this matter then in the House of Commons—I have been here too long. He is right that there is a disproportionate number of senior officers. They are excellent people, but we are looking to reduce that disproportionate number so that there are fewer senior officers in relation to bayonets on the ground.

Defence Munitions Beith

Katy Clark: What plans he has for the future of Defence Munitions Beith; and if he will make a statement.

Peter Luff: There are no current plans to change the status of Defence Munitions Beith. The weapons end-to-end initiative is working on the best through-life support solution for the MOD and industry, taking into account the strategic requirement, value for money and the linkage with associated industries. This is a wide and complex piece of work. There is a need to maintain
	Beith at least until the Spearfish torpedo has been converted to a single-fuel system, when the need for specialist facilities may lapse. The conversion programme is expected to be completed around 2018.

Katy Clark: I thank the Minister for that answer. Is he willing to meet me and trade union representatives of the work force at DM Beith to discuss what future contracts might be available to the depot?

Peter Luff: I am delighted to repeat the invitation that I made in a letter early last year, to which the hon. Lady has not so far replied, and to extend it once again on the Floor of the House. Of course I should be delighted to meet her to have the precise discussion that she seeks.

Gemma Doyle: Will the Minister provide some more details on how cutting the MOD policing budget in half will impact on the policing and guarding of defence munitions sites such as Beith, and the armaments depot at Coulport, in which my constituents are particularly interested? Specifically, will he respond to concerns that the policing of those sites will have to be downgraded and that those sites will no longer be protected by armed guards or, indeed, with dogs?

Peter Luff: I understand and respect the hon. Lady’s concern, but she is simply wrong. We will maintain effective and proportionate levels of security on all our sites, including Coulport and Beith.

Falkland Islands

Amber Rudd: What plans he has for defence deployments to the Falkland Islands; and if he will make a statement.

Desmond Swayne: What plans he has for defence deployments to the Falkland Islands; and if he will make a statement.

Simon Kirby: What plans he has for defence deployments to the Falkland Islands; and if he will make a statement.

George Freeman: What plans he has for defence deployments to the Falkland Islands; and if he will make a statement.

Philip Hammond: The Ministry of Defence routinely deploys a range of military assets in defence of the Falkland Islands and in fulfilment of our standing Atlantic Patrol, South task. Despite media speculation to the contrary, there has been no recent change to force levels. There is no evidence of any current credible military threat to the security of the Falkland Islands, and therefore no current plan for significant changes to force deployments. However, Her Majesty’s Government are committed to defending the right of the Falkland Islanders to self-determination, and plans exist for rapid reinforcement of the land, sea and air forces in and around the islands should any such threat appear.

Amber Rudd: I thank my right hon. Friend for that answer. May I press him on the defence plans? Is he confident that the United Kingdom has sufficient naval assets in the area to prevent any naval attack?

Philip Hammond: Yes, we are quite confident that we have sufficient naval assets in the area, and we have the ability to reinforce those naval assets should there be any evidence of intent to carry out any form of attack.

Desmond Swayne: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the withdrawal of HMS Endurance some 30 years ago prompted a subsequent invasion, and that although there is no intention whatever to militarise the south Atlantic, proper precautions are absolutely necessary?

Philip Hammond: My right hon. Friend is right on two counts. First, it is absolutely necessary to ensure that our intentions are not capable of being misinterpreted. We have the strongest possible intention of defending the Falkland Islanders’ right to self-determination and the strongest intention to defend the islands. Equally, we have no desire or intention to increase the heat around the debate. We are not seeking to take actions that are provocative or cause unnecessary alarm. We will defend the islands—nobody should be under any illusion about that—and we will deploy the forces necessary.

Simon Kirby: May I press my right hon. Friend on that very matter? Will he do whatever it takes to ensure that the only time that the Falkland Islands will not be British is when the Falkland Islanders themselves decide that they do not want to be?

Philip Hammond: That is the position of Her Majesty’s Government. We will not discuss the issue of sovereignty of the Falkland Islands unless at any time it becomes the islanders’ wish that we should do so.

George Freeman: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the UK has important strategic interests in the south Atlantic, not least in energy security, the important work done by the British Antarctic Survey on climate change and the geopolitics of the Antarctic? Will he update the House on any discussions that he has had with our allies regarding the defence of the Falklands?

Philip Hammond: The defence of the Falklands is an integral part of our overall military tasks, and I regularly discuss the conduct of those tasks with our allies as appropriate.

Gerald Kaufman: Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that the determination of the people of the Falkland Islands to remain British must be respected and protected, as it rightly was when a fascist dictatorship grabbed the Falklands 30 years ago? If there is any sign from this crew in Buenos Aires that they are going to try it on again, will he ensure that they are stopped?

Philip Hammond: I can answer the right hon. Gentleman unequivocally by saying yes. It is important that we also recognise that the crew in Buenos Aires, as he puts it, is quite a different crew from the fascist dictatorship that invaded the Falkland Islands using conscripts back in 1982. We are dealing with a democratic Argentina that has publicly eschewed the use of military force in pursuing its claim to the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands.

Gisela Stuart: I spent some time with HMS Montrose in September last year before it sailed to the south Atlantic. During the discussions over deployment, it became clear that the supply routes to the Falklands for fresh provisions were being severely impeded. Will the Secretary of State say something about the security of supply to the Falklands of fresh food and other services, and about the deployment of the Navy?

Philip Hammond: As the hon. Lady knows, an air bridge is operating via Ascension island and other routes into the Falklands are available. The Government are concerned about the actions and statements of some states in respect of access to their ports for Falkland Islands-flagged vessels. We will keep this issue under close scrutiny. We always have the option of increasing the frequency of the air bridge, should that become necessary.

Denis MacShane: Are not Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward, Admiral Lord West and General Sir Mike Jackson absolutely right when they say on the record that were the Falklands again to be occupied, Britain would not be able to retake them because this Government do not have any naval aircraft carriers on the high seas? We are in our weakest position in five centuries of naval history, and it is happening on the watch of a Conservative Government.

Philip Hammond: The right hon. Gentleman has succumbed slightly to hyperbole. The Government’s position is clear. Our approach is to make clear to Argentina our intent to defend the islands, to deploy the necessary military forces to provide a credible defence of the islands, and to ensure that we are not placed in the invidious position of having to mount a long-range invasion to retake the islands.

Falkland Islands (Argentine Forces)

Dominic Raab: What assessment he has made of the capacity of armed forces from Argentina to enter the Falkland Islands by force.

Philip Hammond: We pay close attention to developments in Argentina’s military capability. There is no current evidence of the intent or the capability to launch a credible military threat to the Falkland Islands. However, we are committed to the protection of the islanders’ right to self-determination and will remain vigilant in our posture.

Dominic Raab: I thank the Secretary of State for that answer. What impact will the ban on Falklands-flagged ships in Latin American ports have on Britain’s ability to defend the islands? Which Governments in the region can we count on as allies in the unlikely event—let us hope that it remains a very remote possibility—of hostile Argentine action?

Philip Hammond: As I have said, the statements that some Governments have been induced to make about access to their ports for Falkland Islands-flagged vessels are most unwelcome, but we judge that they will have no material impact on our ability to defend the islands or reinforce the islands, should that be necessary. I hope
	my hon. Friend and the House do not mind, but it would not be in the interests of the UK’s national security or of the Falkland Islands to explore in public which regional nations might be friendly to us if there were a need for military action at any time in the future.

Arctic Convoy Veterans

Caroline Dinenage: What recent progress has been made by the independent review into granting a medal to the Arctic convoy veterans; and if he will make a statement.

Andrew Robathan: The Government have agreed that there should be a fresh review of the rules governing the award of military medals. It will be conducted by an independent reviewer with full consultation with interested parties. The terms of reference and further details will be released shortly.

Caroline Dinenage: I am grateful to the Minister for that response, but I am not entirely happy with it. The veterans endured the most unimaginable hardships to protect this country during the second world war. Given that many of them are now in their late 80s and early 90s, does the Minister agree that it is imperative to be quick? We need to know when the review will be concluded.

Andrew Robathan: We all owe a huge debt to those of our fathers’ and grandfathers’ generation who gave up their youth in the service of this country to keep it and the world free from fascism. In the context of my hon. Friend’s question, that particularly applies to those who endured astonishingly awful conditions in the Arctic, and I pay tribute to them for their courage and resilience.
	Medals are not awarded by me, and it is quite right that there is to be an independent review that will not be led by the Ministry of Defence. I share my hon. Friend’s concern, but I can assure her that I am told that it will be a swift review and will take place shortly.

Tom Brake: Does the Minister agree that the review should be open, should consult widely and should be conducted outside the oversight of the MOD?

Andrew Robathan: As I have just said, the review is not being led by the MOD. I understand that it will be able to consult widely, and I look forward to seeing the terms of reference and details shortly. It is not being led by the MOD, so it is not up to us to determine exactly when it will happen.

Frank Roy: Who chose those who are on the independent review?

Andrew Robathan: I do not know who is on the independent review, because it is not being led by the Ministry of Defence.

Defence Science and Technology

Henry Smith: What plans he has for future investment in defence science and technology.

Peter Luff: At the beginning of this month, I was pleased to see published our White Paper, “National Security Through Technology”, which emphasised the contribution that using, sustaining and developing technology makes to our national security. The Government are therefore prioritising investment in defence science and technology. The White Paper makes clear our intention to end a long period of declining budgets and maintain the Ministry of Defence’s investment in science and technology at a minimum of 1.2% of the defence budget as protection for our future.

Henry Smith: Before asking my supplementary question, I would like to pay tribute to my constituent Corporal Jay Baldwin, who was recently seriously injured while serving in Afghanistan and who is now being treated in the Queen Elizabeth hospital at Edgbaston. I am sure the whole House will join me in sending him and his family our best wishes.
	How does the Minister believe that investment in science and technology supports not only our defence industry but our economy and companies such as Thales UK in my constituency?

Peter Luff: I obviously join my hon. Friend in his tribute to his constituent and hope that he makes a rapid and full recovery.
	Of course, investment in science and technology is about not just industry but protecting and securing our troops, and I am glad to say that we are having phenomenal success in that regard in Afghanistan. I am glad to tell my hon. Friend that Thales is one of the many companies and trade organisations that welcomed the White Paper when it was published earlier this month. They recognise that investment in science and technology is crucial for their future as successful, enterprising and competitive companies operating here in the UK. Perhaps one of the most exciting recent examples of the importance of that investment was the four-year £40 million future combat air systems focused research contract, which we announced in December. It will generate capability for the future and provide important work for the high-tech advanced manufacturing businesses of the UK.

Philip Hollobone: What emphasis is the Department placing on the development of unmanned air reconnaissance and attack vehicles? Surely that has to be the future for all three of our armed services.

Peter Luff: My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and that was a major feature in the UK/French summit that occurred last Friday, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said earlier. The future of the unmanned combat air sector is very important, which was exactly why I highlighted in my earlier answer the contract with BAE Systems. That contract will take forward technology in a number of crucial areas and ensure that our skill base is sustained, maintained and can take advantage of the opportunities that the sector will provide in the future.

Pakistan and Afghanistan

Gregg McClymont: What discussions he has had with his NATO counterparts on Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan.

Philip Hammond: Pakistan is an important player in the regional politics and will play an important role in Afghanistan’s future, so Pakistan’s involvement is routinely discussed during regular talks on regional issues with my NATO counterparts, most recently at the NATO Brussels summit that took place on 2 and 3 February. Lasting stability and security in Afghanistan is, I believe, in Pakistan’s interests. We continue to encourage Pakistan to support the Afghan-led reconciliation process fully, recognising that progress could help pay a peace dividend on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

Gregg McClymont: The Secretary of State will be aware of the history of the Pakistani intelligence services’ role in the emergence of the Taliban. Is he as concerned as I am about recent reports that the Pakistani intelligence services continue to operate inside Afghanistan? Does that have implications for Afghanistan after NATO leaves the country?

Philip Hammond: The hon. Gentleman underlines the fact that Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked, largely by the big overlap of the Pashtun population in the border areas. We should never forget, as well, that Pakistan has suffered more from terrorism than any other country, with more than 30,000 Pakistanis having lost their lives to acts of terrorism over the past decade. We continue to look carefully at how Pakistan’s security forces and others interact with their Afghan counterparts, and we continue to encourage Pakistan to play a positive and dynamic role in stabilising the area.

Patrick Mercer: The Secretary of State will be only too aware of the febrile relationship at the moment between the United States of America and Pakistan—apparent allies. What concerns does he have and what can be done about the safety of Pakistani nuclear sites, which are so close to the Afghan border?

Philip Hammond: Obviously, the safety of Pakistani nuclear missile and nuclear weapon sites is of the utmost importance, not only for regional stability but for counter-terrorist efforts across the world. The Pakistan military regard that as a very high priority, and all the information that I have seen suggests a very high level of security and security assurance around Pakistani nuclear sites.

Carrier Programme

Nick Smith: What recent assessment he has made of the cost of the UK carrier programme.

Peter Luff: The overall cost of the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier programme is continually informed by the conversion development phase, which is developing a much greater understanding of the costs and risks involved. We will publish the findings as soon as we can and will keep the House informed in the usual manner.

Nick Smith: May I press the Minister to say what will be the total project cost after converting the carriers for the carrier variant aircraft? If he cannot tell us—and it does not look as though he can—does he recognise that that is a worrying, unfunded liability?

Peter Luff: I am afraid that I cannot answer the hon. Gentleman’s question, because we simply do not know the answer. In answer to the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Alison Seabeck), I talked about the possible price implications for the joint strike fighter as a result of the Americans’ decisions in rescheduling their profile. Similarly, we are still doing the work on the precise cost of the conversion. We will report to the House in the usual way. That will be part of the major projects report, so all the normal processes will be followed. I understand the importance of the hon. Gentleman’s question.

Edward Leigh: Whatever the cost of the carriers, is not a key argument in their favour that if—God forbid—the Falklands were, despite all our preparations, taken in a surprise attack, it would be essential to have a carrier to regain them? Does not that prompt the question of why we do not have one at the moment?

Peter Luff: I understand my hon. Friend’s concern, and I am aware of the arguments, for example, about the use of carriers off Libya. However, I think that the correct decisions were taken in the strategic defence and security review regarding the Tornado aircraft, which enabled us to fight that war very effectively. I repeat what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said: the Falklands are well protected; we live in a different world; and the suggestion that aircraft carriers play an important part in the Falkland Islands in the near future is unhelpful at this stage.

Topical Questions

Ann McKechin: If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.

Philip Hammond: My departmental responsibilities are to ensure that our country is properly defended, now and in future, through the delivery of the military tasks for which the MOD is mandated; that our service personnel have the right equipment and training to allow them to succeed in those military tasks; and that we honour our armed forces covenant. It is clear to me that in order to discharge those duties I have a responsibility to ensure that the Department has a properly balanced budget and a force generation strategy and defence equipment programme that are affordable and sustainable in the medium to long term.

Ann McKechin: Ministers have already made reference to last week’s meeting between the Prime Minister and President Sarkozy, where they agreed to move on to the procurement phase on the unmanned aerial vehicle project. How many new jobs does the Secretary of State estimate will be created in the UK as a result of this agreement, and how will he maximise the potential for job growth?

Philip Hammond: The announcement made at the summit last week was to advance the assessment phase of the unmanned aerial vehicle project, which involves £44 million of expenditure split between British Aerospace and Dassault. I cannot give the hon. Lady an exact estimate
	of the number of jobs that that will create in BAE, but I am happy to write to her to give her the best estimate I can.

Jack Lopresti: Can the Secretary of State update the House on progress made at the recent Anglo-French summit—if any?

Philip Hammond: The Anglo-French summit consisted of two separate parts. First, there was a defence meeting where we were able to have direct discussions with my counterpart in France and talk about all the joint procurement programmes and opportunities that we see for collaborating together in future—for example, in the combined joint expeditionary force—and for procuring together as both defence budgets come under financial pressure. The broader summit conducted between the President and the Prime Minister reasserted at the highest level the desire of the two countries to work together in areas such as nuclear collaboration and the unmanned aerial programme.

Jim Murphy: Due to the nature of this question, I will ask it gently. Forces children receive a service pupil premium, but it has recently come to light that a child who is orphaned due to the bravery of their parent in combat also loses that payment. I welcome the fact that the Government say they will act upon that, but have they now implemented the change? How many children receive the premium? Can the Minister guarantee that no child will lose the premium as a result of a seriously injured parent being discharged from Her Majesty’s forces?

Andrew Robathan: This is an important issue and the Government were concerned about what we read. However, it must be understood that the premium is given to schools, not to children, to compensate for the way in which armed forces children move around. We have instigated scholarships for the children of casualties in Afghanistan so that they can go into higher education. The pupil premium is a Department for Education responsibility, but Defence Ministers are concerned and we wish to ensure that nobody is disadvantaged. The Department for Education is looking at the matter. We certainly do not wash our hands of it and we are concerned, but the right hon. Gentleman will understand that once a child is settled in a school, the need for a premium is somewhat changed.

John Baron: Having served with the present commander of British forces in the Falklands, I think the Argentines would be very foolish even to contemplate any sort of military intervention, but does the Secretary of State agree that a strong statement of support from the United States would be helpful?

Philip Hammond: Clearly, strong statements of support from any of our allies are always helpful, but the realistic situation, which we have long recognised in this country, is that the defence of the Falkland Islands is a task for which the UK must be prepared and
	capable of undertaking alone if necessary. We hope that we will have support from others, but that cannot be our planning scenario.

Stephen Hepburn: What is the current position concerning the aircraft carrier project? Has there been any change in strategy as far as the design and build are concerned?

Peter Luff: I think I can give a very short answer to that question: no.

Gareth Johnson: I welcome my right hon. Friend’s decision to purchase the new C-17 aircraft for the Royal Air Force. Is that not evidence of the benefits of tackling the Ministry of Defence budget, which is vital to securing the future effectiveness of our armed forces?

Philip Hammond: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. In fact, the acquisition of the eighth C-17 aircraft was an extremely high priority for the military. It reinforces the Afghanistan air bridge at a time when the ground lines of communication through Pakistan are closed.
	The purchase was possible because the MOD is moving forward with the process of delivering a credible and sustainable budget with which Treasury officials are comfortable. Trust between the Treasury and the MOD has been the crucial missing ingredient in the past, and rebuilding it has allowed the Treasury to sign off the acquisition of the new aircraft from an in-year underspend. The Treasury would traditionally have been very reluctant to do so without seeing MOD hard numbers for the following year.

Iain McKenzie: I thank the Minister for his reply to my right hon. Friend the Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr Murphy) on the service premium. However, was the Secretary of State aware that extra support would be cut off if a serving parent dies in the service of their country before it was disclosed in The Sun and other newspapers, which pressured the Government into a U-turn?

Andrew Robathan: The hon. Gentleman also raises that important point. The truth is that that is a Department for Education responsibility. Let us remember that this Government introduced the pupil premium, and it is therefore new, but it would be fair to say that we in the Ministry of Defence had not appreciated that this might happen. The Department for Education is looking to ameliorate any problems, but let us remember that the pupil premium is about the transience of service children attending schools—[ Interruption. ] Well, that is why we introduced it. Circumstances change when a child is settled, but we do not wish them to be disadvantaged.

Charles Kennedy: Is the Ministry of Defence able to offer the longer term reassurance, of the type that it gave last July for the MOD bases in South Uist and St Kilda, for the Sound of Raasay, Rona and the Kyle of Lochalsh bases in my constituency, not least because in the last couple of weeks QinetiQ, the operator, has published half-year profits that were up—commendably—by 45%?

Philip Hammond: As my right hon. Friend will know, the whole issue of bases is currently under review. The Army is undertaking a large rebasing exercise in conjunction with the new Defence Infrastructure Organisation, and I hope to be in a position to make an announcement to the House in the not too distant future.

Eric Joyce: The Minister with responsibility for veterans will be aware of the call by the shadow Secretary of State for a £1 million legacy veterans fund, to be funded by cuts at the top end. The Minister is well known to be a commonsensical man: will he stand up and say that he agrees with my right hon. Friend?

Andrew Robathan: I always accept compliments, from whatever surprising quarters they come. I was not aware of the £1 million veterans fund suggestion, but I will look into it when I have heard from the shadow Secretary of State.

Julian Lewis: The Secretary of State’s excellent decision to deploy an anti-air warfare Type 45 destroyer to the Falklands certainly ensures that the islands are protected against aerial attack. That still leaves the danger of surface attack. In the absence of aircraft carriers, can my right hon. Friend confirm that a nuclear-powered submarine is available to protect our warship and the sea lanes approaching the Falklands?

Philip Hammond: First, I should make it clear that the deployment of HMS Dauntless to the south Atlantic is a routine deployment and she will rotate with other vessels of the fleet in due course. Secondly, as I suspect my hon. Friend knows, we never comment on the deployment of our submarines of any description. As he has raised the issue, I will take the opportunity to make one thing clear. There has been some speculation in the press and by Argentine Ministers about the deployment of nuclear weapons to the south Atlantic. The United Kingdom has a clear and publicly stated policy that we will neither use nor threaten to use our nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state that is a compliant member of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, so the Argentine republic need have nothing to fear on that count.

Dan Jarvis: The Government have willed an end-date for combat operations in Afghanistan, but not yet an endgame for how we disengage militarily. Can the Secretary of State give an assurance that the sacrifice and outstanding efforts of those who have served and continue to serve in Afghanistan will be underpinned by a departure that is properly planned, co-ordinated and commensurate with conditions on the ground?

Nick Harvey: The ISAF strategy for transition in Afghanistan has been worked up in detail and continues work that the previous Government had started before we took office. The strategy is clear—it is a progressive transition to an Afghan security lead, which is taking place area by area throughout Afghanistan. It is proceeding well and on a time line that gives every indication that we can make the withdrawal from the combat role at the date that we
	have suggested. Obviously, the precise speed and order of events depend on circumstances on the ground, but the direction of travel is clear. All international elements are signed up to it and it is progressing well.

Jason McCartney: I welcome the review of the awarding of medals, but will it also look at the service of police officers who have served with distinction on the police training mission in both Iraq and Afghanistan?

Andrew Robathan: The review is of military medals. I believe that those police officers who serve are entitled to campaign medals. I am sure that they can make representations, but as they already receive those medals, I do not think that it will affect them. I am not responsible for the terms of reference.

John Cryer: Further to Question 6, what structures exist to allow concerns about the biggest Army cuts of all time to be raised further up the chain? I am thinking of the sorts of concerns raised earlier by hon. Members on both sides of the House.

Philip Hammond: I and my colleagues are asking ourselves, “What’s he talking about?” I’m not quite sure what the hon. Gentleman is referring to. Is he talking about whether the Army is top-heavy? [Interruption.] I am at a loss to know exactly what he is talking about, but we intend to reduce numbers in the senior ranks of the Army in order to address the disproportion there.

Mr Speaker: I think that arrangements can be made for a conversation outside the Chamber, possibly over a cup of tea—who knows?—if the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (John Cryer) is lucky.

Jessica Lee: I welcome the forthcoming review into the awarding of military medals and I thank my right hon. Friend for his recent correspondence regarding the survivors of the 1940 Lancastria disaster and their campaign for a medal, but may I press him for further details on the timing and remit of this important and timely review?

Andrew Robathan: It should happen speedily. The problem is that this is a responsibility across Government and led, I believe, by the Cabinet Office. We want it announced swiftly and we want it to take place swiftly so that we can understand the rules. I am sorry that I can only give this answer, but I think that everyone will be glad to know that I am not responsible for it.

Mary Glindon: When members of the armed forces are facing a two-year pay freeze and 20,000 are losing their jobs, how can the Secretary of State justify bonuses, some of five figures, to senior officers in the MOD civil service?

Philip Hammond: I think we have covered this one already. The arrangements for performance-related pay were put in place by the previous Government and were a decision taken by them with which I concurred entirely. It is the right way to incentivise senior civil
	servants. By paying non-consolidated performance-related pay, we reduce the total cost to the Department. The scheme was introduced in lieu of pay increases.

Alun Cairns: What assessment has the Secretary of State made of the impact of reported collusion between the Taliban and Pakistan on our troops serving in the region?

Philip Hammond: The situation on the Afghan-Pakistan border is extremely complex, as my hon. Friend will know. As I said, the Government’s position remains that we repeat continually to the Pakistanis that it is in their interest to engage with the peace process and the reconciliation talks, and to ensure long-term stability in the region.

Paul Flynn: What precise act of brilliance justifies the payment of an £85,000 bonus to one of the Secretary of State’s civil servants? Will the Secretary of State make a bid for his own bonus for today becoming the first Minister to stop blaming the previous Government for all his problems, and tell the House on what precise date the coalition Government will take responsibility for their own conduct?

Philip Hammond: The hon. Gentleman might not have heard my previous answer when I stated the fact that this contractual, performance-related pay system was put in place by the previous Government. I happen to approve of it; I consider it the right way forward. If he wants to ask about the details of its design and why it was done the way it was, perhaps he should ask the right hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr Murphy) or one of his many right hon. Friends who served in the previous Government as Secretary of State for Defence.

Anne McIntosh: RAF Fylingdales and RAF Staxton perform key duties as listening and radar stations. There is concern locally about the impact of wind farms on them. May we have a rejection of any wind farm applications on the grounds that they will interfere with the RAF’s work?

Peter Luff: I am not sure whether this will be good news or bad news for my hon. Friend, but we are making increasing strides towards finding radar systems that do not interfere with RAF operations, so this particular obstacle to wind farm applications is diminishing. That is probably not the news that she wanted, but it happens to be the truth.

Office for Fair Access

James Clappison: (Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills if he will make a statement on the appointment of director of the Office for Fair Access.

Vincent Cable: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question and for giving me the opportunity to tell the House why the Government think that Professor Ebdon is the right candidate for the post of director of fair access. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Universities and Science would happily have been here to respond, but he is currently in Antarctica.
	First, I would like to pay tribute to the work of the current director, Sir Martin Harris. Sir Martin has been the director of fair access since the post was created in 2004. Under his leadership, universities have committed themselves to a 50% increase in spend on access by 2015-16. In recruiting Sir Martin’s replacement, we were looking for someone who could build on that achievement. There is much that remains to be done. Progress over the last few years in securing fair access to the most selective universities remains limited. Only around 50 pupils out of the 80,000 on free school meals currently make it to Oxbridge. All parts of the education sector need to work together to ensure that all with the potential to succeed are identified and nurtured.
	We conducted the search for a replacement for Martin Harris in a fair, competitive and transparent way. Professor Ebdon has considerable experience. He is a prize-winning analytical chemist with a PhD from Imperial, and he transformed the finances and the quality of his own university for the better. We undertook two long, thorough searches to ensure that we found the right candidate for the post. I have no doubt that Professor Ebdon has the qualities and determination to help students from low-income and under-represented groups to secure the places in higher education that their attainments and potential show they deserve.
	Following receipt of the Select Committee on Business, Innovation and Skills report, which raised questions about Professor Ebdon’s presentational skills, Ministers considered carefully whether the report presented any new, relevant facts about the candidate’s suitability for the post. As the Chair of the Select Committee—I think he is here now—has said today:
	“It is clear that both Vince Cable and David Willetts feel Professor Ebdon is the right man for the job.”
	He has also said today:
	“The committee’s report was advisory only; the secretary of state was under no obligation to follow our recommendations.
	I am pleased to note that both Mr Cable and Professor Ebdon have taken the committee’s concerns seriously and strongly agree that Professor Ebdon should appear before the committee at regular intervals,”
	as he will. After due consideration, I have decided to proceed with the appointment.

James Clappison: Let me make it clear that, in the questions that I want to ask, I in no way want to express any disrespect for Professor Ebdon, who is an academic of great distinction. However, there are questions to be answered.
	I think the Secretary of State has rather tiptoed around the question of the Select Committee’s approach, because my understanding is that the Committee did not express confidence in Professor Ebdon and suggested that the advertising process—indeed, the whole process—be reopened with a view to appointing a different candidate as the director of OFFA. Is the Secretary of State aware that this is only the second time that a Select Committee has been overruled in this way? The first such occasion did not set a particularly happy precedent. What effect does he think his decision will have on the authority and standing of Select Committees of this House, and on the confirmation processes that they carry out? Although he may technically have the power to overrule the Select Committee, is it not deeply unsatisfactory for him to have done so with this appointment?
	What confidence can students, universities and parents have in this appointee if the Select Committee does not have confidence in him? What confidence can the public have in the appointment, when the Select Committee says in its conclusion that
	“we were not convinced by Professor Ebdon’s descriptions of the root causes of the obstacles to accessing universities”—
	something that is rather more fundamental than the presentational skills to which the Secretary of State referred?
	Would not the implementation of the views expressed by Professor Ebdon, to the Select Committee and elsewhere, have serious consequences for the achievement of high standards in our universities? How can the Secretary of State say that he believes in the principles of university autonomy and admissions on merit when his appointee says that he is prepared to threaten universities with what he chose to describe as the “nuclear option” of fines and deprivation if they do not meet his centrally decreed targets?
	Finally, may I gently remind the Secretary of State, and his Liberal Democrat colleagues who are here today, what he and they promised in their 2010 manifesto, when they said that they would
	“Strengthen the House of Commons to increase accountability,”
	and
	“increase Parliamentary scrutiny…of government appointments”?
	How does he square what he has done in this case with that promise? Or is it the case that his hands were tied by the coalition and he has been forced to carry out this process?

Vincent Cable: I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s positive and generous introductory comments about Professor Ebdon, which were absolutely right. I also congratulate him on a report that he and three of his colleagues produced this morning, entitled “Achieving Fair Access: Removing Barriers, Realising Potential”. I agree with much of it. We are all concerned with the same objectives; the issue is one of how this should be done and the balance between the responsibilities of universities and those of schools, but we have much in common in terms of what we are trying to achieve.
	The hon. Gentleman mentioned the authority of the Select Committee, whose Chairman I have quoted. The hon. Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) is right to say that we must treat Select Committees with respect, and we do so. The obligation on me, as Secretary of State, was to establish whether any new evidence had emerged from the hearings, and I found that none had. Had the report been unanimous and based on cross-party consensus, we might have responded differently to it, but it was not.
	The hon. Gentleman has been very eloquent on this subject, and I know that he is anxious that we should not introduce prescriptive quotas for admission to universities. That is his primary concern. Let me be clear that that is not Government policy and it is not the policy of OFFA. The independence of universities in regard to admissions is enshrined in law, and Professor Ebdon has gone firmly on record as saying that he will respect the diversity of the sector and its institutional autonomy.

Chuka Umunna: Let me start by congratulating the Business Secretary on securing his preferred appointment to this post. We have no objection to it. We have other concerns, however. Notwithstanding the support of the Minister in Antarctica, the distinct impression has been given that this appointment has been secured as part of some trade-off in the ongoing turf war in Government over higher education policy. Is that the case? It has been well briefed that the Education Secretary is thoroughly opposed to this appointment and, indeed, to the Business Secretary’s continued responsibility for our universities. The sector needs certainty in order to plan, and this turf war is deeply unhelpful. We are firmly of the view that higher education policy should remain the responsibility of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. What assurances can he give us that that will remain the case?
	Mr Ebdon has served the universities sector very well for more than 40 years. He knows a thing or two about the higher education sector; some might say that he knows considerably more than many of his critics on the Conservative Benches. Does the Business Secretary agree that the opprobrium heaped on Mr Ebdon by Conservative Members will do nothing to encourage others to come forward and take up high-profile public positions of this sort?
	Finally, does the Business Secretary agree that we should not lose sight of the purpose of this appointment? The Office for Fair Access was set up to promote and safeguard fair access to higher education for lower income and other under-represented groups. What are the right hon. Gentleman’s achievements to date in increasing access? He has trebled tuition fees, overseen a cut in student places of 15,000 and presided over a 7.4% drop in university applications this year compared with last year. The appointment of Mr Ebdon today does not alter those salient facts.

Vincent Cable: On the hon. Gentleman’s first, rather desperate, point about turf wars, let me make it absolutely clear that this is a Government appointment that is supported by all my colleagues, and that responsibilities for higher education will remain exactly as they are. On his more general point about access, I am sure that he will have been following the recent evidence on UCAS
	admissions. Contrary to the Opposition’s predictions of doom and gloom, applications from low-income students have been almost wholly unaffected by the changes in the financing arrangements. This owes a great deal not just to the outreach work—particularly that led by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes)—but to the very generous provisions that have been put in place for scholarships and other support for low-income families. Access to universities has been considerably enhanced as a result of these changes and not in any way diminished.

Rob Wilson: I welcome the fact that the Secretary of State has dropped the plan to charge students interest on early repayment of their loans. Does he accept, however, the overwhelming evidence set out in the report today showing that skewed access to our top universities is the result not of a failure of admissions policy but of a lack of adequate preparation in our secondary schools?

Vincent Cable: I should congratulate the hon. Gentleman as a co-author of this very good report on fair access—on removing barriers and realising potential. I repeat that I agree with much of what it says. The problem that the authors of the report have produced is, I think, the creation of an artificial binary distinction by claiming that access to universities is entirely an issue of schools’ policies as opposed to the admissions policies of universities. Clearly, there is an element of both, and a great deal needs to be done to raise performance levels in schools, as the hon. Gentleman and his co-authors have argued, but equally there is an obligation on universities, as this excellent report says, to help raise aspirations by improving the quality of choices of A-level subjects and making other such advances.

Adrian Bailey: The Secretary of State is correct to say that issues arising from Professor Ebdon’s interview were raised in the Select Committee on Business, Innovation and Skills, and those issues will have been raised with him. However, the clear political dividing line in the subsequent voting demonstrates that a political perspective was involved in the final decision. I think that is regrettable; it is the first time my Committee has ever produced a report that was not founded on a unanimous, consensual basis. Will the Secretary of State assure me that, contrary to the press speculation, there was not some sort of back-room deal to offset an allowance for early repayment of tuition fees in return for ratifying this appointment?

Vincent Cable: I thank the Chairman of the Select Committee for his role: he has made his own views clear while protecting the integrity of his Committee, which is his duty in Parliament. As far as this so-called deal is concerned, there is no such deal. We have made it clear for some time that we intended to listen to the results of the consultation on prepayment. This consultation was absolutely clear that this was not an attractive way forward, so we have pursued other ways of assuming a fair and progressive system of graduate contributions.

Charles Kennedy: I welcome my right hon. Friend’s decision, the reasoning behind it and the appointment. On the last point that he dealt with—the so-called back-room deal—there will
	be considerable reassurance politically, but also among the academic and would-be student community, from the statement he has made. Will he emphasise again that the spin and speculation we have seen in the media over the past few days to that effect is no more than just spin and speculation, and that there is no substance to it at all?

Vincent Cable: Yes, I can give my right hon. Friend absolute assurance on that score. I would like to pay tribute to him for the work he has done on universities, particularly on promoting fair access, for many years.

Kevin Brennan: Before he went off to the south pole, did the Universities Minister say, “I’m just going out. I may be some time”? Will the Secretary of State give us an absolute assurance that no Minister communicated with any Conservative member of the Select Committee in an attempt to influence the ratification of this appointment?

Vincent Cable: It would have been quite improper to have done so. To the best of my knowledge, that has certainly not happened. The decision is a Government decision, and we all stand behind it.

Brian Binley: I am sure that you would want me to reassure you, Mr Speaker, that no plot whatsoever—preordained or otherwise—was organised within the Select Committee, causing it to reach the decision that it reached, by Conservative Members. However, given that the Committee was unable to endorse Professor Ebdon’s appointment and instead called for a new recruitment exercise, is it not deeply regrettable that Ministers have been so unwilling to engage with its concerns? Does this exercise not prompt serious questions about Ministers’ approach to higher education, especially as training appears to have been given more priority than the views of Parliament?

Vincent Cable: I would never accuse the hon. Gentleman of plotting. I know that he is a totally straightforward and much respected colleague. I will say, however, that what we have engaged with is a very thorough process. We went through two rounds of applications in order to attract a high-quality applicant for this important post, and Professor Ebdon and the other two gentlemen who made the final shortlist were regarded as eminently appointable by independents on a completely non-political basis.

Ann McKechin: As the Secretary of State will know, I concurred with his decision about the appointment. Does he share my concern about the apparently organised campaign of vilification against Professor Ebdon in the Tory media, many of whose members are friends of the Secretary of State for Education? Will he also tell me how the Secretary of State for Education will help the professor in his new role?

Vincent Cable: The one aspect of the so-called campaign of vilification that does concern me is that slights have been cast on the reputation of Professor Ebdon’s university, which is in fact excellent. Here are some of the key facts: 90% of the university’s graduates are engaged in
	work or further study within six months; last year it was given one of the Queen’s Awards for Enterprise; it was given top quality assurance in the most recent audit; and, in the most recent research assessment exercise, it was complimented on its world-class research. Those are the things that we should remember about Professor Ebdon’s achievements in his existing university.

Richard Fuller: Six months ago, it was my pleasure to present Professor Ebdon with a lifetime achievement award. I think that some of my hon. Friends may have wished that that had been the end of his career.
	Is it not true that Professor Ebdon has brought analytical rigour to all the tasks that he has undertaken, that he has over 40 years of experience in the sector, and that if we continue to heap public opprobrium on people who step forward to serve their country—as was the case with Stephen Hester, and as has been the case with Professor Ebdon in the press—fewer people will step forward to give our country that help?

Vincent Cable: I consider that to be a very fair and generous assessment of Professor Ebdon by, I believe, the local Member of Parliament.

Paul Blomfield: I congratulate the Secretary of State on his statement, on behalf of, I believe, the majority of members of the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee. Will he, however, answer the question put by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West (Kevin Brennan)? Can he give a categorical assurance that no pressure was brought to bear on Conservative members of the Committee in the ambush of Professor Ebdon at the pre-confirmation hearing?

Vincent Cable: I have already answered that question. I have explained very clearly that the decision was made jointly by me and my coalition colleague, the Universities Minister. No pressure was brought to bear on us; we made a decision on the merits of the case.

Philip Davies: It comes as no surprise that the Secretary of State wants to appoint someone who is moving the agenda of social engineering forward and the agenda of merit backward, but just so that we can sort out the wheat from the chaff on the Back Benches, will he be specific about which Ministers in his Department were in favour of the appointment and which were against it, and about how many Ministers in the Government contacted him privately to express their concerns about it?

Vincent Cable: I have just answered that question. The Universities Minister and I were involved in the decision, and it was made by us and by no one else. As for the general political drift of the hon. Gentleman’s question, I think it fair to point out—as some of the national newspapers did not—that among the institutions that Professor Ebdon has advised on higher education policy is the Conservative party.

Kevin Barron: rose—[Interruption.]

Mr Speaker: Order. I want to hear from the right hon. Member for Rother Valley (Mr Barron) and I hope that that House will be courteous enough to allow me to do so.

Kevin Barron: When a Select Committee reaches a conclusion on an overtly party political basis, it is easy for the Executive to ignore it, and the Committee should not be used in this way. Is the Secretary of State concerned that people seeking such appointments in the future will not want to put themselves through the machine that has been set against Les Ebdon in the past few months, in the media and elsewhere, and that we will end up with a second XI batting for Britain, not a first XI?

Vincent Cable: This is a first-class appointment, which was arrived at in a proper, open and fair manner. As I said, I welcome the role that the Select Committee plays; I used to serve on the Treasury Committee, and the critical reviews it gave the members of the Monetary Policy Committee were very valuable. Critical comments have been made in this case, they have been addressed by Professor Ebdon and by me, and he will therefore come before the Select Committee on a regular basis to report. I think that the Select Committee scrutiny process has been very valuable.

Julian Huppert: I have the privilege of representing three excellent universities. Clearly, the head of OFFA has a lot of work to do to balance improved access and high standards. Will my right hon. Friend assure me that Professor Ebdon will get full governmental support in his role, particularly from the Department for Education, because far too many pupils, particularly those from black and ethnic minority backgrounds and those who receive free school meals, are still not given the chance to reach their full potential while they are at school?

Vincent Cable: My hon. Friend is absolutely right to stress that the origins of the access problem and the lack of fair access are frequently found in the schools—I think that that was the point of the original question—not just in university admissions. It is important to pay tribute to the reforms that my colleague the Secretary of State for Education is making, in terms of improving standards and the introduction of the pupil premium, for which my hon. Friend and I have campaigned. It will undoubtedly raise standards in schools.

Nicholas Dakin: I congratulate the Secretary of State on sticking to his guns, but what message does he think this political football chaos and confusion about this appointment sends to prospective students and their families?

Vincent Cable: I think it sends a very positive message that public appointments are open to scrutiny and that the best person gets the job.

Douglas Carswell: On 19 October 2009, the then Conservative Opposition obtained an urgent question following the decision by a Labour Minister to appoint the Children’s Commissioner in defiance of the relevant Select Committee. In April 2010, the Liberal Democrats published a manifesto
	which stated, on page 88, that they would give Parliament power to approve Government appointments. Why has the Minister failed to respect the views of the legislature on this occasion when he had promised to do so?

Vincent Cable: Both the Chairman of the Select Committee and I have already answered the hon. Gentleman’s question. We treat the Select Committee’s report and the legislature with respect. Criticisms have been made and they will be addressed through the Select Committee. This is a good process and we will continue to uphold it.

Ian Lucas: Between 2006 and 2010, five students only from Wrexham were admitted to Oxford university—regrettably, there was no right of appeal to the Select Committee on Business, Innovation and Skills. Does the Secretary of State agree that admission by interview prevents transparent consideration of admissions criteria and of the effect of those criteria?

Vincent Cable: I do not want to get into criticising universities. I have already made it very clear that they are independent bodies responsible for their own admissions policies. The access agreements that they sign will improve access—that is why those agreements are in place and that is what Professor Ebdon is there to do. I do not, as a Minister, want to lecture universities on how they admit particular students.

Edward Leigh: After 50 years of comprehensive education, why do we have this tragedy that only 50 pupils receiving free school meals are getting into the top universities? How are we going to solve this? The Secretary of State says that he is not going to dumb down standards. Is it not a fact that the era of the greatest social mobility—the most opportunities for poor people—was when there was a grammar school in every town?

Mr Speaker: In answering, the Secretary of State will want to focus on the appointment of the director of the Office for Fair Access.

Vincent Cable: The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to say that I have no intention of dumbing down standards. The access agreements that are being reached through OFFA and which will be implemented by Professor Ebdon will not dumb down standards either.

Katy Clark: As a member of the Select Committee who attended the hearings and was aware that all the Conservative members attended for the full meeting and made the strongest possible representations opposing the appointment, may I ask the Secretary of State whether he was aware before the Committee met that it was likely that Conservative MPs were going to try to block the appointment?

Vincent Cable: No, I was not aware, and it is not appropriate for me to investigate how the Select Committee came to its conclusions. I have already responded to it, and its Chairman, in a very proper way, has set out how it operates.

Anne Main: It is notable that, having defied the Select Committee, there have been no comments about why a minority report was not produced
	in the event that some people did not concur with the findings of the Select Committee. I therefore suggest that, by ignoring the Select Committee, we are doing a disservice to those Members who spent time considering the representations to the Committee. May I urge the Secretary of State to give the House an assurance that we will not allow the nuclear option to discriminate against pupils from high-achieving schools such as mine in St Albans?

Vincent Cable: I have already made it clear that there is no question of discriminating against people with ability. My constituency has two of the most successful independent schools in the country. I fully support their activities, and frequently visit them and work with them, so there is no question whatever of discrimination. Access is a much broader concept: it is helping people to realise their potential, and what can possibly be wrong with that?

Gregg McClymont: As someone who spent several years as an admissions tutor in one of our leading universities, may I tell the Secretary of State that it is difficult to make judgments on the merits of individual applicants? Contextual data are absolutely critical in trying to achieve a fair admissions process, so will he endorse their use?

Vincent Cable: Contextual data are already used by universities, including both Oxbridge universities, as a useful aid to establishing someone’s potential, but it is not the Government’s job to prescribe particular systems of admission, and we have no intention of going down that road.

Peter Bottomley: May I join my right hon. Friend in paying tribute to our colleagues who, in the fair access report, have drawn attention to the need for aspiration, attainment and eligibility while preserving autonomy and excellence? Will he work with the Department for Education so that what Michael Rutter discovered in the 15,000 hours study—and with the 70,000 hours that people spent outside school in preparation for university or college—will make it less necessary to have any kind of OFFA in future? In time, the Secretary of State should seek the abolition of the office, so that people can, on merit, grow up and, on merit, be considered by universities and colleges.

Vincent Cable: I am among the people who paid tribute to that report, and I acknowledge that there is a lot of good material in it. One of the things that it emphasised was the importance of helping with aspirations in schools, changing the expectation that many people have that they have no prospect of going to university, and working at the level of individual schools. I think we will continue to see OFFA concentrating on that, and not on penalties of various kinds, about which some hon. Members appear to be concerned.

Simon Hughes: Given that both coalition parties are committed to improving social mobility and that the Office for Fair Access is increasingly important as an agent for doing that, is it not right that the director should be qualified,
	determined and tough? Professor Ebdon, like Sir Martin Harris, amply fulfils that requirement, and will be an excellent leader to change what universities so far have sometimes failed sufficiently to do.

Vincent Cable: Yes, that is a very good summary of the conclusions that the Minister for Universities and Science and I reached after interviewing Professor Ebdon and the other candidates.

Diana Johnson: What message does the open political split in the Government sends to universities, given their responsibility to provide the reality of fair access to all our youngsters?

Vincent Cable: I think that universities will be greatly reassured that they have an excellent man to lead OFFA in future, as Sir Martin Harris has done in the past. It has been a good process, we have a good outcome, and universities have absolutely nothing to be afraid of.

Nicola Blackwood: As someone who once conducted interviews of undergraduates at Oxford, my experience is that Oxford was a university that admits on merit, rather than considering the background of candidates, and was always looking for ways to widen access. Oxford spends double the sector average on financial support for lowest income students, but given concerns expressed today about Professor Ebdon’s appointment, does the Secretary of State agree that decisions about admissions to universities must remain the ultimate decision of those universities, as they are best placed to make that judgment?

Vincent Cable: Yes, of course I agree, and I repeat what I have said several times in the past. Indeed, the ultimate assurance that the hon. Lady has are the terms of the legislation under which OFFA operates, the Higher Education Act 2004, which said that the director of OFFA
	“has a duty to protect academic freedom”,
	including determining
	“the criteria for the admission of students”.
	That is absolute.

John Baron: May I press the Secretary of State on whether he agrees that the quota policy espoused by Professor Ebdon puts the cart before the horse, and whether we should be pushing schools to produce better students, rather than tempering our universities’ freedom to choose students on merit? Otherwise both students and universities will ultimately suffer.

Vincent Cable: As far as I am aware, Professor Ebdon has never advocated the use of quotas. He is certainly not on record that I have seen.

Peter Bone: This is a case of Parliament v. the Executive. On only two occasions have Select Committees not endorsed a senior appointment, one of which was under Labour. When we were in opposition, we created merry hell about it and said that the Executive were ignoring Parliament. What is different this time?

Vincent Cable: What is different is that the Executive are not ignoring Parliament. We are aware of the criticisms that were made of Professor Ebdon’s interview and we
	have asked him to appear on a regular basis before the Select Committee to demonstrate that he has its full confidence. That is what is different.

Stephen Lloyd: Over the past few days there has been an enormous amount of media hype of the issue and some hyperbolic language, “social engineering” being one of the terms used. To get down to some facts, more than 20 Oxbridge colleges made no offers to black students for undergraduate courses in 2009, with one college not having admitted a single black student for five years. Meanwhile, four elite independent schools have sent more pupils to Oxbridge than 2,000 state schools. Would the Secretary of State—

Mr Speaker: Order. May I very gently say to the hon. Gentleman that there is a lot to get through, so I feel sure he will reach a question mark before very long?

Stephen Lloyd: Will the Secretary of State confirm that the new director of fair access will have sufficient resources to make a real difference to this deplorable record?

Vincent Cable: Yes, he will. He has been given additional resources in order to do his job properly. The issue on which my hon. Friend focuses, under-representation of at least some ethnic groups, is a particular focus of the letter that I, together with the Universities Minister, sent to the previous director as something that he should work on.

Mark Field: Given that the Secretary of State feels that it is his role to intervene in these matters, will he tell us how many pupils who qualify for free school meals should be going to Oxbridge by the end of Professor Ebdon’s tenure? If that number is not reached, will he intervene yet again on Professor Ebdon?

Vincent Cable: I have not intervened beyond making the appointment, and Professor Ebdon has clear terms of reference. But since the hon. Gentleman has set out a standard, let me remind him and other colleagues of the current position. Pupils from independent schools are 55 times more likely to go to Oxbridge than children with free school meals. That is the imbalance that we are trying to address.

David Nuttall: Does the Secretary of State agree that the brightest pupils from the poorest backgrounds would be far better off if, regardless of who its director is, the Office for Fair Access, which as far as I can see is no more than an expensive and unnecessary quango that is engaged in social engineering, was scrapped and the money used to support directly the outreach programmes of our top universities?

Vincent Cable: Actually, one of the main purposes of OFFA will be to promote those outreach programmes and to draw from the lessons and experience of different outreach programmes, which as far as I am aware have not been systematically evaluated. That will be one of Professor Ebdon’s tasks.

Stephen Williams: Fair access, particularly to research intensive universities, is of paramount importance, because it is from that body that the media, the professions, and membership of this House are drawn. In the four and a half years that I shadowed higher education for the Liberal Democrats in the last Parliament, I met more than 100 vice-chancellors, and Les Ebdon sticks in my mind as someone who is passionately committed to the agenda of widening participation and fair access in particular. I congratulate my right hon. Friend on the appointment, and I hope that he will give Professor Ebdon all the support that he will need for the very important job that lies ahead.

Vincent Cable: Yes, indeed. Despite the considerable cuts that the Government have had to make as part of fiscal consolidation, we have made commitments to increase the resources available to OFFA and substantially to increase the scholarship programme, of which my hon. Friend is aware and, I think, was one of the architects.

Elizabeth Truss: Only 50% of comprehensive school sixth forms offer further maths, which is a requirement to study maths and physics at most of the top universities. I am very concerned that we are getting a mismatch between what students are able to do and what universities are able to offer. What specific steps will the Secretary of State and OFFA take to ensure that there is more availability of this important subject in schools so that our students can go on to study maths and science?

Vincent Cable: The hon. Lady is quite right that that is one of the major problems. As I recall, under the last Government, a report was commissioned by the Department for Education and Skills from Professor Smith, which looked specifically at mathematics teaching in schools, as a result of which I think that there has been a significant increase in the recruitment of maths teachers and the level at which maths is now taught.

Henry Smith: Will the Secretary of State consider establishing an advisory body for OFFA so that a range of opinions can be considered?

Vincent Cable: Yes, we will do that. As I understand it, this does not require legislation, and we are looking at the feasibility of doing that and how to get the best advantage from it.

Philip Hollobone: Given that explaining the Government’s new access arrangements and the new tuition fee regime is a complicated task at best, why is the Secretary of State prepared to appoint somebody who has doubtful presentation skills?

Vincent Cable: He may well have had doubtful presentation skills on this particular occasion, but he is the spokesman for a substantial group of universities, million+, and I do not think that it underestimates his ability to present his case.

Several hon. Members: rose —

Mr Speaker: Order. I am grateful to the Secretary of State and to colleagues.

UK Border Agency

Theresa May: With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on border security. In November last year, it became apparent that certain border security checks had been suspended without ministerial approval. As a result, the head of the UK Border Force was suspended with immediate effect, full controls were reinstated, and I commissioned John Vine, the independent chief inspector of the UK Border Agency, to report on what had happened. Today, I have laid the report before the House and copies will be available from the Vote Office.
	The Vine report reveals that security checks carried out at the border have been suspended regularly and applied inconsistently since at least 2007. In June of that year, Ministers accepted a policy that allowed the limited suspension of warnings index checks on certain health and safety grounds, but the Vine report found that those checks were suspended on many occasions for other reasons.
	In July 2008, Ministers approved the relaxation of warnings index checks for school coach parties at specified French ports, but the Vine report found that the Border Force had waived checks for other passenger groups over and above what had been approved by Ministers. The report also uncovered evidence that, between 2007 and 2011, warnings index checks were not carried out on European economic area nationals travelling to the UK on Eurostar services from a number of French resorts. This is likely to have resulted in 500,000 EEA nationals not being checked against the warnings index. To put those numbers into context, around 100 million passengers enter the UK each year. These Eurostar passengers are judged to be low risk and they still had their passports checked, but the fact remains that these suspensions were completely unauthorised and that is simply not acceptable.
	The Vine report is clear that the risk to the border needs to be kept in perspective. No one was waved through, everyone had their passports checked, and warnings index checks were almost always carried out so that those who had previously come to the attention of the authorities would still be identified and refused entry. Quite reasonably, Ministers in the previous Government gave permission for warnings index checks to be suspended in limited circumstances, but the report shows that the Border Force went much further, suspending those checks in unauthorised circumstances and abandoning them entirely for some passengers. The report is clear that that happened without the authorisation of Ministers in either this or the previous Government.
	The report also makes it clear that the suspension of checks of which I informed the House in November occurred without ministerial approval. I have just described the suspensions of warnings index checks, which date back several years, but the report also finds that secure ID, the system for checking the fingerprints of foreign nationals who require a visa to come to Britain, was suspended on a number of occasions without ministerial approval. Although the report makes it clear that there should have been a policy setting out the use of secure
	ID when it was introduced from 2009, it finds that Ministers and senior Border Force officials believed that secure ID should be a mandatory check.
	In May 2011, when officials asked for permission sometimes to suspend secure ID checks, I explicitly refused. The report finds that, despite that clear instruction, secure ID checks continued to be suspended at Heathrow. It also confirms that checks on the biometric chip, which contains a second photograph and no further information, were sometimes suspended without ministerial approval.
	The report makes it clear that the suspensions of checks were, as I told the House last year, entirely separate from the pilot I authorised. I remind the House that that pilot meant that in limited circumstances EEA national children travelling with their parents or as part of a school group would be checked against the warnings index only when assessed by a Border Force official to be a credible risk. It also allowed Border Force officials the discretion, in limited circumstances, to judge when to open the biometric chip, which contains a second photograph, in the passports of EEA nationals.
	The pilot was designed to focus resources on the highest risk passengers and journeys and allow Border Force officers to conduct more targeted, intelligence-led, checks. As the Home Affairs Select Committee concluded, it could have been a promising framework for a new approach to border security. However, as a result of the unauthorised suspension of checks, it is impossible to know fully what effect the pilot had. Although we can remain open-minded about the principle of risk-based checks, they must be implemented only in a controlled and authorised way.
	The Vine report also uncovered a local initiative at Heathrow that allowed students from supposedly low-risk countries to enter the UK even when they did not have the necessary entry clearance. There was no ministerial authorisation for this activity. The report finds that Operation Savant, as it was called, was potentially discriminatory and unlawful. The Home Office permanent secretary is undertaking a review of this activity and will decide whether any disciplinary action should follow. That review will report by the end of March.
	The Vine report reveals a Border Force that suspended important checks without permission; spent millions on new technologies but chose not to use them; was led by managers who did not communicate with their staff; and sent reports to Ministers that were inaccurate, unbalanced and excluded key information. The report makes a series of recommendations on how to improve the operation at the border, and I accept them all. Many of them we are already implementing, and the rest we will implement in full. Most importantly, I want to make it clear to the House that all the suspensions detailed in the report have now been stopped. We will shortly issue an operating policy on the use of secure ID fingerprint checks, and we will follow it up by implementing a new operating mandate for border control. This will detail the minimum level of mandatory checks for all passengers; set out which additional checks apply to which groups of passengers; and cover the opening of chips on passports, interviews for visa holders and the use of secure ID. It will detail explicitly the additional checks that border officers can apply at their discretion. It will specify the record-keeping standards to be maintained and make it clear that no unauthorised suspension of checks is acceptable under any circumstances.
	As part of our wider work to improve the border, we have already made a number of other important improvements. We have separated immigration policy work from operations. We have created a Strategy and Intelligence Directorate to analyse intelligence; measure performance; develop rules, procedures and guidance; and monitor compliance with those rules. We have established a new UKBA training academy to raise professional standards and are reviewing service standards for queuing times and staffing levels. But I do not believe that the answer to the very significant problems exposed in the Vine report is just a series of management changes. The Border Force needs a whole new management culture, and I can tell the House today that I have appointed Brian Moore, currently the chief constable of Wiltshire police, as the interim head of the Border Force. In addition, from next year the new National Crime Agency will be charged with improving our intelligence capability at the border, investigating serious and organised border crime and tasking law enforcement assets across all the relevant agencies.
	There are many hard-working and dedicated members of staff in the Border Force. They want to get on with their work securing our border, and I want to make it clear that this report is in no way a criticism of them, but, as the Home Affairs Committee and its Chairman have argued consistently, there is no getting away from the fact that UKBA, of which the Border Force is part, has been a troubled organisation since it was founded in 2008. From foreign national prisoners to the asylum-seeker backlog and the removal of illegal immigrants, it has reacted to a series of problems instead of positively managing its responsibilities.
	I believe that, with a new chief executive and a plan for comprehensive change, UKBA is in better hands for the future, but I believe also that the extent of the transformational change required—in the agency’s casework functions and in the Border Force—is too great for one organisation. I can therefore tell the House that from 1 March the UK Border Force will split from UKBA and become a separate operational command, with its own ethos of law enforcement, led by its own director general and accountable directly to Ministers.
	Many of the changes that I have outlined today cannot happen overnight; they will take time, but we will make them as quickly as possible. They will ensure not only that we have a stronger border in future, but that the Border Force becomes the disciplined law enforcement organisation that it was established to be. I commend this statement to the House.

Yvette Cooper: I thank the Home Secretary for early sight of her statement, in which she makes important points about the fiascos at our border last summer, but it does not cover everything in the report from John Vine. In less than the hour that we have had to look at the report, we have found that it says something very different from the points that the Home Secretary has made.
	For example, on the watch index checks from Calais, the Home Secretary’s statement today gives the House reason to believe that the problems had been going on since 2007. In fact, the watch index checks were suspended
	zero times in 2007, zero times in 2008, six times in 2009, 33 times in 2010 and 50 times in the first nine months of 2011. The report states:
	“Although the figure for 2011 only covered nine months to the end of September, this represented a 51% increase over the previous year. The Agency should assess whether this increase can be attributed to changes in port infrastructure, increases in passenger numbers, a reduction in staff or a combination of all three.”
	So the clear suggestion in the report is that a lack of staff may have increased the problems at the UK Border Agency in the past year, but the Home Secretary in her statement to Parliament has hidden that information.
	On secure ID, the report states that it was suspended 482 times under this Government. The Immigration Minister approved the reduction in secure ID checks as part of the risk-based approach in January 2011, and again the Home Secretary has not explained how far Ministers’ authorisation, even if provisional, contributed to the downgrading of secure ID checks.
	On the Immigration Minister’s further agreement to proposals, the report quotes the former head of the Border Force, who said:
	“The Immigration Minister was clear that this did not require Home Secretary sign-off and he had followed up with a note stating that we should progress with the implementation.”
	Time and again the Home Secretary has not set out the full information in the report.
	On the level 2 pilots, the report is clear that they were downgraded over 2,000 times. That is not occasional, or under the “limited circumstances” that the Home Secretary told us about last year.
	We have asked the Home Secretary before about the operational instruction that states:
	“We will cease routinely opening the chip within EEA passports.”
	She told the House on 9 November 2011 that that operational instruction did reflect Government policy, and that is the very guidance that led to checks being downgraded 2,000 times, for hours at a time, covering huge numbers of people.
	On page 12, the report states:
	“We found that the language used in both the ‘Summer pressures’ submission to Ministers and the response provided, was not clear and as a result was open to misinterpretation… For example, the written response from the Home Secretary’s office said that ‘the change in checks should not be a routine measure but only used when the queues get beyond a reasonable length.’ As the key terms were not clearly defined, we found this had been interpreted and operated in different ways at different ports.”
	The report is clear that:
	“Given the importance of decisions to suspend border security checks, it is imperative that the language used is absolutely clear and unambiguous.”
	Clearly, the language from the Home Secretary’s private office was not clear and unambiguous, and that led to huge confusion in the Border Force across the country.
	There is no evidence in the report of proper monitoring by Ministers. It is scathing about the way in which checks were downgraded and talks about unauthorised activity. Why on earth were Ministers not asking for information and not properly monitoring the pilot that they had authorised and introduced? One of the updates, which it appears did not go to Ministers, makes it clear that secure ID was suspended as part of the checks over the summer. Why did that update not go to Ministers
	and why did they not ask for that information? Why did they accept only three updates over the course of the summer, when seven were provided? Why were Ministers not visiting the ports to ensure that the pilot that they had introduced was being properly implemented? Ministers decided to roll back the principle that had been in operation for many years—that we should gradually strengthen and tighten our border checks, using new technology and biometrics—and to introduce a huge experiment with border security. They made no proper checks to see what was happening during the fiasco last summer.
	Finally, when confronted last November with the problems that had arisen, the Home Secretary told us that
	“initial UKBA statistics show an almost 10% increase in the detection of illegal immigrants and a 48% increase in the identification of forged documents compared with the year before.”—[Official Report, 9 November 2011; Vol. 535, c. 318.]
	She said that that had happened as a result of her pilots. However, the facts in the report show something very different. The Heathrow data alone show that the number of people refused entry was more than 100 lower each month—not higher—compared with 2010. The official statistics show a 10% drop in the number of non-asylum seekers who were stopped at ports compared with the previous year. Will the Home Secretary take this opportunity to apologise to the House for giving it premature and inaccurate information about the supposed success of her pilots, when clearly they were a huge failure in controlling the border?
	The Home Secretary told us that her pilots did not weaken border security. The report states that
	“it is not possible to quantify the extent of the risk that these measures presented to the border.”
	The implications of that for our border are very serious, yet the Home Secretary continues to hide. She has hidden behind a report and not set out its full consequences, just as she has blamed officials, hidden from the media and hidden behind spurious statistics. In opposition, she said of a former Immigration Minister:
	“I’m sick and tired of…government ministers…who simply blame other people when things go wrong.”
	That is what she is doing now. It is time for her to stop hiding and to take responsibility for things that have happened on her watch: the unclear instructions from her office, the policy decisions to downgrade our border controls, the failure to monitor and check what was going on, and her failure to take responsibility. This mess escalated on her watch with every month that went by. Unless she accepts responsibility for this fiasco, she will fail to sort it out and she will fail to reassure the House that she can cope with future fiascos and that she is the Home Secretary to keep our borders secure.

Theresa May: The shadow Home Secretary’s mock outrage would have rather greater credibility if she had shown any real interest in immigration or border control at any stage over the year for which she has been doing her job. I remind her that the Vine report states that security checks have been suspended without ministerial authorisation since at least 2007. The suspension of checks of which I told the House in November happened
	without ministerial authorisation, and that unauthorised suspension had nothing to do with the pilot that I authorised last summer.
	The right hon. Lady makes a number of claims in relation to the report. I suggest that she consider her track record on such claims. The Vine report exposes everything that she claimed last November as plain wrong. She said that the pilot was reckless, but the Vine report shows that Labour Ministers approved similar measures. She said that the pilot gave the Border Force the green light to suspend other checks, but the report shows that the suspensions were unauthorised.
	The right hon. Lady said that by sometimes suspending warnings index checks on certain children, we risked an increase in trafficking. Not only is that wrong, but the Vine report makes it clear that Labour Ministers approved the suspension of checks on children. She said that we should have known about the unauthorised suspension of checks, but the Vine report makes it clear that information was withheld from Ministers and that unauthorised suspensions have been going on since at least 2007. She repeated that Labour increased checks on passengers and improved security, but the Vine report shows that it did not.
	The right hon. Lady mentioned information about what happened during the pilot. I did indeed report figures to the House in November. They were the ones that were available at the time, and I faithfully reported them to the House. Since then, the chief inspector has discovered that unauthorised suspensions were made, so it is not possible to give a full picture of what effect the pilot had. We remain open-minded about risk-based checks, but they must be implemented in a controlled and authorised way.
	The right hon. Lady blamed what has happened on cuts. I know that is her Pavlovian response to everything, but I would have thought she had noted that on the second page of the Vine report the chief inspector states that the suspensions were
	“affected by a number of factors including…the numbers of staff deployed”—
	the numbers deployed, not the numbers employed. As with the police, the right hon. Lady seems to find it very difficult to get her head around that. Just in case she has forgotten, I remind her that the previous Government planned to cut UKBA budgets.
	The right hon. Lady talked about information that was available to Ministers about the pilot. I remind her that the Vine report makes it clear that updates to Ministers on the pilot
	“were not balanced…presented an inaccurate picture of performance”
	and
	“could not be relied upon to determine the success or otherwise of Level 2.”
	There is nothing more important than the security of our border, so it is a shame that the right hon. Lady has taken the approach that she has and has not addressed the measures that we are undertaking to secure our border and ensure that the Border Force is the law enforcement agency it should be. We did not hear any of her views on the recommendations in the Vine report, the proposal to take the Border Force out of the UKBA or the proposal to change the approach that the Border Force takes, because she has nothing positive to say about immigration or border security.

John Redwood: As someone who supports what the Home Secretary is trying to do to get better control over our borders and a risk-based approach, may I ask her what explanation she has been offered of the failure of some officials to accept ministerial instructions? There is no point in having Ministers and Parliament if officials ignore everything that they tell them.

Theresa May: Sadly, the chief inspector describes in the report poor communication and poor managerial oversight in the Border Fore. He makes it clear that the information systems within the UKBA and the UK Border Force were not being used properly to enable proper assessments to be made of the proposals that were being made.

Jack Straw: May I take it from what the Home Secretary has said that she agrees with my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary that the number of those refused entry is 100 lower than she claimed, rather than higher? Will she say briefly what she thinks she has learned in the past 18 months about how she manages her Department?

Theresa May: I did not say in November that the overall number of refusals was higher. The report does indeed say that the number of refusals was lower, which was a result of the chief inspector’s investigation of what was happening at the border. We reported to Parliament about certain numbers of individuals who were stopped and about numbers of drug seizures.

Tony Baldry: It is clear from the Vine report that some immigration checks have been suspended since at least 2007 and that they were abandoned without ministerial authority. However, is not the important point that the country and our constituents do not want to hear a lot of huff and puff from Opposition Front Benchers trying to score points but to know that Ministers are now taking action to make our borders more secure? Will my right hon. Friend reiterate to the House, so that the information does not get lost, the new action that she is taking to make sure that our borders are more secure than they have been in the past?

Theresa May: I thank my hon. Friend for his question. He is absolutely right that the public want to know that we are dealing with these issues. That is why I have appointed the chief constable of Wiltshire police to be the interim head of the Border Force and why the Border Force will be separated from UKBA. We will put a much greater focus on the Border Force as a control body that is securing our borders and has a greater emphasis on law enforcement. At the same time, we have made a number of changes to the way in which UKBA operates—for example, we have taken policy away so that there is a greater concentration on operations.

Keith Vaz: I welcome the fact that the Home Secretary is to implement all the recommendations by John Vine. This is about a root and branch reform of a very troubled organisation. She was right not to personalise the matter, because it is a cultural problem to do with the way in which UKBA operates. Only last week, as Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee, I wrote to the chief executive to ask for certain information, which he refused to give. It is very important, not only for UKBA but for the new
	organisation that she is creating, that there should be proper parliamentary scrutiny of the agencies. I warn her that if she does not reform the organisation, it will come back and bite her and other Ministers in future. I therefore welcome her proposals.

Theresa May: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for the serious and constructive way in which he has engaged in his comments. As I said, he and the Home Affairs Committee have consistently, over a number of years, pointed out the problems at UKBA. Through the Vine report, we see in depth the problems that were occurring, particularly in the Border Force. He is absolutely right that this is about a change of culture within the organisation. That is why we have separated the Border Force from UKBA, and we have a new chief executive at UKBA who has already made a number of changes that are starting to change the culture. We will have a new interim head of the Border Force, which will be separate from UKBA, and that can be the start of the culture change, but it does take time to change a culture.

Tom Brake: Will the Home Secretary set out what regular performance assessment of UKBA there will be to ensure that it does not fall back into the ad-hoc, events-driven approach to border security and management that was so prevalent under the previous Government?

Theresa May: We will issue the UK Border Force with a new operating mandate that makes absolutely clear the circumstances in which certain discretion may be applied and which checks should be mandatory at our borders. We are already receiving more detailed reports on what is happening in relation to the Border Force and UKBA. UKBA’s task will be to deliver the Government’s immigration policy, and I am very pleased to say that we intend to deliver that policy by the next general election.

Julie Hilling: Does the Home Secretary agree with the report that it is imperative that the language used by ministers is absolutely clear and unambiguous? If so, does she agree that her key terms were not clearly defined because the pilot was interpreted and operated in different ways in different ports—or will she just blame the officials again?

Theresa May: I assure the hon. Lady that we have looked in detail at every criticism made in the report, and that where it is necessary for changes to take place in the Home Office, they will take place.

Nicola Blackwood: The Home Affairs Committee report found that one primary reason the problem continued for so long undetected was that the chain of communication from Ministers to senior managers to front-line staff at UKBA had become convoluted and fragmented. Today we hear that the Vine report finds that Border Force senior managers felt themselves unaccountable to Ministers. What does the Home Secretary intend to do to put an end to that culture once and for all?

Theresa May: That is one of the issues with how the UKBA was originally set up—it was one those so-called arm’s length agencies. Separating the Border Force from
	UKBA and making it part of the Home Office—the director general will be within the Home Office—means that it will be directly accountable to Ministers.

Stewart Hosie: When the scandal broke last year, it was reported that checks were suspended at Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Prestwick airports. In her previous statement, the Home Secretary said she would be happy to speak to Scottish Ministers about that. What discussions has she had with Scottish Ministers and what discussions did John Vine have with the authorities in Scotland? More importantly, what will the impact of a new Border Force, with its own operational command, be for border and port security in Scotland?

Theresa May: The hon. Gentleman is right to raise the impact on Scotland. We will discuss the impact of the report with Scottish Government Ministers and my hon. Friend the Immigration Minister will write to them today about the implications. We will obviously take up more detailed discussions on the precise operations at official level—[ Interruption. ]

Mr Speaker: Order. I appeal to the hon. Member for Blyth Valley (Mr Campbell) to calm himself. Perhaps he should take up yoga. It is only Monday, and I know that he will want to hang on every word of the Home Secretary—[ Interruption. ] I do not know what he is chuntering about with such good nature from a sedentary position, but it cannot be as interesting as what the Home Secretary has to say.

Michael Ellis: Having heard the bluster from the shadow Home Secretary, will the Home Secretary confirm to the House one thing: that the Vine report entirely vindicates what she and the Immigration Minister said last November, and that all the suspended checks that she told the House about in November occurred without ministerial authorisation?

Theresa May: The report makes it clear that the suspension of checks outside the limited pilot that had been approved took place without ministerial authorisation. The shadow Home Secretary raised an issue in her opening remarks about my hon. Friend the Immigration Minister. He and I have made it clear that his comments on the proposed pilot early last year were provisional; that, crucially, no new operating instructions were issued to staff as a result; that there was no change to policy as a result; that secure ID checks were suspended before January last year until May; and that, sadly, despite my explicit instruction that the checks should not be suspended after May, they continued to be suspended.

Fiona Mactaggart: Does the Vine report include any criticism of, or comment on, the behaviour of Ministers?

Theresa May: The Vine report goes through the facts of what happened over a period in relation to the potential suspension of checks. It makes it clear that, sadly, the UK Border Force was undertaking checks without ministerial authorisation, and that it withheld information from Ministers and gave inaccurate information to them.

Chris Heaton-Harris: Does the Home Secretary agree that because the previous Labour Government were so uninterested in protecting our borders, they allowed the bizarre culture of ignoring ministerial direction to embed itself at the head of the UKBA? Will she assure the House that that culture will not be allowed to continue following this Government’s measures and the Vine report?

Theresa May: The precise reason for separating the UK Border Force from UKBA is to give the UK Border Force a much clearer focus on its key job of maintaining security and conducting controls at our borders. However, I am bound to comment to my hon. Friend that, as he knows well, this Government have a proper immigration policy and are doing our best to control it.

Alun Michael: Does the Home Secretary understand one of the points made by the Home Affairs Committee, which is that the Border Agency, of which the Border Force is a part, is not a separate agency but an integral part of the Home Office, for which she is responsible? Does she accept that communications within the Home Office, including that agency, were poor and sometimes shambolic, which is why officials frequently thought that Ministers knew what Ministers should have known? Will she now publish, alongside the Vine report, the document on which she relied in giving evidence but which she has denied so far to the Home Affairs Committee? Can we have it all out in the open?

Theresa May: I am interested in the comments that the right hon. Gentleman makes about the relationship between Ministers and the UK Border Agency and the UK Border Force. I return to the point I have made previously that of course what we saw was decisions being taken within UK Border Force that were contrary to ministerial authorisation, not just under this Government but under the previous Government as well.

Several hon. Members: rose —

Mr Speaker: Order. There is pressure on time. I am keen to accommodate all colleagues, but to do so I require brevity, to be exemplified by Mr Robert Halfon.

Robert Halfon: Will my right hon. Friend confirm that the suspension of border checks had nothing to do with budget cuts and began under the previous Government when budgets were rising and our immigration system was in a shambles?

Theresa May: My hon. Friend is absolutely correct. The suspension of checks did start under the previous Government. As I told my hon. Friend the Member for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris), this Government have a proper immigration policy and intend to control immigration. We also need to ensure that UK Border Force is the law enforcement agency with control at our borders that we all want it to be.

Paul Goggins: When the Home Secretary made her statement to the House on 7 November, there was some initial confusion about whether Manchester airport was included in the pilot. Can she now confirm how many passengers
	passed through Manchester airport without biometric or fingerprint checks during the period of the pilot that was authorised by Ministers?

Theresa May: I can confirm to the right hon. Gentleman that Manchester airport was indeed part of the pilot scheme, but one of the problems—as shown in the report by the chief inspector—is that some of the record-keeping at ports was not complete in relation to the operation of the pilot and the suspension of checks, and that records were kept on a different basis between different ports. While the chief inspector has put the figures into his report as far as he is able, it is not possible to get the complete picture of the operation of the pilot precisely because the records are incomplete.

James Clappison: I welcome my right hon. Friend’s statement. As part of the culture change to which she refers, will she ask the management of the successor bodies whether they will use English of a type that is understandable to the rest of the English-speaking world?

Theresa May: I am grateful to my hon. Friend and I know that this is a campaign that he pursues at every opportunity. Indeed, when I appeared before the Home Affairs Committee he raised the issue of the language that was being used. We will make every effort to do what he requests.

Nick Raynsford: On occasions such as this, when Opposition Back Benchers have not seen the report that is the subject of the statement, we depend on a comprehensive and non-partisan presentation of the report by the Minister responsible. The Home Secretary has given us the impression that the report is in no way critical of Ministers, but we have heard suggestions that the report does contain criticism of a lack of clarity in the language used by Ministers in their instructions to the Border Agency. Is there criticism in the report, and if so will she apologise for her Department’s failings?

Theresa May: In a number of aspects, the report does indeed refer to the need for greater clarity in communications of all sorts that were taking place in relation to what was happening at the border. That is part of the work that will be done by the Home Office and the UK Border Agency.

Kris Hopkins: The failure of the previous Government to manage our borders and even know how many immigrants had come into the country was rightly punished by the electorate at the election. Does the Home Secretary agree that, unlike Labour, this Government will not tolerate failure by the Border Agency?

Theresa May: Indeed, that is why we are responding fully to the recommendations of the Vine report. Furthermore, as I have made clear to the House, we are changing the structure of the UKBA and the UK Border Force so that we can focus more on the need for the Border Force to secure our borders. That is what people want it to do, and it is what we want it to do.

Stephen McCabe: Given the Home Secretary’s decision to split the Border Force from the UKBA, can we expect a corresponding reduction in the salary of the UKBA’s chief executive to reflect his reduced responsibilities, or will this end up costing us more and adding to the complexity of a situation that Ministers are already struggling to control?

Theresa May: I am happy to remind the hon. Gentleman—I am sure that he is already aware of this—that the current chief executive is paid significantly less than was his predecessor, who was appointed by the previous Labour Government.

Graham Evans: Apart from the political posturing and point-scoring attempted by the shadow Home Secretary last November, will my right hon. Friend remind me when the Opposition Front-Bench team last took the slightest interest in immigration and border control?

Theresa May: I understand that the last time there was an immigration debate in the House, not a single speech was made from the Labour Back Benches.

Meg Hillier: One of the Government’s first acts was to abolish plans to put fingerprints in British passports. We now hear that the Immigration Minister gave the impression to officials that it was okay to implement the suspension of secure identity checks. Does he have the Home Secretary’s full confidence?

Theresa May: Absolutely, and I have already answered the points about the Immigration Minister’s comments. The hon. Lady needs to recognise that secure identity checks were suspended before January/February 2011, that they were suspended until May and sadly, despite the fact that I explicitly said that they should not be suspended in May, they remained suspended. That was without ministerial authorisation. It is high time that she and her right hon. and hon. Friends recognised what was happening without ministerial authorisation.

Philip Hollobone: The establishment of a new operational command for the UK Border Force and the appointment of its interim head sound like positive and constructive steps forward, but they come just five months before the London Olympics. Will the Home Secretary ensure that the interim head has all the resources he needs to cope with the increased number of visitors that this country can expect?

Theresa May: I can assure my hon. Friend that the UK Border Force has already undertaken a great deal of work within the UKBA, and will continue to undertake it, to ensure that we can accommodate people coming to London and other parts of the country for the Olympics and Paralympics. We are doing a great deal of work, including, crucially, with the airport operators.

Charlie Elphicke: A couple of months ago, I toured the border controls at Dover. I would like to make the Home Secretary and the excellent Immigration Minister aware of the following: first, the problems at Calais are the result not of budget cuts but of coaches
	queuing back on to the motorway, causing the police to put pressure on the UKBA to hurry people through; secondly, the previous Government also did nothing about eye scanners that did not work properly; and, thirdly the previous Government supplied laptops that did not work properly and took too long to load up. While she is addressing the problems of the past, will she take an interest in those things too?

Theresa May: My hon. Friend, given his constituency, takes a particular interest in border matters. He is assiduous in dealing with these issues, in liaising with those at Dover port responsible for such matters and in taking up any issues with Ministers. He raised several matters. I am happy to say that despite this weekend being the busiest weekend for returning school coach parties—the thoughts of the House must be with those affected by the terrible school coach accident in France—the UKBA, by working with the French authorities and putting in place mitigating measures, achieved a greater throughput than was achieved previously. There were also fewer problems with coaches on the motorway.

David Nuttall: I welcome the Home Secretary’s announcement of the separation of the UK Border Force as a separate entity, but it is clear that the organisation urgently requires a period of stability. In order to provide it, will she say when she envisages a permanent head being appointed?

Theresa May: We will, of course, be holding an open competition for people to apply for that post. I hesitate to give my hon. Friend a date, because we have to be cognisant of the fact that, with the Olympics and Paralympics coming up, we need to ensure minimum disruption to the Border Force. It is with that in mind that an appointment will be made, at an appropriate time.

Points of Order

Mr Speaker: On a point of order relating to the Code of Conduct, on which no further points of order may arise, I call Mr Mark Simmonds.

Mark Simmonds: It has been brought to my attention that on 31 January and 16 March 2011, I inadvertently omitted to draw the House’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests relating to strategic advice that I provide to a social enterprise health care provider. I would like to take this opportunity both to correct the record and to apologise.

Mr Speaker: We are grateful to the hon. Gentleman.

Iain Wright: On a point of order, Mr Speaker. You may have seen reports last week that while on a conference in India an official from the Office for Nuclear Regulation lost a memory stick containing information and plans relating to Hartlepool nuclear power station. I have yet to be informed of this by the Government. Going back many years, Ministers faced with data loss have come to this House to answer questions and explain their actions. Given that precedent and the paramount importance of securing and safeguarding our civil nuclear industry, is it in order that the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change has chosen not to inform me or to come to this House? What powers do you have, Sir, to ensure that I can receive notification and provide reassurance to my constituents on this important breach of data?

Mr Speaker: It is a matter for Ministers to make statements as and when they judge appropriate, if policy options or announcements are due. From what the hon. Gentleman has said so far, it is not immediately obvious to me that there is any matter of order on which the Chair need rule, but his words are on the record, and I shall take particular pleasure in observing them for a second time when I read the Official Report. If I have any further thoughts on the matter at that point, he will be the first to hear; meanwhile his constituents will know of what he has said.

Angus Robertson: On a point of order, Mr Speaker. As you will be aware, the Scotland Bill is still making its way through Parliament. Last week the Prime Minister made a visit to Scotland, where he announced that he is now in favour of more devolution and that his proposal is “on the table”. Given that the UK Government repeatedly say that a lack of detail about constitutional change causes uncertainty, will you confirm whether Ministers have sought to make a statement about any changes to the Scotland Bill?

Mr Speaker: I can confirm that they have not, and if I were a more cynical fellow than I am, I might be tempted to conclude that the hon. Gentleman was seeking to dress up in the language of constitutionalism an important point—a fundamental point; and, for him, an urgent point—that was nevertheless overwhelmingly a political point. But as I am not so cynical, I will not so conclude.

Backbench Business
	 — 
	[Un-allotted Day]

Iran

Mr Speaker: Because of the level of interest in speaking in this debate, I have imposed an eight-minute limit on most Back-Bench contributions. That does not apply to the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), who is opening the debate. He will be aware of his time limit, to which I know he will faithfully adhere.

John Baron: I beg to move,
	That this House believes that the use of force against Iran would be wholly counterproductive and would serve only to encourage any development of nuclear weapons; and calls upon the Government to rule out the use of force against Iran and reduce tensions by redoubling diplomatic efforts.
	May I start by thanking the Backbench Business Committee for supporting my application to debate this subject today? Statements by the Government allow opportunities to ask a question, but rarely allow a thorough examination of the issue. I also thank those Members who supported me in calling for this debate. Many did not agree with the motion, but all felt that such a debate was long overdue, as is borne out by the number of people who have put in to speak this evening.
	The debate is urgently required. With tough new sanctions in place and further ones threatened by Iran, with naval forces mustering in the Persian gulf and with state-sponsored terrorism ongoing inside and outside Iran, this might be the only opportunity for Back Benchers to discuss the topic before hostilities begin. Israel is contemplating an air strike, and we could be on the brink of a regional war. I called for today’s debate because I believe that we need a fresh approach. The sanctions and the sabre-rattling are yesterday’s failed policies, and the fact that we are once again on the brink of military conflict is testament to that failure. My motion calls on the Government—and, by implication, the west—to rule out the use of force in order to reduce tensions and bring us back from the brink of war and military conflict, and to redouble diplomatic efforts. That would give us time to reflect on some of the inconvenient truths that the west chooses to ignore, and on the need for a fresh approach.
	I shall start by outlining some of the inconvenient truths. The catalyst for the latest round of condemnation was the report published by the International Atomic Energy Agency last November. The United States and the United Kingdom chose to see the report as evidence that Iran was building nuclear weapons, and further financial sanctions followed, which led directly to the storming of the British embassy in Tehran, inexcusable though that was. We should be careful about accepting such reports at face value, however. Close reading of the report reveals no smoking gun: there is no evidence of attempts to produce nuclear weapons, or of a decision to do so.

Robert Halfon: Will my hon. Friend give way?

John Baron: I want to make some progress, then I will try to accommodate all colleagues who wish to intervene.
	The fact that there is no evidence of attempts to produce nuclear weapons or of a decision to do so was confirmed by Peter Jenkins, the UK’s former permanent representative to the IAEA. Robert Kelley, a former director of the agency, highlighted the fact that the report contained only three items that referred to developments after 2004—the year in which the American intelligence services concluded that Iran had ceased its nuclear programme. Indeed, the agency spends 96% of a 14-page annexe reprising what was already known. I therefore ask the Foreign Secretary to highlight for the House today the paragraphs in the report that provide evidence of a nuclear weapons programme. He has referred to this matter many times, but I can see no such evidence in the report. Is he willing to highlight those paragraphs for the benefit of the House now? I am willing to take an intervention from him.

Robert Halfon: Will my hon. Friend give way?

John Baron: I shall just wait for the Foreign Secretary. His silence speaks volumes. I shall therefore take an intervention from my hon. Friend.

Robert Halfon: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way—

Mr Speaker: Order. We cannot have two Members standing up at the same time. The hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) is perfectly tall enough. We can see him; he has nothing to worry about.

Robert Halfon: I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. Is he aware that paragraph 43 of the IAEA report states that Iran worked
	“on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components”?

John Baron: Yes, I am aware of that, but it is not concrete evidence; it is circumstantial—

Martin Horwood: rose —

John Baron: I will take and answer one intervention at a time, if I may.
	We need to be careful when considering the report. Much has been made of the circumstantial evidence and of western intelligence reports, but Iraq should have taught us to be careful about basing our foreign policy decisions on secret intelligence and circumstantial evidence. That is a lesson that we should have learned from Iraq.

Martin Horwood: Another section of the report talks about the
	“acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network”.
	It concludes that:
	“While some of the activities identified in the Annex have civilian as well as military applications, others are specific to nuclear weapons.”
	How else are we to interpret that?

John Baron: That does not answer the actual question. That is circumstantial evidence; it is not concrete evidence of a nuclear weapons programme. It is as straightforward as that. I challenge the hon. Gentleman who asked the question: if he could point to concrete evidence, it would be useful for the House.

Alec Shelbrooke: Will my hon. Friend outline when in his view circumstantial evidence becomes actual evidence—it is when the bomb has dropped, for example?

John Baron: It is very straightforward. There has to be evidence of nuclear weapons. We were told, for example, that there was no shortage of circumstantial evidence about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but it turned out that there were no WMD there. That shows how careful we need to be and how clear we need to be about the difference between circumstantial evidence and concrete evidence.

Paul Flynn: Is the hon. Gentleman aware of any IAEA evidence on Israel’s nuclear weapons programme?

John Baron: The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. In certain quarters in the middle east, it is felt that double standards are being applied in that Israel has developed nuclear weapons and the west does not seem to worry about them. [Interruption.] My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) suggests that the evidence is circumstantial, and I am willing to grant him that point.

Stewart Jackson: Can my hon. Friend name any experts in the field who would explain how enrichment to a 20% threshold, currently being undertaken by the Iranian regime, could plausibly be for civilian and not military use?

John Baron: My hon. Friend makes a fair point, which I will address later in my speech, but I say to him now that there is a world of difference between nuclear capability and actually having nuclear weapons. I am sure that the House would accept that difference.
	A second inconvenient truth relates to the usual depiction of Iran as intransigent and for ever chauvinistic in her foreign policy. Western Governments, I suggest, too easily forget that Iran is not totally at fault here. There have been opportunities to better relations between Iran and the west, but the west has spurned those opportunities. We forget, for example, that following 9/11, Iran—unlike many in the middle east street—expressed solidarity with the US. We forget also that attempts were made to develop contacts during the early stages of the Afghan war. What was Iran’s reward? It was to be labelled or declared part of the “axis of evil” by President Bush, which led directly to the removal of the reformist and moderate President Khatami. Despite that, there were further attempts at co-operation in the run-up to the Iraq war, but those efforts were similarly rebuffed.
	Again, I ask the Foreign Secretary whether he is prepared to deny that the west has made mistakes in its dealings with Iran and has missed opportunities to better relations. I would genuinely like to hear his views on that and would welcome an intervention.

Mike Gapes: rose —

John Baron: If I am not going to get an intervention from the Foreign Secretary, I shall take one from the Labour Back Benches.

Mike Gapes: I am grateful. The hon. Gentleman refers to lost opportunities. Does he agree that the Iranian regime was at fault in rejecting President Obama’s initiative when he first came to office? Is that not a sign that the regime in Tehran is afraid of international engagement and is pursuing this course relentlessly?

John Baron: I am the first to agree that Iran was completely wrong on President Obama’s offer. Let me make it clear that I am not an apologist for Iran. No one can agree with its human rights record, its sponsoring of state terrorism or the storming of our embassy—all are terribly wrong—but they are not arguments for military intervention; they do not justify war. Rather, I suggest that no one’s hands are clean in this region, including our own, particularly after the invasion of Iraq on what turned out to be a false premise. Opportunities have been missed on both sides. I would have thought there can be little doubt about that.
	Let us get to the nub of the issue and think the unthinkable. Let us assume, despite the lack of substantive evidence, that Iran is moving towards the option of nuclear capability. Hon. Members will be fully aware that there is a world of difference between nuclear capability and possessing nuclear weapons. This is perhaps understandable. We in the west underestimate the extent to which status is important in that part of the world. The reason Saddam Hussein did not deny possessing weapons of mass destruction, despite the fact that he did not have them, was that it was in his interest not to deny it. He had, after all, failed in his invasion of Iran. Iran’s insecurity is also understandable. Those who view the map from Tehran’s point of view will see that she is surrounded by nuclear powers: Russia, Pakistan, a United States naval presence, and Israel. All those powers contribute to Iran’s feeling of encirclement.
	I am very conscious, as the House will be, of the argument that if Iran develops nuclear weapons, that will lead to a nuclear arms race in the region but without the safety mechanisms that existed during the cold war, which in itself could lead to a nuclear escalation. However, I do not accept that argument. There is no reason why the theory of nuclear deterrence to which the west adheres should not be equally valid in other parts and regions of the world. Paul Pillar, the CIA’s national intelligence officer for the middle east between 2000 and 2005, recently wrote that there was
	“nothing in the record of behavior by the Islamic Republic that suggests irrationality”.
	That view was reinforced by Ehud Barak, the Israeli Defence Minister, last year.
	India and Pakistan have fought wars, yet both have shown nuclear restraint. As the House is well aware, only one country has ever used nuclear weapons in anger. Furthermore, the view that an Iranian nuclear capability would start a nuclear arms race in the region does not take into account the possibility that regional allies of the west will opt to shelter under a US nuclear umbrella. That happens in Japan and in South Korea.

Stephen McCabe: I am afraid that this is sounding terribly like an appeasement argument. If the hon. Gentleman does not wish his position to be characterised as such, will he say something about what the western powers should do to support legitimate protest in Iran by the people who are pushing for regime change, whom we have supported in other countries and whom we should support in this instance?

John Baron: I ask the hon. Gentleman to be patient. I promise to deal directly with that later in my speech.
	At this point, many invoke President Ahmadinejad’s call for Israel to be wiped off the face of the map. Surely, they say, that is proof of irrationality; surely that is evidence that Iran cannot be allowed to develop nuclear weapons. However, a careful examination of the translation suggests that President Ahmadinejad was badly misquoted. Even The New York Times, one of the first outlets to misquote Ahmadinejad, now accepts that the word “map” was never used. A more accurate translation offers
	“the regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time”.
	Given that Ahmadinejad compared his desired option—the elimination of “the regime occupying Jerusalem”—with the fall of the Shah’s regime in Iran, it is quite clear that he was talking about regime change and not about the destruction of Israel itself, just as he did not want the end of Iran in his comparison. The pedantry over the translation is important. Some Members may scoff, but this is a terribly important point. The immediate reaction to Ahmadinejad’s speech in 2005 was the then Israeli Prime Minister’s call for Iran to be expelled from the United Nations, and the US urging its allies to “get tougher” on Iran.
	That mistranslation is used to this day, even by former Foreign Secretaries outside the House. I wonder why the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has not provided more clarity on the point. I hope that it is not to do with a hidden agenda. Perhaps it is to do with a shortage of properly qualified Farsi speakers, but we would appreciate clarity from the Foreign Secretary in due course. I ask him to tell us whether he denies at least the possibility that President Ahmadinejad was misquoted.

Louise Ellman: If the hon. Gentleman is so dismissive of Iran’s statement that Israel should be wiped off the face of the earth, can he explain why, in February 2011, Ayatollah Khamenei repeated the statement that Israel was a “cancerous tumour” that must be removed?

John Baron: If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I must say that we need to examine these statements very carefully, because that translation too is open to dispute. It is all very well coming to the House with these translations, but Farsi is a complex language, as she will know, and we have to make sure that we get them right. Many scholars outside this place verify that President Ahmadinejad’s original statement was misquoted—theses have been written about it—which is why I ask the Foreign Secretary to clarify the situation. We need to get this quote clarified.
	There can be little doubt that the west’s policy of sabre-rattling and sanctions has failed; the Iranians are not going to back down on their nuclear programme.
	Mr Mousavi, the unofficial leader of the green movement and one of the great hopes of the west, said during the 2009 presidential campaign that any backtracking on the nuclear issue would be tantamount to surrender. Iran’s statement that it is introducing an oil embargo for certain countries shows that it is impervious to sabre-rattling, yet we in the west still pursue that policy when confronting Iran. Indeed it is considered “naive”—I have heard that word used a lot—to rule out the use of force. We are told that all options must be left on the table. Some people go further: there seems to be a hairshirt auction among Republican candidates for the presidential nomination in America as to who can be toughest on Iran, with Mitt Romney openly advocating war over the nuclear issue. I would counter that by saying that what is naive is pursuing a policy that has clearly failed. Sanctions and sabre-rattling are yesterday’s policies and they have brought us to the brink of a military conflict, which is hardly the sign of success.
	What compounds the error of that approach is that most agree that a military strike would be counter-productive to the point of being calamitous. It would reinforce the position of the hard-liners at the expense of the pragmatists within Iran, just as the Iran-Iraq war boosted patriotic support for the regime and helped to cement the revolution. Military intervention would not work; the US Defence Secretary judges that it would delay the Iranians for only a year at most. Knowledge cannot be eradicated by military intervention, and such intervention will only delay the inevitable. If Iran has set herself on acquiring nuclear weapons, she will not be scared away; and if she has not, a military strike would encourage her to do so. We even hear voices from within Israel against a strike. Meir Dagan, the hard-line former chief of Mossad—nobody could accuse him of being a pussycat—has referred to an attack on Iran as “a stupid idea.”
	I ask hon. Members to reflect on a wider historical point. It is perhaps relevant to reflect more generally that military action often has an embedding effect: it reinforces the position of the existing regime. For example, communism has lasted longest in those countries where the west intervened militarily—North Korea, China, Cuba and Vietnam.

Edward Leigh: My hon. Friend talks about the verdict of history. Is the verdict of history not also that when dealing with tyrannies it is unwise to rule out force in defence, and that sometimes it is wise to keep tyrannies guessing as to one’s intentions?

John Baron: Yes, although I suggest an exception: keeping an option on the table that heightens tensions and makes a peaceful outcome less likely is less worthy, and we have to examine that position.

Alec Shelbrooke: Will my hon. Friend give way?

John Baron: No, I am going to make a little progress.

Nigel Evans: Order. May I remind Mr Baron that he has already taken 20 minutes? This is an over-subscribed debate, and we will impose an eight-minute limit on speeches after the Front-Bench contributions. He would be generous to his colleagues if he began to draw his remarks to close.

John Baron: I very much take that on board, Mr Deputy Speaker. If hon. Members will forgive me, I will not accept any more interventions.
	A strike by Israel or the west would unite Iran in fury and perhaps trigger a regional war, and it would certainly encourage the hard-liners to push for a bomb. Despite that, the present policy is to refuse to rule out the use of force. Such a policy is not only naive, but illogical: we are keeping an option that we all know would be a disaster, against a country that chooses to ignore it, yet that option heightens tensions and makes a peaceful outcome less likely. That is nonsense.
	A fresh approach is required. Israel will not attack Iran if Washington objects. Now is the time for the US to make it clear to Israel that force should not be used. Ruling out the use of force would have the immediate effect of reducing tensions and making conflict less likely. That would lessen the chance of another accident like the shooting down of Iran Air 655, which could spark conflict. Such a policy in the longer term would give diplomacy a greater chance of success. Iran will not be persuaded to give up her pursuit of nuclear technology. We need to understand and engage better with Iran, and offer the prospect of implicit recognition of Iran’s status as a major power in the region—a status we created ourselves through our misguided invasion of Iraq, which fundamentally altered the balance of power in the region.
	There is a precedent for recognising that new status. In the 1960s, when the US presence in Asia was waning and China was beginning to flex her muscles, Nixon did not respond by denying the reality of Chinese power. His visit to China in 1972 took everyone by surprise, but it was the right decision—it was a defining moment. I suggest that the US needs to realise that this is one of those defining moments, which needs to be seized.
	Israel and Iran are two proud nations but they are perhaps uncertain about the best course of action. The US needs to put behind it the underlying antagonism towards Iran that defines this crisis. That will not be easy, but speaking as an ally of the US, too often in the past the US approach has been to overwhelm an issue rather than to solve it. This is not one of those occasions.
	In conclusion, the US needs to adopt a wider perspective: it needs to make it clear that an Israeli attack would be unacceptable, and then to engage better with Iran. That would be in Israel’s long-term interests. No one is suggesting it is an easy option, particularly given the presidential elections in both countries, but without it discussions on Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and a host of other issues will remain needlessly difficult. The west underestimates the opportunity to influence Iran. She is a state in transition, with multiple centres of authority and constant power struggles. The challenge for the west is to influence those internal debates and struggles. Crude threats of military intervention and sanctions, along with talk of regime change, only reinforce the hard-liners’ position.
	We need a better understanding of what makes Iran tick. We need to better understand the culture, the people, the history, the religion—the British Museum’s current Hajj exhibition is a well worth a visit. We need to renounce the option of a military strike and go the extra mile for peace. War should always, I remind the House, be the measure of last resort, to be used when all other avenues have been exhausted. We have not reached
	that point with Iran. As such, it is my intention to test the will of Parliament by dividing the House on the motion tonight.

Several hon. Members: rose —

Nigel Evans: Order. Will hon. Members resume their seats? I will explain the procedure to be applied so the House can follow what is going on. I will call an Opposition Member next. The Speaker has selected the amendment in the name of Sir Malcolm Rifkind, whom I will call after the first speaker from the Opposition side. I will then call another Opposition Back-Bench Member, then we go to both Front Benches. The time limit will then be formally applied. I say to those Members whom I call before that if they exceed eight minutes, plus two minutes for interventions taken, I will cough loudly. I may become even more explicit than that. I call Michael McCann.

Michael McCann: I welcome the procurement of the debate by the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), but I fear that many of the Members who contribute to it will not support the position that he outlined. I will support the amendment.
	I should start by declaring that my sister is married to an Iranian and that I have strong links with the Iranian community in the west of Scotland. I have taken the community’s temperature on this issue.
	We know that every Government face challenges, foreign and domestic, during their period in office. The longer the Government are in power, the more likely that challenges will come along and that their frequency will increase. The foreign challenges that we face focus public attention, at times, on making decisions or considering military options that will put our people in harm’s way. Sadly, over the past decade or so, we have seen many challenges in foreign lands—Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan. Most recently, the coalition Government deployed UK forces in Libya.
	On each occasion each Member of the House has had to come to a view on where they stand on the issues. Some will always adopt a pacifist approach. Others will weigh up other factors. The pacifists among us will always have respect and legitimacy for the principled position that they hold, but they must also recognise that their position lacks remedies in the harsh territory—

John Baron: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Michael McCann: I shall make progress. The hon. Gentleman has just had the opportunity to move the motion. He should not try to come in again so swiftly.
	The pacifists among us do not always recognise that their position lacks remedies in the harsh territory of international conflict and that at times it can be seen as a white flag in the face of tyranny. What is more difficult to absorb are those non-pacifists who disagree with a particular decision and then seek to stand astride the moral high ground after the event and lecture us about how they did not support the action in the first place.
	Iraq is the most obvious recent controversy. I have often mused about what would have happened in March 2003 had the French and Russians put their vested interests aside and supported a united final UN resolution. Would Saddam have capitulated? We will never know. I have no issue with those who seek to post-rationalise events, but I do have an issue with those who seek to do so in a manner which neglects to mention that they did not have a feasible proposition to resolve the original problem—in the Iraq context, Saddam’s refusal to abide by the will of the international community. Now we look to Iran.
	I do not support the motion; I support the amendment. In reaching that decision I have examined the actions of the Iranians thus far, and in particular the prospects for a negotiated settlement of the issues. What actions have the Iranians taken thus far? The International Atomic Energy Agency stated on 8 November 2011 that Iran had sought to design a nuclear warhead, that Iran was continuing its atomic weapons programme research, that it could have a nuclear bomb in months and that preparations to install a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile were taking place.
	To this I add the Iranians’ rhetoric that the holocaust did not take place and President Ahmadinejad’s declaration that Israel should be wiped off the map; I refer to the comments of the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay. If that declaration was somehow misinterpreted, were the Iranians also misinterpreted when they said that the holocaust did not take place? We must also question the Iranians’ close relationship with Syria.

Alec Shelbrooke: It appears that President Ahmadinejad likes to cherry-pick his arguments. Clearly, he is an anti-Semite who is intent on getting rid of the Jewish people by denying the holocaust. He also talks about getting rid of the occupation of Jerusalem, but that is just looking at the past hour’s news. Look at the years before that, when the Jews were there before the Muslims. When President Ahmadinejad makes such statements, his intent towards the Jewish people is clear.

Michael McCann: Absolutely. The question is the degree to which President Ahmadinejad is an anti-Semite rather than whether he is an anti-Semite in the first place.
	The close relationship with Syria is headline news at the moment, and there is also state sponsorship of terrorism.

Sajid Javid: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Michael McCann: I will make some progress and then I will be happy to give way.
	At home in Iran—this is important for Iranian communities throughout the United Kingdom—there is the suppression of Iranian citizens, with 650 people executed in 2010 alone, and the violent suppression of democracy protests across the region that we in this House have championed.

Chris Bryant: Will my hon. Friend add to the list of crimes committed by the Iranian regime the horrific way in which the Ahwazi Arabs have been treated for many years? Many of them have been tortured to death and many have been prevented from
	taking part in all the ordinary political discourse that we would expect in any other country. Does he agree that that is consistent with the anti-Semitism that we have seen in many of the public pronouncements of the regime?

Michael McCann: Sadly, it is a consistency that runs through the regime, like lettering through a stick of rock, alongside all the actions of the Iranian Government and the Iranian leadership. What it tells me about the leadership that we are dealing with is that we must consider all possible measures to determine how to move forward.
	Do I believe, as the motion suggests, that the use of force against Iran would be wholly counter-productive? I do not know the precise answer to that question, but what I do know is that ruling it out would be counter-productive. It would say to an extreme set of people that their tactics have paid off, and the willingness of the Iranian regime to ignore the international community and six UN Security Council resolutions, and to repress the Iranian people’s rights, tells me that diplomacy and sanctions should not be our only options. The Foreign Secretary pointed out on television yesterday, quite properly, the complex nature of the threat, and for those reasons, nothing should be ruled out.
	I appreciate that many wish to speak, so I will finish on this point. Two weeks ago at a local high school in my constituency, I listened to a gentleman named Harry Bibring, who, as a 12-year-old in March 1938, witnessed Nazi troops march into Vienna. Days later, the persecution of the Jews started in that city. In that same year, the Peace Pledge Union, a British pacifist organisation, asked people to make this pledge:
	“I renounce war, and am therefore determined not to support any kind of war. I am also determined to work for the removal of all causes of war.”
	I am sure that all would agree that those are laudable aims and that all of us would be prepared to sign up to that pledge to remove all causes of war. But I am also acutely aware of Edmund Burke’s quote:
	“All that is necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing.”
	That is why I oppose the motion and will support the amendment.

Nigel Evans: Thank you for your self-restraint. I am sure that Sir Malcolm will do likewise.

Malcolm Rifkind: I beg to move an amendment, to leave out from “House” to the end of the Question and add,
	‘supports the Government’s efforts to reach a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue through a combination of pressure in the form of robust sanctions, and engagement led by the E3+3 comprising the UK, US, France, Germany, China and Russia; and recognises the value of making clear to Iran that all options for addressing the issue remain on the table.’.
	I have a genuine respect for my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron). It is courageous sometimes to put forward a view that may have very little support, but as I listened to his speech, I could not but irresistibly be reminded of the remark that was made about a Minister in the 1930s, who had
	the reputation of being very logical. It was said of him that starting from a false premise he had moved inexorably to the wrong conclusion. I say to my hon. Friend in all honesty that I feel that he is in that situation.
	Of course, we all want to see a peaceful resolution of this dispute by negotiation. I agree with my hon. Friend that there is a powerful case to see if we can have a normalisation of relations between the United States and Iran, but it takes the two to have such a negotiation, and, as he himself conceded, when President Obama put forward such a proposal, it was rejected in Tehran. There is no evidence that Tehran has changed its position. If it has changed it, it would be very easy for it to say so.
	I want to go straight to the question raised in the motion rather than to the wider issues involved, and that is whether there is a powerful or persuasive argument at this moment in time for renouncing the use of force. I presume my hon. Friend means not by the United Kingdom, but by the west—the international community in general. I believe he is profoundly wrong for three reasons. First, if the United States—the key country in this regard—the west and the international community renounced the use of force at this stage, I believe that Israel would be more likely to decide to act unilaterally. The Israelis know perfectly well that their military capability is far less than that of the United States and that the Americans, with their cruise missiles, bunker-busting bombs and other capabilities, stand a much better chance of destroying or severely degrading Iran’s nuclear capability. As long as the United States has not ruled out that option, the Israelis are under much greater pressure to allow the negotiations the best possible opportunity to produce the desired result. If that option is removed from the table, particularly by the United States, the Israelis will say, “We are sorry, but sanctions are not working and the negotiations are going nowhere. Every week that passes creates a more dangerous Iran. If no one else will act, we will.” I say to my hon. Friend that, for anyone who understands the Israeli position, this is not scaremongering, but the most likely consequence.

John McDonnell: If the Israelis do act unilaterally, what sanctions should be applied to them?

Malcolm Rifkind: The Israelis acted unilaterally against Iraq when they removed the Osirak reactor, and both the western world and the Arab world breathed a huge sign of relief. It would ultimately depend on how successful the Israelis could be, and that is a separate question.
	Secondly, this is inevitably an extraordinarily complex period of diplomacy and, as other hon. Members have noted, diplomacy requires maximum pressure. It requires carrots and sticks. To reduce unnecessarily the pressure we can apply would be to act fundamentally against our own interests. There are circumstances—very limited circumstances—when it is right to rule out the use of force in advance. Let me give an example, because it is a question of disproportionate responses. When Argentina occupied the Falkland Islands, some rather foolish people said, “The United Kingdom has a nuclear weapon, so why does it not just threaten Argentina that it will use it if it does not withdraw from the Falkland Islands?”
	The Government at the time rightly said that under no circumstances was that an option, because it would have been an incredibly disproportionate response, and that was of course the right position to take.
	However, we are not in such a situation. When a country is contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons, as the rest of the world believes Iran is, even if my hon. Friend does not, and when we know that that would dramatically alter the geopolitical balance of power in the Gulf—the capability of producing a nuclear weapon in a few weeks is as serious as actually having one—that is a huge threat. We can debate whether it is a legitimate threat, but the possibility of using conventional force to destroy that capability in order to prevent the emergence of such a nuclear weapon state is not inherently unreasonable, extreme or irrational.

Sarah Wollaston: Is it not in Israel’s gift to de-escalate the situation and move away from a nuclear arms race by declaring its own nuclear capability?

Malcolm Rifkind: That might be an option, but the political reality is that Israel has had nuclear weapons for 30 years and that has not led to Arab countries threatening seriously to develop their own nuclear capability. The reason the Saudis and others have reacted in such a hostile way to Iran is that they know that Iran is intent on geopolitical dominance in the Gulf region by being the only country of the Muslim world, other than Pakistan, to have nuclear weapons capability or the reality of it. I believe that we cannot rule out a military response because the potential for such a response must be part of the equation.

Paul Flynn: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

Malcolm Rifkind: I do not want to accept too many interventions, for the reasons you have mentioned, Mr Deputy Speaker.
	Thirdly, the use of force will never be a desirable response, but it might be the least bad one if all else fails. In considering that, let me put to the House what I think is a very important point. Many commentators have drawn attention to all the downsides of a military response. They suggest that an attack by the United States—let us concentrate on the United States at the moment—would lead to a hike in the oil price, which is correct. They suggest that it might lead to increased terrorist support by Iran for Hezbollah or Hamas and to attempts to block the strait of Hormuz and all that that would entail, and they are right. There are various other downsides, too. But, when we think about it, we find that almost all the examples—the correct examples that have been given—of the adverse consequences of a military strike by the United States are relatively temporary. They are short to medium-term: they might last a few days, weeks or possibly even months, but they would gradually cease to have any impact.
	The alternative, however, of an Iran with nuclear weapons capability is not temporary; it is permanent. Therefore, we have to come to—we cannot avoid coming to—a judgment. If diplomacy fails, if negotiations go nowhere and if sanctions do not deliver, we will at some stage still have to come to an honest judgment: whether
	the downside, which I do not deny exists, nevertheless has to be borne if the long-term objective is either to destroy or seriously to degrade Iran’s nuclear capability.
	That brings us to a crucial question: would such action in fact do so? Do the Americans have the capability? That is ultimately a military question, and we are not privy to the military advice that the President may be receiving. If the advice is, “No, it wouldn’t,” it is not worth considering the option, but, if the advice is that we could either destroy or seriously degrade Iranian nuclear capability so that it is pushed back five or 10 years, that is a different argument.

John Baron: I am listening very carefully to my right hon. and learned Friend, but does he not accept that even the US Defence Secretary admits that a successful military strike would only delay the programme for about a year—those are his words, not mine—and that what my right hon. and learned Friend ignores is the possibility that a strike could actually do much worse and inflame a regional war?

Malcolm Rifkind: Panetta was probably referring to the consequences of an Israeli attempt to damage Iranian nuclear capability which, because the Israelis do not have cruise missiles or bunker-busting bombs, would clearly have a much more limiting effect, even if it had some limited success.
	In the interests of time, I shall share my final point with the House. Sometimes the inference of those who argue against even the option of a military response is that the world would be a much more peaceful, happy and gentle place if only we renounced the use of force, even as an option, in resolving this dispute. I say to my hon. Friend, however, that we have to contemplate— for a very brief moment, Mr Deputy Speaker—the consequences of Iran becoming a nuclear weapon state. There is not just the one response, to which my hon. Friend referred—whereby the Saudis themselves, pretty certainly, feel obliged to become a nuclear weapon state, Egypt and Turkey perhaps follow them and, therefore, the middle east, which is already the most dangerous part of the world, becomes incredibly volatile for all the perfectly obvious reasons that I do not have to go into. The only alternative, which my hon. Friend touched on, is that in order to discourage any Saudi, Egyptian or Turkish response of going nuclear the United States would have to give a nuclear umbrella guarantee to the Arab and Gulf states of the region, just as it has to NATO members, to Japan and to South Korea. In each case, when the United States gives such a guarantee, however, the guarantee is not credible unless the United States has bases in the area, as it has had in western Europe and has in the far east.
	My hon. Friend’s view leads to the point that, if Iran became a nuclear weapon state, to have any prospect of discouraging the Saudis and others from becoming nuclear powers themselves, we would have to envisage not just for a few weeks, a few months or the odd year or so, but for the indefinite future, the middle east as a region where the United States, far from disengaging, became more committed and involved than it ever has—committed by guarantee not just to go to war, but if necessary to use its nuclear weapons in the defence of what would then be its allies, in the sense that NATO is an alliance, alongside the need for bases in the region,
	with all the inflammatory consequences of American troops in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf on a permanent basis.
	The stakes are very high, and my hon. Friend cannot just sleep quietly, saying, “I don’t think we should have the military option, and everything would be peaceful if only people accepted the judgment that I have come to.” It has to be an option. We must hope that it never comes to that, but it cannot be ruled out at this stage. It is no one’s interests that it should, and therefore I commend the amendment to the House.

Nigel Evans: I call Mr Jack Straw. The same unofficial time guidelines still apply.

Jack Straw: Do I understand you correctly that the time limit is now on, Mr Deputy Speaker?

Nigel Evans: It is not yet official.

Jack Straw: First, I declare that I co-chair the all-party parliamentary group on Iran, along with the hon. Member for Wyre and Preston North (Mr Wallace). I congratulate the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on securing this important debate. I was one of the people who supported him in obtaining the debate, although it will be noted that I have not signed his motion. If there is a vote, as I suspect there will be, I will vote for the amendment in the names of the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) and many other right hon. and hon. Members.
	I will first offer the House briefly my experiences of negotiating with the Iranians as Foreign Secretary. I visited Tehran on five occasions and I am the only Foreign Secretary who has visited Tehran since the Iranian revolution in 1979. I will also offer a brief assessment of where we are today.
	I want to make it clear to the House that in supporting the amendment, I do not for a moment believe that we are anywhere near reaching the bar for military action. I am sure that I speak for my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench in saying that none of us are giving the Foreign Secretary carte-blanche approval for military action, and I am sure that he would not see it that way. The other side of the coin—I say this to the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay—is that I do not think it reasonable to ask the British Foreign Secretary, on behalf of the British Government and Parliament, to negotiate on this difficult issue, but to remove one option that may, in distant circumstances, be necessary.
	Some may ask how I square that position with the statement that I made in November 2004, when I was asked on the BBC whether I thought that Israel or the United States would go in for the bombing of Iran. I said:
	“Not only is that inconceivable but I think the prospect of it happening is inconceivable.”
	That was my judgment at the time. The fact that it has not happened in the intervening seven and a half years may suggest that I was not far off the mark. The more important point is why I made that intervention as stridently as I did. One reason was that we were engaged
	in two wars, as was the United States. It was inconceivable at that time, given the difficulties in both theatres, that the United States would wish to engage in a further military action even if it had the capability, which I doubt it did. The second reason was that we were making progress in negotiations with the reformist regime in Iran.
	I accept what the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay said about there having been a number of missed opportunities in dealing with Iran. Tony Blair asked me to go to Tehran as a positive response to President Khatami’s reaching out to the west straight after 9/11. Mr Blair took a risk there. He responded in a positive way by sending me. We had the support of the US Department of State. I am sad to say that our efforts were partly undermined by the line in President Bush’s speech at the end of January 2003 and by other efforts to undermine the strategy, although not by the State Department. That said, we made progress with Khatami. After an extraordinary and tense negotiation in October 2003, when Joschka Fischer, Dominique de Villepin and I came very close to walking out altogether, we got the Iranians to agree to a series of measures, including effectively abandoning their work on a nuclear programme and signing an additional protocol under the non-proliferation treaty. The effectiveness of that agreement is shown by the US national intelligence estimate from four years later, which stated:
	“We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program”.

John Redwood: On reflection, does the right hon. Gentleman think that the war in Iraq increased the stability or the instability of the middle east?

Jack Straw: I hope the right hon. Gentleman will allow me not to go down that particular rabbit hole. I have given endless evidence to the inquiry into Iraq, and I do not resile from my support for that military action, not least for the reasons that my hon. Friend the Member for East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow (Mr McCann) gave. We can have that debate on another occasion, but it is incontrovertible, as the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay showed, that the Iraq war changed the balance of power in the region. We knew that it was going to do that, but that provides still more reason for us to use better our relations with the US.
	Progress was made, but for a variety of reasons, including errors by the US, the reformists lost out and President Ahmadinejad came to office in the summer of 2005. Since then, there has been a gradual deterioration in relations with Iran, despite, in my judgment, the best efforts of successive British Governments and many others. I wish that I shared the view of the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay about whether it will be possible to achieve a shift by the current Administration without any pressure. I have literally sat across a table from President Ahmadinejad trying to negotiate with him—an interesting situation that did not lead to any great progress. Since 2009 and the disgraceful attitude of the Iranian authorities towards the elections, and then following their reaction to the Arab spring, things have got worse, not better.

Bernard Jenkin: We have yet to hear whether the right hon. Gentleman is going to support the amendment or the motion—[Hon. Members: “The amendment.”] I beg his pardon. Were the implicit military threat to be taken off the table, with whom in the current regime would we negotiate? Is that not a matter of considerable complexity? I am all in favour of negotiation, but with whom should we negotiate? Is that not part of the problem?

Jack Straw: I have had a serious problem in my right ear since 1981, and I can tell the hon. Gentleman that there is a very good consultant just across the river at St Thomas’s, on the NHS. I have been treated there for 30 years. I think it was within the hearing of the House and Hansard when, within about my first two sentences, I spelled out that I would support the amendment moved by the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington. I apologise if it did not quite get as far as the bubble in which the hon. Gentleman sits.

Paul Flynn: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the current situation is very similar to the prelude to the war in Iraq? Does he really think that going to war on the basis of what proved to be non-existent weapons of mass destruction was worth the loss of 179 British lives?

Jack Straw: The two are very different, and in any case I have already said that I do not regard us as being remotely close to the bar for military action at present. It is important that Members, particularly those who support the amendment, are cautious and do not get themselves into a lather, as some but not all did in respect of Iraq and other issues. It is very important to acknowledge the evidence.
	If the House refers to paragraph 53 of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s report of November, it will see that it states:
	“The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.”
	However, it continues that information
	“indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be ongoing.”
	The truth is that—until recently, we think—the major part of the programme stopped in 2003. It is my judgment, but no more than conjecture, that Iran’s aim has been to build up a nuclear weapons capability on paper, but not to turn it into a nuclear weapons programme. With respect to the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, there is a big difference between the two.
	Finally, I urge caution. I hope that we hear less of the suggestion that were Iran to get a nuclear weapons capability, there would automatically be an arms race in the middle east. I do not believe that. A senior Saudi diplomat said to me, “I know what we’re saying publicly, but do you really think that having told people that there is no need for us to make any direct response to Israel holding nuclear weapons, we could seriously make a case for developing a nuclear weapons capability to deal with another Muslim country?”
	This is a complicated issue, and we need a resolution to it. We need to ensure that the Foreign Secretary does not go into negotiations without options open to him,
	but I also believe that with sensible negotiations, and working with the United States, Europe and other allies, we can ensure that there is a peaceful solution.

William Hague: I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on securing the debate and welcome the opportunity to set out the Government’s policy towards Iran. I pay tribute to two distinguished predecessors of mine who have just spoken with the benefit of their enormous experience. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) made a compelling, almost unanswerable, case for his amendment and against the motion tabled by my hon. Friend. The right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), to whom I have often paid tribute in the House for his efforts to reach a rapprochement with Iran—I do so again today—spoke with his great experience of the difficulty of trying to arrive at an accommodation. I did not agree with quite everything he said, but he said many wise words about the current situation.
	Iranian nuclear proliferation risks one of the most serious crises in foreign policy that the international community has faced in many years. As Iran moves closer to acquiring the capability to build and deliver a nuclear weapon, and as it continues its confrontational policies elsewhere in the world, that crisis is coming steadily down the track. Three years after Iran’s secret nuclear site at Qom first came to the attention of the world, it is expanding its uranium enrichment programme in defiance of the United Nations Security Council, and it is enriching uranium to 20% on a scale greater than that needed for a civil nuclear power programme. It remains in breach of its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and it is not meeting the requirements of IAEA resolutions.
	My hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay asked me to read the relevant extracts from the IAEA report of November. The right hon. Member for Blackburn has already referred to one of them. Paragraph 53 states:
	“The Agency has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.”
	The report goes on to make the points to which the right hon. Gentleman referred.

Paul Flynn: Does not the right hon. Gentleman see the danger that increasing tension between the west and Iran might well persuade it to expel the IAEA inspectors from its land, meaning that the transparency that we have now will end?

William Hague: First, it is of course not the IAEA’s view that Iran has been fully transparent. Indeed, it states in paragraph 52 of that report that
	“the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities”.
	I hope the hon. Gentleman listened to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington, who pointed out that it could very well be argued that adopting the policy prescribed in the motion would increase tension and the likelihood of military conflict in the near term. I certainly hold to that view.
	Another part of the IAEA report says that
	“in 2005, a senior official in SADAT”—
	that is, the Section for Advanced Development Applications and Technologies—
	“solicited assistance from Shahid Behesti University in connection with complex calculations relating to the state of criticality of a solid sphere of uranium being compressed by high explosives.”
	A solid sphere of uranium being compressed by high explosives can be found only in the core of a nuclear weapon.

Bob Ainsworth: I am a signatory to the amendment tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), but I was very concerned about his belief that an American military attack would have only temporary consequences. I am not suggesting that it be taken off the table, but would the Foreign Secretary care to give us his own thoughts on the consequences if we were to face such a situation in which the Americans intervened militarily in order to stop the programme?

William Hague: It will be clear from my remarks that that is not what I am calling for, although I will shortly come to some of the arguments about it. It is very difficult to speculate about what the actual physical impact of a military strike would be, as it would depend on who did it, what they did it with, and exactly which facilities were struck. However, it is not something that we are advocating, as will be clear from my speech.

Stewart Jackson: Would my right hon. Friend like to disabuse the House of the notion that were it not for 9/11 there would have been a rapprochement with the Iranian regime, given that well before that period Iran was the leading state sponsor of international terrorism, as we have seen most recently in Azerbaijan and Bangkok?

William Hague: I am about to come to that point, so I will make some more progress in doing so.
	It is our assessment and that of our allies that Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons—that is in line with what the right hon. Member for Blackburn said—and is steadily developing the capability to produce such weapons should it choose to do so. A nuclear-armed Iran would have devastating consequences for the middle east and could shatter the non-proliferation treaty. On that point, I differ from the right hon. Gentleman, because I believe, given everything that I have seen and heard in the region as Foreign Secretary so far, that if Iran set about the development of nuclear weapons, other nations in the middle east would do so as well, and that there would be a nuclear arms race in the region.
	As my hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Mr Jackson) suggests, our well-founded concerns that Iran’s intentions may not be purely peaceful are heightened by its policies in other areas. It is a regime that recently conspicuously failed to prevent the sacking of our embassy premises in Iran; that conspired to assassinate
	the Saudi ambassador to the United States on American soil; that only last week was accused of planning and carrying out attacks against Israeli diplomats; that is providing assistance to the Syrian Government’s violent campaign against their own people; and that supports armed proxy groups including Hezbollah and Hamas. Taken together with Iran’s nuclear activities, this behaviour threatens international peace and security. That is why Iran is one of the very top priorities in foreign affairs for this Government, just as it was for the last Government.

Frank Roy: On the taking over of the UK embassy in Tehran, has the Foreign Secretary’s office or the Iranian Foreign Minister’s office made any approaches towards meeting one another since the day when the attack took place?

William Hague: The Iranian Foreign Minister and I spoke twice during and after those events, so we were in touch at the time and immediately afterwards. We are now in direct touch with the Iranians at official level to clarify with each other the arrangements for protecting our embassies in each country. Of course, we continue to be able to discuss matters with Iran in multilateral forums, as well as bilaterally should we choose to do so. We have not broken diplomatic relations with Iran.

Frank Roy: rose —

William Hague: I had better continue, because the embassy is a bit of a side point.
	Our quarrel emphatically is not with the Iranian people: we want them to enjoy the same rights, freedoms and opportunities as we do and to live dignified lives in a prosperous society. Today, they labour under a repressive political system that attempts to stifle all opposition and has incarcerated more journalists and bloggers than that of any other country in the world, on top of its appalling wider record on human rights. Let there be no doubt that the Iranian Government’s current policies endanger the interests of the Iranian people themselves, as well as undermining global security.

John Baron: One does not condone the human rights record of Iran; there are many regimes around the world that have abysmal human rights. May I bring my right hon. Friend back to the report? Does he agree that there is a world of difference between moving to the option of capability and what we have sometimes heard about evidence suggesting a nuclear weapons programme or a decision to develop one? He has still failed to present the House with proof that nuclear weapons are being developing or that a decision has been made to do so.

William Hague: I read out some quite interesting paragraphs from the IAEA report. My hon. Friend should also consider the evidence that is now coming out of Iran saying that it will use its expanding stockpile of near-20% enriched uranium to make fuel for the Tehran research reactor. That reactor is designed to produce medical isotopes, but its capacity is being expanded to produce near-20% enriched uranium to levels far beyond what would be required for that purpose. On that basis, one would have to be extraordinarily trusting and innocent
	in world affairs to believe that this programme had entirely peaceful purposes and that no possible provision was being made for the development of nuclear weapons. My hon. Friend must remember, too, that the regime deliberately concealed—we do not know for how long, because western nations revealed it—the construction of the secret underground facilities at Qom. It has a strong track record of deliberately concealing aspects of the nuclear programme, and that might lead him to be just a little bit suspicious about its purposes.

Mike Gapes: Will the Foreign Secretary make it clear to the Iranian people that we are opposed not to Iran having nuclear technology but to the breach of the non-proliferation treaty? The regime could have accepted the Russian proposal on Bushehr, for example, which would have resolved these issues.

William Hague: The hon. Gentleman is right. I will make that clear when I come to that that point.

John Redwood: Given the amount of blood and treasure that we have shed in the middle east in recent years, does my right hon. Friend agree that in this difficult and potentially dangerous situation we should look to the considerable regional powers to take the lead, in consultation with the United States of America, and not rush in ourselves?

William Hague: Of course we need to work on this with all the regional powers. My right hon. Friend can be assured that the regional powers are extremely concerned about Iran’s nuclear programme. However, we also have our responsibilities as a member of the United Nations Security Council, and we must live up to those responsibilities on this, as on all other occasions.

Angus MacNeil: rose —

William Hague: I will give way later, but I must have regard to the number of hon. Members who wish to speak.
	Our Government’s objective is simple. It is shared by the international community as a whole and, I believe, by this House and by our country. We wish to see a peaceful, negotiated diplomatic settlement to the Iranian nuclear crisis by which Iran gives the world confidence that it is not developing, and will not develop, nuclear weapons. All our efforts are devoted towards such a peaceful resolution.
	Our strategy to achieve this and to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon coming about has two elements: first, diplomacy and engagement with Iran; and, secondly, pressure on Iran in the form of peaceful and legitimate sanctions.

Tom Clarke: rose—

William Hague: I think that I must carry on with my argument for a few minutes.
	This strategy of diplomacy and pressure has been reflected in six consecutive United Nations Security Council resolutions backed by all its permanent members including Russia and China, which work alongside
	Britain, the United States, France and Germany as the E3 plus 3 to negotiate with Iran on behalf of the international community. These resolutions have shown that the world is united in opposing Iranian nuclear proliferation and in supporting a diplomatic solution. The UN sanctions target companies and individuals associated with Iran’s nuclear activities and ballistic missile programmes. On top of this, European Union member states have adopted successive rounds of sanctions, including, most recently, an embargo on Iranian oil exports into the EU that will come to effect on 1 July.

Sajid Javid: Will the Foreign Secretary give way?

William Hague: I am going to carry on for a few minutes.
	Those are unprecedented sanctions and we have been at the forefront of bringing them about. Members will be aware that Iran announced this weekend that it would end oil exports to the UK and France. Given that we are already imposing an oil embargo, that will have no impact on Britain’s energy security or supplies. Britain has also adopted stringent sanctions against Iran’s financial sector, severing all links between British banks and Iran, alongside similar measures taken by the US and Canada.

Several hon. Members: rose —

William Hague: I shall finish the argument on sanctions before I give way again.
	Sanctions are designed to show the Iranian Government that there is a considerable price attached to their current policies and to urge them to change course. The sanctions have a practical impact, slowing Iran’s progress towards a nuclear weapons capability. They are also necessary to uphold the authority of the UN and the IAEA, which have called on Iran to suspend its enrichment programme—demands that Iran would otherwise flout with impunity. The Iranian Government can act to bring sanctions to an end.
	Sanctions, however, are a means to an end, not an end in themselves. Our ultimate goal is a return to negotiations that addresses all the issues of concern about Iran’s nuclear programme and the successful conclusion of the negotiations. The door of negotiations has been open to Iran at every stage over the past eight years and it remains open today.

Tom Clarke: Will the Foreign Secretary give way?

William Hague: I will give way in a moment—I want to conclude this point.
	To help bring Iran to negotiations, the E3 plus 3 has offered it help to develop civil nuclear power stations—a point that was just made—and its economy in the form of economic and agricultural assistance, provided Iran satisfies the concerns of the international community about its nuclear programme. That offer was most recently put to Iran again at talks in Istanbul in January last year. It remains on the table and we urge Iran to respond to it in good faith.

Several hon. Members: rose —

William Hague: I will give way a couple more times, first of all to the hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Mr MacNeil).

Angus MacNeil: The right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), a former Foreign Secretary, has said that he reckons the bar for military action is quite far away. Does the current Foreign Secretary agree with his analysis?

William Hague: I will come to that point. As I made clear in interviews over the weekend, we are not calling for or advocating military action, although we do not agree with the terms of the motion moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay.

Menzies Campbell: Thus far, our debate has concentrated on the political and the pragmatic, but does the Foreign Secretary feel reinforced in the attitude he has just expressed from the Dispatch Box by the fact that, under customary international law, there is an obligation to exhaust all possible political and diplomatic alternatives before embarking on military action? Is that not what we are engaged in?

William Hague: Absolutely—force is a last resort in any situation, and it is not what we are calling for now.

Tom Clarke: As one who supports the amendment, I welcome the tone of the Foreign Secretary’s remarks in the past few minutes, as I believe engagement is important. He might recall that some years ago four hon. Members of the House, including me, were asked to go to Iran to meet the leaders and negotiate on the release of Terry Waite, John McCarthy and Brian Keenan. I am saying not that it was a pleasant experience or that we succeeded immediately, but that we made a contribution to an improved situation and their release. As somebody much better than I once said, to jaw-jaw is better than to war-war.

William Hague: That is very much what we want. This may be an opportune moment for me to update the House on where we are now on negotiations.
	On 21 October last year, Baroness Ashton, who chairs the E3 plus 3 in her capacity as EU High Representative, wrote to Iran to ask it to set a time and place to resume meaningful negotiations. In the last few days, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Mr Jalili, has finally responded to that letter. Mr Jalili states in his letter that Iran is willing to resume negotiations with the E3 plus 3 on the nuclear issue. We are studying the letter in consultation with our American, French, Russian, German and Chinese counterparts to assess whether it amounts to a serious intention by Iran to negotiate with the international community, which would permit talks to resume. As the Prime Minster has said:
	“If there is going to be dialogue then Iranians need to enter it in a new spirit and recognise they are taking a different path.”
	We hope the Iranians do so in respect of any such negotiations as we study that response.
	We will continue to intensify our diplomacy and the peaceful, legitimate pressure on Iran. There is still time for peaceful diplomacy to succeed. That remains the best course available to achieve the goal of an Iran without nuclear weapons and to avert the risk of any military conflict.

Sajid Javid: Will my right hon. Friend give way?

William Hague: I shall speak for a few minutes before I give way again. Otherwise I will take too much time.
	That is why the Government are not seeking, advocating or calling for military action against Iran. One hundred per cent. of our efforts is devoted to the path of diplomacy and peaceful economic pressure. Our strategy is designed precisely to increase the pressure for a peaceful settlement, not to lead to any conflict. I am on record in this House saying that although Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon would be a calamity, the consequences of military action might well be calamitous themselves. As the Prime Minister has stated in this House,
	“nobody wants military action, by Israel or anyone else, to take place”.—[Official Report, 28 June 2010; Vol. 512, c. 580.]
	That is our position, and the effort we have put into negotiating, securing and implementing sanctions on Iran is testament to our determination to pursue robust diplomacy, which we are pursuing daily. We are in regular contact with our E3 plus 3 partners about Iran, and I discuss the issue frequently—daily—with other Foreign Ministers from around the world. An entire unit—one of the largest in the Foreign Office—is devoted to finding a diplomatic way forward with Iran. We confirmed our commitment to engagement by not completely breaking off diplomatic relations with Iran even after the outrageous provocation of the attacks on our embassy compounds, which made it necessary to withdraw our diplomats.
	We also play a leading role at the IAEA and support its efforts to work with Iran to address the concerns about the military dimensions of its programme. Senior IAEA officials are visiting Iran today and tomorrow. They are seeking co-operation from Iran in addressing the agency’s findings about the “military dimensions” of the programme, including access to a sensitive site at Parchin. We urge Iran to co-operate with the IAEA and to permit access to that site. The House will join me in paying tribute to the dogged and painstaking work of the IAEA in Vienna and on the ground in Iran, under very difficult circumstances, and we look forward to the next meeting of the IAEA board on 5 March, at which Iran will be discussed.
	All those efforts will continue, and diplomacy remains the driving force of our policy towards Iran, but the motion moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay calls for the Government to take a course that no responsible Administration could take on this issue, namely unilaterally to rule out the use of force.

Sajid Javid: rose —

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: rose —

William Hague: I will discuss that before concluding my remarks, but I will give way to each of my hon. Friends.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: Given all that my right hon. Friend has said, especially on the unanimity on the six UN resolutions, was he as disturbed as I was at reports in today’s press that some of our friends and allies are engaging in barter deals to weaken the unprecedented sanctions to which he and the E3 plus 3 have agreed?

William Hague: I would be very disappointed if that took place, but I believe the sanctions will be well upheld across the EU. Some countries have difficulties because of the extent of their supplies from Iran, which is why we have phased in those measures. The sanctions will also be well supported by many nations outside the EU. Other major consumers of Iranian oil have indicated that they will reduce their purchases or that they have already done so. My hon. Friend may have seen press reports this morning that Iran is currently having difficulty selling a large part of its oil production.

Sajid Javid: My right hon. Friend’s approach on sanctions is to be warmly welcomed, but I wanted to follow up directly on the previous intervention, and particularly on press reports that Iran is speaking to China and India. We clearly and rightly have warm relations with India. As he knows, we have a large aid programme in India and rightly support its desire to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Can we use our warm relationship with India to put pressure on it as our ally not to help Iran with its sanctions-busting programme?

William Hague: We have made and will make that point to India, as we have to many other nations. My hon. Friend mentions China, which, perhaps for other reasons, has substantially reduced its purchases of oil from Iran in the past two months. We will energetically make the argument that he calls on us to make.

Chris Bryant: I wholly support everything that the Foreign Secretary has said about diplomatic efforts and I want to achieve the same outcome as every other hon. Member, but my anxiety is that diplomatic language, by moving from forceful to robust to pugnacious to belligerent, can sometimes have a ratchet effect that makes the use of violent force almost inevitable. I hope that he will stick with forceful and assertive, and move no further.

William Hague: It is certainly our approach to be forceful and assertive without being belligerent, and I hope that we will be able to continue with that posture. We have had many occasions to be forceful in our language about Iranian behaviour over recent months.
	Our policy is that while we remain unswervingly committed to diplomacy, it is important to emphasise to Iran that all options remain on the table. This policy is not new. It was the position of the previous Government, and it is the position of our closest allies not to rule out the use of military force while emphasising that peaceful diplomacy is the way forward that we all wish to see.
	No United States President has made a more powerful appeal to Iran peacefully to negotiate an end to its differences with the international community than President Obama, and yet as he said in his State of the Union address last month,
	“America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and I will take no options off the table to achieve that goal.”
	That is the approach of our Government, and it was also the approach of the previous Government. The former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown), said when asked in July 2007 if he would rule out a military strike against Iran:
	“I firmly believe that the sanctions policy that we are pursuing will work, but I’m not one who’s going forward to say that we rule out any particular form of action”.
	It is also the position of France and Germany, and I believe that on this issue we and our key allies should stand united together.
	Iran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the middle east, some of which are deemed capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Iranian revolutionary guard corps commanders have repeatedly hinted at their ability and willingness to strike at their opponents overseas. Iranian officials have threatened to use military force to close the strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most vital trading corridors, including for the passage of oil supplies.
	Under these circumstances, no prudent Government, despite what the motion implies, could rule out any use of force in the future. Let me be clear that ruling out other options would be irresponsible given the serious nature of our concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme and the consequences of Iran developing a nuclear weapon. We should not relieve Iran of any of the pressure it is currently facing. If we rule out military action, Iran might perceive that it can get away with aggressive actions. Taking other options off the table might cause Iran to respond by stepping up its aggressive and destabilising activity in the region. Taking options off the table would also have implications for the positions of several nations in the Gulf and potentially undermine their security. This adds up to a compelling case to keep the policy that we have.

Zac Goldsmith: The Foreign Secretary is making a brilliant speech, and I agree with every word he has said. Can he shed light on Ahmadinejad’s standing with his own people? Does Ahmadinejad’s belligerence command the backing of the Iranian people, or are we simply talking about the Iranian regime?

William Hague: That is a hard thing to determine in a country in which opposition is not free to operate in the way it should. Just last week we commemorated the one year under house arrest and effective imprisonment of both main opposition leaders. It is not easy to assess the state of democratic opinion in such a country. We know that there are many divisions in the regime and that there is much discontent about many issues in Iranian society. I doubt that support for the policies of the President overall is universal.

Steven Baker: I am deeply heartened by much of what my right hon. Friend says, but my understanding of article 2 of the United Nations charter and the Kellogg-Briand pact, which I understand is still in force, is that the United Kingdom is not entitled to hold military force as an option on the table and that we long since delegated that power to the United Nations—[ Interruption. ]

William Hague: Not all international law is in the charter, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell), with all of his legal experience, says. It is the view of many of the leading nations in the United Nations that we are fully entitled to retain that position.
	If we were to adopt the course of action proposed by my hon. Friend in his motion today, we would break with longstanding British policy, abandon the position
	of our allies and create the appearance of division and uncertainty between leading members of the international community. We would send the wrong signal to our allies in the region, and we would weaken the diplomatic pressure on the Iranian regime at the time when our efforts to persuade Iran to return to negotiations are more vital than ever, giving the impression that our determination to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons is waning, and possibly emboldening those within the regime who favour a more aggressive approach. This would be the wrong course of action for this country and for all those who wish to see a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Far better is the approach that the Government are taking with our allies of diplomatic engagement combined with robust pressure pursued with will, energy and determination. That strategy is the world’s best hope of averting any military confrontation with Iran, with all the very serious risks and consequences that that might bring.
	Today the message that this House should send out is to call on Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment activity; to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations and the IAEA; peacefully to negotiate a settlement to its differences with us and with the international community; to abandon any intent to acquire nuclear weapons now or in the future; to turn away from confrontation; to stop support for violence and terrorism; and to allow the Iranian people the full benefits that would flow from their nation enjoying its rightful place in its region and the world at large. To send this message to Iran with one voice today there is no course for this House but to reject the motion and vote in support of the amendment.

Douglas Alexander: I commend the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) for securing this debate and welcome the timely opportunity for the House to debate the subject of Iran. Like the Foreign Secretary, I will urge hon. Members to support the amendment in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind).
	I shall start with the broader regional context of the issues before the House this evening. Iran stands more isolated today than it has for many years. As several hon. Members have suggested, in recent years Iran has sought to build its influence across the middle east, supporting groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah and backing repressive regimes that could help to enhance Iran’s network of influence in the region, most notably that of Assad in Syria. Today, however, the regional balance of power has shifted away from Tehran. Recent events in Syria leave Iran further isolated, and in time Iran will lose this vital state ally in the Arab world and its main proxy for the arming of Hezbollah. Iran’s hold on the region is slipping, and even previously reluctant players, such as the Saudis, have now publicly condemned Iran and given their support to the EU oil boycott by promising to fill the gap in Europe’s energy demands. Sanctions today, unlike those in the past, are showing signs of having an impact and the Iranian regime seems to be struggling to contain their effect.
	The Iranian regime’s response to declining domestic legitimacy and increasing international isolation has been to channel discontent towards external enemies beyond its own borders. The regime continues to support
	terrorist groups across the region, and by its sponsorship of terrorism threatens the lives of British service personnel today in Afghanistan. In particular, members of the regime have directed their hatred towards Israel, from their denial of the holocaust to the continued threats to the people and state of Israel, and for those statements and threats they deserve our clear and unequivocal condemnation. Israel should know that the international community is united in condemnation of this violent and abhorrent rhetoric and the world view that it reveals—there can be no excuse and no defence for such outrageous and inflammatory language about any member of the international community, and it should be condemned without qualification—but Israel should also understand that its friends in the international community see Iran acquiring nuclear weapons as affecting not only Israel’s security alone, but the security of the broader region and indeed the world.
	The non-proliferation treaty is clear: Iran can have civilian nuclear power, but it must not have nuclear weapons. If Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon, its capacity to destabilise the middle east would be enhanced. It is disconcerting to be at odds with a distinguished former Foreign Secretary on my own Benches, my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), but I believe that the potential response from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others would put at risk the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In so unstable a region, the chance of a nuclear weapon being used again would significantly increase.
	Several Members have mentioned the IAEA’s latest report, issued last November, which sent the clearest warning yet that Iran had carried out tests
	“relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device”.
	As this debate takes place, IAEA representatives are in Iran having talks aimed at clarifying the possible military aspects of its nuclear programme. Everyone in the House is aware of the decades of failed negotiations, despite the best efforts of some Members present today, and the numerous Iranian breaches of the terms of the NPT. Iran is a signatory of the treaty and so is under obligations to comply with its terms, but despite that, Iran hid an enrichment programme for nearly 18 years. As a result, the Security Council has rightly decreed that until Iran’s peaceful intentions can be established it should stop all enrichment, and has imposed seven rounds of UN sanctions in the face of continued Iranian defiance.
	The IAEA report sets out clearly that Iran is not complying with its international obligations and therefore the intentions behind its nuclear activities cannot be accounted for. Alongside the deception, secrecy and concealment that has characterised Iran’s relationship with the IAEA, the report for the first time highlights evidence to suggest that Iran is undertaking activities that could indicate a military dimension to its nuclear programme. To quote directly from the report:
	“The information indicates that Iran has carried out the following activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.”
	Following the publication of that most recent report, the IAEA board of governors passed a resolution expressing “deep and increasing concern” over the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and said it was
	“essential” that Iran provide additional information and access to the IAEA. We are right to heed the IAEA’s warnings.

John Baron: Can the right hon. Gentleman provide any evidence that the theory of nuclear deterrence would not be effective in this region, as it has been in others? India and Pakistan have fought wars and shown nuclear restraint. The evidence suggests that Iran is no more irrational than any other country. Can he provide the evidence to counter that assertion?

Douglas Alexander: The environment in the middle east—the sectarian divides, the history of tension and its multifaceted nature—surpasses even that of India and Pakistan in its potential threat not just to regional security but to global security. It would be a very brave or very naive individual who, in the absence of the sorts of communication that were the foundation of our capacity to maintain peace over the 50 years of the cold war, presumed that we could feel confident that, whether intentionally or inadvertently, there would not be a heightened risk of nuclear conflict in the region. That is why it is right that the House tries today to speak with one voice in urging on the Iranians a different course from the one implicit in the scenario that the hon. Gentleman depicted, which is the development of nuclear weapons.

Malcolm Rifkind: My hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) has twice mentioned nuclear deterrence, but would the right hon. Gentleman agree that nuclear deterrence requires a threat from a nuclear armed state to deter another country with a nuclear weapon? Other than the Saudis and other Arab states themselves becoming nuclear weapon states, that would require an American nuclear umbrella guarantee, with all its implications, including American bases in the region, for the indefinite future?

Douglas Alexander: I listened with great care to the point that the distinguished former Foreign Secretary made about the American security guarantee and the potential for basing within the Gulf and elsewhere. I would also suggest, though, that given the financing of A. Q. Khan in the past, one would also need at least to countenance the possibility that, rather than rely on an American nuclear umbrella, other states in the region might take matters into their own hands. Although it might take 10 or 15 years for the development of nuclear technology, it could spur the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other means, principally financial, rather than through research. We should work extremely hard to avoid any of those scenarios in these circumstances.

Angie Bray: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that there would be not only a scramble among other nations in the middle east to get hold of nuclear weapons to balance things out, but a danger that some of the weapons would fall into the hands of terrorists and so be even more difficult to control?

Douglas Alexander: We must do everything in our power to avoid nuclear weapons first proliferating and secondly falling into the hands of non-state actors. When we reflect even for a moment, as the Foreign Secretary did
	for the elucidation of the House, on the track record of the regime in Tehran in supporting non-state actors and their violent methods, even in recent days, we should redouble our efforts to avoid a scenario in which Tehran would have that choice. That would be a deeply worrying prospect not only for its immediate neighbours but for global security more generally.

Stewart Jackson: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that it would be foolish to take any options off the table, given that many foreign policy specialists believe that President Ahmadinejad is under severe threat, that he and his supporters might be removed from the parliamentary elections in 2012, and that he might be excluded from the presidency in 2013 and replaced by revolutionary guard-supported politicians and a more theocratic, militarist, jihadist regime?

Douglas Alexander: For the reasons that I have outlined and will continue to outline, I believe that it would be wrong to take those options off the table. When calibrating the way forward, one has to factor in the potential for change within the Iranian regime, given the prospect of elections next month. We are facing some critical months in terms of judgments to be reached in Tehran and elsewhere. That is why the responsible course at this juncture is to advance the twin-track approach that has characterised the attitude of the international community.

Paul Flynn: Does my right hon. Friend think that, although the Foreign Secretary rightly condemned what were probably terrorist attacks by Iran, he failed to attack incidents involving major explosions in Tehran, a cyber-attack against Tehran and the murder of four of Iran’s scientists? If we are to be taken as honest brokers, is it not right that we attack terrorism on both sides and insist on transparency not only in Iran but in Israel?

Douglas Alexander: There is surely consensus on both sides of the House on the desire for a peaceful resolution to this crisis. That is why I argue that the strengthening of the sanctions regime to an unprecedented level is a necessary response to the growing tensions. All of us have an interest in a peaceful resolution.

Menzies Campbell: I do not want to embark on a theological discussion about deterrence, but does the right hon. Gentleman accept that the effectiveness of deterrence depends on the party against which nuclear weapons might be used being unwilling to accept the consequences of using them? To base the whole issue of non-proliferation in the middle east on something so uncertain—the regime is renowned for its uncertainty—would be very dangerous.

Douglas Alexander: I have some sympathy with that view. I will argue that there have been instances where the regime in Tehran has come to judge where its own self-interest lies, and the continued pursuit of sanctions reflects that reality. That said, I sympathise with the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s broader point about what is implicit within a relationship of deterrence. That is why, despite my appearance on the “Murnaghan” show on Sky television yesterday morning, I was rather restrained in my mild rebuke to the Foreign Secretary over his cold war analogy. He was more accurate in describing the potential risk of an arms race, but I would
	not say that the cold war is the perfect historical parallel. First, it involved a global struggle for supremacy, and it mischaracterises the threat that we are confronting in the middle east to suggest that there is a perfect parallel with a global struggle for supremacy. Secondly, it is fair to say that mechanisms were developed during the cold war that allowed for a peaceful resolution. In that sense, it was in some ways a prospect more favourable than that which we are facing now, unless we find a resolution as I have described.
	I have been generous in taking a number of interventions. I would now like to make a little progress. What would I, on behalf of the Opposition, argue is the way forward? In my view, there has been too much discussion in recent days of possible military action and too little discussion of how diplomacy can still succeed. As one of my colleagues suggested, we must avoid talk of the possibility of military action becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Our efforts must focus on how we can use all the diplomatic tools available to force the Iranian Government to change course. In the past, Iranian leaders have adjusted their behaviour in the face of international pressures—ending the war with Iraq in 1988 and stopping assassinations of Iranian dissidents in the 1990s are just some of the most significant examples.
	Evidence is now accumulating that the sanctions are beginning to put unparalleled pressure on the Iranian regime. Sanctions in place for many years now on exporting materials relevant to the development of nuclear weapons have slowed Iran’s nuclear programme and directly hindered its ability to develop next-generation centrifuges. The combined effect of international sanctions on the Iranian financial sector, including steps taken by the Government last year, has triggered an enormous currency devaluation, which the regime is struggling to contain. The Iranian Government can no longer access reputable sources of international credit, insurance for its merchant fleets or investors for its state-led infrastructure programs. Crucially, Iran is struggling to find investors to revitalise its dilapidated energy infrastructure, which requires billions in new investment if production levels are to be maintained. Alongside that, the oil embargo, of which we have already heard a little, is increasing the strain on the Iranian regime even before the EU embargo comes into full force on 1 July.
	Despite rejecting offers of talks in past years, Iran has now signalled that it is willing to resume talks with the E3 plus 3, and reports suggest that Iran’s supreme national security council replied last week to a letter from Cathy Ashton, on behalf of the European Union, inviting Iran to resume those talks without preconditions. Those are encouraging signs, but let me be clear that we must remain vigilant against the prospect of Iran seeking to draw out talks while continuing its nuclear programme unabated. The Opposition welcome the diplomatic steps that the international community has so far taken: the United Nations Security Council has passed seven resolutions on Iran in less than six years, and the EU, the US, and the UK Government and others have all taken important steps in recent months to increase further the pressure on Iran. However, despite those efforts, we have seen too little progress. What is needed now is a more concerted and co-ordinated international response. At this crucial time, it is vital that we remain focused on pursuing the twin-track approach, which remains our best route to resolving the crisis.
	As we have heard, sanctions are not designed to punish the Iranian people. They are intended to increase pressure on the regime, and those pressures now seem to be mounting. This month, the Iranian Parliament voted to hold a special session to force President Ahmadinejad to account for some of the dire economic and social indicators in Iran today. Unemployment is high, growth is low and anger is mounting. The Iranian regime is beginning to show signs of doubt as to whether the cost of international isolation is simply too great a price to pay. Alongside that, parliamentary elections to elect new members of Islamic consultative assembly are due to be held in Iran on 2 March. They may offer yet another opportunity for the regime to change course and for a new leadership to steer Iran away from the brink of international isolation. The Iranian political calendar, the internal political dynamics, and the domestic economic and social pressures all imply that the next few months could be crucial.
	The motion focuses on the use of military action, which has rightly been the subject of much debate in the House today. The risks facing the region are real, but I believe we must make it clear to our friends in Israel that now is not the time for a pre-emptive strike. However, notwithstanding our view that pre-emptive action should not be taken now, we are firm in our view that all options must remain on the table. That is because the prospects for a diplomatic resolution are enhanced, not undermined, by all options remaining on the table at the present time. Leaving all options on the table actually strengthens the international community’s hand in negotiations and therefore increases the likelihood of achieving a peaceful resolution, to which I believe the whole House is committed.

Edward Leigh: Wars often start because of an element of uncertainty, so let us be quite clear: notwithstanding the fact that the Opposition favour negotiations at this point, is it the Labour party’s position that we must not tolerate Iran being nuclear-armed?

Douglas Alexander: I have said on the record previously that the cost of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is too high. I could not be clearer that this is an issue not simply for Iran’s immediate regional neighbours, but for the whole international community. That is why I am grateful for the Foreign Secretary’s gracious acknowledgment that the position being advanced by the British Government today is entirely consistent with the position that was advanced when Labour was in office.

Michael Ellis: The right hon. Gentleman has been gracious in most of his remarks about the Foreign Secretary, but as he has said, he did not agree with the cold war analogy. Will he clarify the Labour party’s position on that? Is it not the case that, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) pointed out, we are talking about the difference between a hot war—a fiery and more immediate conflagration—and a cold war-type scenario, where Iran has a nuclear device, with all the hostilities and the fractious situation that would evolve from that, potentially over the very long term? The analogy with the cold war is therefore quite accurate in the circumstances.

Douglas Alexander: I remain unconvinced. I listened with care to the explanation of his remarks in The Daily Telegraph that the Foreign Secretary offered on the Andrew Marr programme yesterday morning, but it is really up to him to elucidate the analogy he chose to set before the public. My view is clear: this is a point at which we need clear minds and cool heads. We need to ensure that the language we use is consistent with the approach, which I welcome, that the Foreign Secretary set out before the House today: that there should be a 100% focus on finding a diplomatic resolution.
	In line with the arguments that I have put to the House, the Opposition support the amendment, which is supported by two former Foreign Secretaries as well as by Members from across the House. In the spirit of that amendment, we agree that the Government should focus their efforts on finding a negotiated solution to the nuclear issue and recognise the value of making it clear to Iran that all options remain on the table, but the threat of military action must not be allowed to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Now is not the time for a pre-emptive strike on Iran. Now is the time for redoubling our diplomatic efforts to capitalise on the progress that is being made.
	Let no one doubt that Iran presents a real and urgent threat. We should be doing all we can to dissuade Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. With Iran feeling the pressure from co-ordinated international sanctions, I believe that the prospects for finding a diplomatic resolution have been enhanced, not diminished. The coming months are crucial. To digress, deviate or dither at this crucial stage would be to undermine the months and, indeed, years of diplomatic and co-ordinated efforts to increase pressure on the regime and promote dialogue as the path to a peaceful resolution of this issue.

Several hon. Members: rose —

Nigel Evans: Order. The eight-minute limit now comes into effect, with the usual injury time for interventions.

Richard Ottaway: I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), who is a valued member of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, on securing this debate. He is at least consistent: he voted against the intervention in Iraq, the intervention in Libya and the Foreign Affairs Committee report on Afghanistan, and now he wants to rule out an attack on Iran. I respect his point of view, but I believe that he is underestimating the challenge facing the western world and the civilised world.
	The Iranians are tough so-and-sos. As the Foreign Secretary rightly pointed out, they have sacked our embassy in Tehran, they are propping up the regime in Syria, they are undermining peace efforts in Afghanistan and Syria, and they are supporting terrorism around the world. In my view—it is quite clearly also the view of many people in this Chamber—it is critical that we do not blink first. The production or potential production of nuclear weapons has the ability to destabilise the region, with profound global impact. My hon. Friend says that the threat of military action is counter-productive. I am sorry to say this, but I simply do not agree. I believe that if we take this option off the table, the
	Iranians will go full throttle, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) pointed out, in a speech of lucidity that I can only envy. It ill behoves anyone to quote Chairman Mao in support of their argument, but it was he who said that peace comes from the end of the barrel of a gun. That is particularly pertinent here, and we must keep the option on the table.
	There are four ways through the growing mess: diplomacy, sanctions, a military strike or learning to live with a nuclear Iran. Diplomacy has clearly not succeeded, despite countless United Nations resolutions. I remember when the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) was making regular visits to Tehran. I was a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the time, and I remember meeting him there on one occasion. He tried valiantly, but I felt at the time that he should have pushed harder and that we should have threatened sanctions at a much earlier stage. I was left with the feeling that he was trying to do something about the situation without having any conviction as to what it might achieve.

Jack Straw: If the hon. Gentleman looks at the record, he will see that we were working in concert with Germany and France, and with the tacit but quite active support of the United States. This was before the E3 plus 3 architecture got going. Those negotiations were tough, but they produced a positive result at the time. That is what followed from the October 2003 negotiations. Furthermore, it is my belief that had President Khatami been allowed to stay in place, with all that that would have entailed, we could have made further progress. It was others in the regime who decided to undermine him and the progress that we had made.

Richard Ottaway: I do not want to be unduly critical of the right hon. Gentleman. I recognise that he believed that he was doing the right thing at the time, but, as history illustrates, it was not enough to deter the regime.
	A second course of action involves sanctions and, as I have said, I wish that they had been imposed much earlier. It is possible that they might work, and one can only hope, genuinely and passionately, that they will. They must be as tough as possible, and I look with dismay at the slow speed with which our European Union partners wish to impose them. I understand that Greece, of all countries, is holding up their full imposition until it can get its own oil contracts in position. Sanctions can be effective. The United States has the ability to jam up the financial markets and the oil trading markets, which would have a significant and profound impact.
	The Iranians have threatened to shut the straits of Hormuz; I believe that to be a completely hollow threat. The straits are defendable. When I served in the Royal Navy in the 1960s, I was based in Bahrain. Even in those days, we had a game plan for the region. Now, the Iranians are faced with the full might of the US sixth fleet, which, I have to say, I would not want to take on in these circumstances.
	If sanctions fail, there will be no other choice than that between a military strike and learning to live with a nuclear Iran. I am sorry that my hon. Friend has left the Chamber. We are having a debate about intervention. Support for non-intervention is a perfectly respectable point of view that is held by Russia and China and a
	number of South American states. The common factor for all those regimes is that their democracy is either weak, non-existent or new.
	I have to confess that I am a reluctant interventionist. I was quite prepared to oppose the intervention in Libya until the United Nations resolution went through. It is hard to oppose a successful campaign in those circumstances. I would hesitate to intervene in Syria without UN backing, although diplomacy is clearly failing. I was not persuaded that the UN resolutions on Iraq gave proper cover for military intervention, and I was against such an intervention until the then Prime Minister stood at the Dispatch Box and persuaded me that the security of the western world was threatened. This illustrates that the only occasions on which we should intervene in such circumstances are those in which we have the backing of a UN resolution or those in which our interests are threatened.
	In these circumstances, our interests are threatened by a nuclear Iran. It has been pointed out that there is a possibility of a nuclear arms race in the middle east. I believe that Saudi Arabia will want a bomb, and that it will be in contact with Pakistan to ask it to supply one. What really worries me about Iran having a nuclear weapon is that I am left with the feeling that it might, in certain circumstances, actually use it. Many countries with nuclear powers hold them exclusively for the purpose of self-defence. The Iranians might not use the weapons themselves. They might use them in a proxy manner, supplying terrorists with radioactive material for a dirty bomb to be used in a western capital. Either way, this is going to be messy.
	As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington said, if there were to be a military strike, moderate Arab opinion would not be too upset. The hard-liners are now distracted: Syria, Libya and Egypt are out of action, and Russia and China might huff and puff, but I do not believe that they would make a serious move in the event of a strike. I genuinely believe that we would live to regret Iran getting the bomb, and that an attack might be the least bad option.

Angie Bray: Does my hon. Friend accept that there are certain movements in Iran, notably the green movement, that are working below the surface for change? What weight does he attach to the argument that too much sabre-rattling could alienate such movements from the pro-western stance that they have been taking?

Richard Ottaway: There is a confusing situation in Iran. My hon. Friend is right, however. As the shadow Foreign Secretary pointed out, progress is being made, and negotiations are starting again. I am slightly cynical about how effective they will be at this stage, however. I repeat that an attack is the least bad option, and we can only pray that either sanctions or sanity will prevail, so that this whole debate becomes completely academic.

Elfyn Llwyd: I congratulate the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on securing this important and timely debate. I will not go through the history of the sanctions, but I believe that more effort needs to be made along diplomatic lines. We need to consider smart sanctions and to think about hitting the elite in Iran rather than
	the most vulnerable, as has happened in the past. One problem with sanctions is that they can sometimes be a blunt tool.
	I anticipate being in a small minority this evening when I vote for the motion. I was in that position in the Iraq debate, but I believe that I was right. The evidence was not in the least convincing, and the evidence now is not in the least convincing either. However many people criticise the way in which I vote this evening, I shall do so according to my conscience, and according to what I have learned, read and understood. We are all sensible to the fact that every possible effort will be made to go down the diplomatic route; everyone wants that to happen. I believe, however, that the sabre-rattling and leaving the threat of military force on the table could ratchet up the tension, making a diplomatic resolution impossible.
	The Russia Today news channel reported two weeks ago that the United States was carrying out military drills based on simulations of the shape and width of the straits of Hormuz. The Iranians were participating in their own war games in the straits at the end of December, and if those news reports are true, they could indicate that the US is even now preparing for a stand-off, or worse. Similarly, concern has been expressed by Israel about the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons. The assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists and the threat of pre-emptive strikes from Israel both bring their own sense of chill. That would, of course, be the quickest possible way to inflame the situation outside of international diplomacy, and it would be a step that nobody in this Chamber or elsewhere wants to see. The same might be true of Saudi Arabia, which has spoken of increasing its nuclear power technology and has explicitly linked it with weapons technology. This has taken place in the context of various UN resolutions, with which it has to be said Iran is not fully complying—no one could say that it is.
	It is important to have a level playing field in our approach to the middle east. That is why I believe the US diplomats who have spoken, via WikiLeaks, about Mr Amano are making a grave mistake and performing a grave disservice. They said:
	“This meeting, Amano’s first bilateral review since his election, illustrates the very high degree of convergence between his priorities and our own agenda at the IAEA. The coming transition period provides a further window for us to shape Amano’s thinking before his agenda collides with the IAEA Secretariat bureaucracy.”
	We need to show that international organisations are neutral, but that kind of talk is not conducive to such thinking, and I believe it will only inflame the situation so far as Iran is concerned.
	There has been criticism of the positions adopted by Russia and China at the UN Security Council and of their unwillingness to support the US and UK position. We saw similar frustration over Syria a few weeks ago, when those two powers used their veto. Although the impulse to act is understandable, so is the rational concern that acting in haste might lead to a greater problem. That is clear for all to see if we reflect on what happened in Iraq, for example.
	Some comments made about Iran sound like the echoes of the run-up to war in Iraq a decade ago—for example, the assertion that nuclear weapons existed, even though they could not be pinpointed or proved in
	the least; the stereotyping of a country so that it could be easily demonised through the media; and the ramping up of rhetoric to justify an invasion that could not be substantiated in international law or by the pretext of humanitarian assistance.

Zac Goldsmith: I share the right hon. Gentleman’s views on Iraq, which is why I strongly opposed the war. I agree with most people that war is an appalling prospect in any circumstances and I concur with his scepticism about the intelligence, but does he not agree that if this House were to rule out the possibility of war and if other Parliaments around the world were to do the same, it would almost guarantee giving Iran a green light to develop the bomb, which we all so fear?

Elfyn Llwyd: The hon. Gentleman is right that that is the core of the debate. It is where he and I disagree. He may be right; I may be right. I know not, but this is the debate we are having. I do not pretend to be an expert in international law, but I heard it said that Iran will not be favoured; nobody wants to favour its position.

Paul Flynn: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the immediate priority is to ensure that the present war of words does not deteriorate into a war of weapons, and that our task should be to reduce tension, not to increase it?

Elfyn Llwyd: That is absolutely right. I referred to sabre-rattling, and the hon. Gentleman puts it succinctly. That is not the way to have a diplomatic dialogue with any country.
	We might not like the Government of Iran. Its human rights record remains appalling, despite reports last week that it is looking at revising its penal code. There are many Governments around the world, however, with whom we would not agree. Iran is a highly developed and complex society, and stereotyping makes it easier to demonise and create an atmosphere of fear based around simple sketches of society and the dehumanisation of those within it. It seems we have quickly forgotten the scenes in Tehran in 2009 when the green revolution was taking place and millions voted for Mousavi. Iran has a highly developed middle class, which often disagrees with Ahmadinejad. My point is to remind us all that the spirit of democracy is alive and well, and that when we make international judgments we should remember that the Government are not always representative of the views of their people.
	As a party, we believe in being internationalist and in being committed to peace and justice. We are also strong believers in the importance of international law and diplomacy. We support the United Nations and we would like to see it strengthened. We reject weapons of mass destruction and military alliances based on the possession thereof. We support a role for the European Union in conflict prevention and peacekeeping. These, I think, must be our core aims, but as we speak, the drums of war are beating—and they are a ghastly echo of the run-up to the Iraq conflict. We must ensure that we do everything possible through every diplomatic means to silence those drums of war.
	I hope that the IAEA’s mission in Tehran this week is unequivocally successful. With elections in Iran and in the US this year, we know that there is a lot of political
	mileage in talking tough and ramping up the rhetoric. Our role in this House, however, is surely to listen to the facts, make a calm and reasoned examination of the situation and scrutinise the actions taken on our behalf by our Government. I hope that every effort is made to pursue each and every diplomatic avenue vigorously in order to avoid war and the accompanying destruction of countries and lives. We should pause and listen to reason from informed observers.
	One such person is Hans Blix, whose essay was published in the New Statesman of 20 February. He said that the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the middle east was originally advanced in 1974 in a UN General Assembly Resolution sponsored by Egypt and Iran. That was obviously aimed at Israel. He continued by saying that
	“the idea of an agreement between the parties in the Middle East—including Israel and Iran—to renounce”
	nuclear weapons
	“does not seem far-fetched to me”.
	He went on to refer to a recent poll in Israel in which a substantial majority of Israeli people said that they thought it would be better to have no state in the middle east with nuclear weapons than to have two states with them. I commend this article to all those listening to this debate. I believe that the motion is consistent with the good thinking of that article.

Nicholas Soames: I start by warmly congratulating my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) on what was a remarkable, almost unanswerable, speech. I also congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on giving the House this opportunity to conduct this important debate. Although I am afraid that I cannot agree with him, I greatly respect the consistency and sincerely held nature of his views. Naturally, I agree with some of them.
	It is impossible not to agree that we are right to be deeply distrustful of the Iranian regime. It is, after all, in breach of so many of its most serious obligations, and it is responsible for the brutal suppression of its people, for endless tail-tweaking and interference with its neighbours and elsewhere—putting it beyond the pale in many respects. It is safe to say that the mistrust is entirely mutual, so where do we start?
	It is difficult to be optimistic about the opportunities in 2012. Without wanting to be rude about our revered American friends’ almost unbelievable campaign rhetoric, I think it unlikely that any approach to Iran would be regarded as anything other than appeasement. At the same time, Iran has its own elections this year. No doubt its contempt for the great Satan and his friend the United Kingdom will be on further public show.
	In common with my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay, I was taken by Peter Jenkins’ article in The Timesrecently, in which he argued that if we made a deal and allowed the Iranians to continue to enrich uranium, it would be in the interests of all for there to be a proper monitoring regime consistent with the IAEA rules. If that were possible and Iran volunteered some confidence-building measures, it would be very much in our interest to have constant inspection.
	However—like every other Member who has spoken—I fear an Israeli attack on Iran, and I do not agree with the former Foreign Secretary, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington, that the effects of such an attack would be purely temporary. I think that it would lock in the Islamic republic for a generation, that it would cement the appalling Syrian regime, that it would radicalise Arab opinion at a moment of the most delicate long-term, difficult transition, that it would ignite Hezbollah on the Lebanese border, and that it would boost Hamas. It would undoubtedly lead to a series of violent terrorist acts, it would propel the price of oil through the roof and trigger a possible regional war and, at best, it would set back Iran’s nuclear ambitions for only a few years.
	Although there are no circumstances in which I would countenance a renunciation of the use of force, and although I wholly support the amendment tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington, I also support the Foreign Secretary’s admirable determination that diplomacy, negotiation and constant, unremitting effort to resolve this matter should be the order of the day.

Jack Straw: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Nicholas Soames: I will not—oh, well, of course.

Jack Straw: I am extremely grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, who is making a powerful point. Would he care to add the further point that as a result of the Arab spring, the popularity of President Ahmadinejad and the Iranian regime throughout the Arab world has plummeted—according to all the polls—from about 85% before those events began to between 5% and 10%? Were this conflagration to happen, that would of course change radically.

Nicholas Soames: I agree. I think that the Arab spring is a very fragile flower, and that we must guard it with great care.
	The role of the British Government should be clear: we should encourage every effort to ease tensions, and, for our own part, try to repair diplomatic relations. In that regard in particular, our strong connections and relationships in Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are extremely important in maintaining stability and retaining peace in the region. We need to work alongside them, the United States and Saudi Arabia.
	I hope that our Government will be bold, and will be prepared to explore—either with or without our immediate allies and if necessary, of course, in secret—the options for setting the choreography, which is always so critical in these difficult matters, of who does what and in what order. I remember well that, in the midst of the cold war negotiations with the Soviet Union, it was considered essential for us to develop confidence-building measures so that each side could convince itself, through some small but significant successes—that could convince everyone—that it was worth working with the other side, and thus allow diplomacy to bear fruit. We in Britain must remember those lessons.
	Given the American elections on the one hand and the Iranian elections on the other, this is a good time to think about some specific steps that could be taken in regard to confidence-building. I am sure that the IAEA
	will have some very good ideas on the technical side, and perhaps we could promote a protocol to prevent “incidents at sea”. I believe that it is only a question of time before some ill-disciplined patrol boat sets off a major shooting match in the strait of Hormuz. Perhaps we could also co-operate in dealing with drugs from Afghanistan. Iran, the United States and Afghanistan, perhaps with specialist European Union help, might be able to work together on controlling the flow of narcotics from Afghanistan into Iran. We know that Iran is worried about that, and of course we are very worried about it too.

Paul Flynn: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Nicholas Soames: I will not, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me.
	Whatever steps are taken, they must not loosen the sanctions regime or, indeed, involve a renunciation of the possible use of force, but must rather show that we are serious about progress and the possibility—if it could be there—of reaching a peaceful agreement.
	I do not believe that Iran has any interest in outright war, whether with the United States or with the wider international community. In my judgment, its actions and reactions must be seen through the prism of coercion. It is applying what coercive tools it has—for example, the ability to restrict traffic through the strait of Hormuz, or the use of terrorist proxies around the world—in response to the west’s application of its own coercive tools, such as the escalation of sanctions. New sanctions will cause damage to Iran. They will almost certainly enrich its strongmen, but they will not directly affect the nuclear programme. Unless we are prepared to break out of the conventional approach, this dance will get worse and worse.
	The Foreign Secretary and his fellow Ministers have re-marshalled and re-energised the efforts of the foreign service to the great advantage of this country, and are in the process of revitalising the new global networks that will in future constitute a global super-highway through which great diplomatic and international disputes will be settled. I was very impressed by the line taken by the Foreign Secretary tonight, and with the commitment that he showed. I appeal to him to ensure that we in Britain use all our resources, all our relationships, and all our influence and help—quite apart from our relationship with the United States of America, and our conventional relationships in the Commonwealth, the European Union, the United Nations and the IAEA—to get ourselves into a position in which we can at least agree on some future ground rules for engagement and progress in the future. I fear that, in the absence of such action, this dispute has the potential to have the most dreadful long-term consequences, and we must avoid those at all costs.

Louise Ellman: I join others in congratulating the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron). It is important for us to have a full opportunity to discuss the growing concerns about Iran’s activities to develop nuclear weapons. I fervently hope that those activities can be stopped by
	peaceful means, hopefully through negotiation or sanctions, and I think it is essential for all international efforts to be directed towards that end.
	I want to explain in my brief speech why this matter is of such concern, and why it is of international concern. First, the Iranian regime is domestically a savage regime that attacks dissent. Last year alone, more than 600 dissenters were executed. The UN’s special rapporteur has reported attacks on, and persecution of, groups including Arabs, Kurds, Christians, Baha’is, and gay people. On 3 February this year, 11 violent raids were made on the homes of Baha’i people in Shiraz. That was just the latest episode in official attempts to eradicate the Baha’is as a group, and it is just one example of Iran’s persecution of its own peoples.
	Secondly, Iran threatens international peace, because it exports terrorism and provokes conflict, preventing peaceful solutions to long-standing conflicts. I refer specifically to its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and for Hamas in Gaza. There is clear evidence that it is not just promoting terrorism, but supplying weapons and training to those groups. One of its main aims is to prevent a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Until the events of the Arab spring earlier this year, we were told that that conflict was the only issue in the middle east. We now know that that is not correct, but Iran’s efforts were and still are designed to prevent a peaceful solution there.

Michael Ellis: I congratulate the hon. Lady on her comments. Does she agree that, as well as supporting terrorist proxies in the middle east, Iran has been responsible for an attempt to assassinate an ambassador—the Saudi ambassador—on American soil, has sacked the British embassy in Tehran, and in many other ways has behaved in the international community in a way that is completely inconsistent with the behaviour of a civilised nation state?

Louise Ellman: I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman. Iran exports terrorism, and is a force for instability. Last year 80 Iranian Katyushas went to Gaza and continued the conflict there, and in March 2011 the Israeli navy seized 50 tonnes of weapons from Iranian-loaded ships bound for Gaza. Those attempts by Iran—the supporting of terrorism and the provision of arms to perpetuate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—are underlined by its continually expressed theological objection to the very existence of the state of Israel.
	Another major reason for being concerned about the possibility of Iran promoting and perhaps using nuclear weapons is its pro-genocidal activities. It has repeatedly called for Israel to be wiped off the face of the map. That, combined with repeated holocaust denial, including the outrage of holding an international conference in Iran to see who could produce the “best” cartoon on holocaust denial, is just another example of Iran’s motivation and Iran’s danger. In February last year, Ayatollah Khamenei referred once again to Israel as a “cancerous tumour” that had to be removed, and this February, his chief strategist stated:
	“In the name of Allah, Iran must attack Israel by 2014.”
	I cite those examples to illustrate the danger that Iran poses to peace, not only in the middle east, but throughout the world. As my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary said, what Iran does in the middle east has
	repercussions outside that region, potentially in the whole world. That is why it is so important that this genocidal regime, which already exports terrorism by practical means, must be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons. I fully support all international efforts to secure that by negotiation and by sanctions, if necessary, but it is vital that everyone understands how important it is to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed power. If it were to acquire nuclear weapons, as it now seems determined to do, that would provoke a new arms race across the middle east, and it would mean the exporting of more terrorism and perhaps the equipping of those terrorists with nuclear weapons. That is why I will be supporting the amendment and why I hope it will receive universal support.

Ben Wallace: At the outset, may I declare that I co-chair the all-party group on Iran with the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), and that I have held that position for the past six years?
	I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on securing this timely debate, because it is important that the House moves to more discussion of Iran. From what I have heard so far, the debate has been very good, and I have certainly enjoyed the contributions of my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex (Nicholas Soames), whose speech was extremely good and clear about where we are trying to go and the problems we face, and the right hon. Member for Blackburn. I also congratulate the Foreign Secretary on making it clear that the Government are not advocating force or even calling for force to deal with this problem. One of the problems I have with the motion is that although I do not think military action is the correct way forward, given the current position in Iran, I also do not believe that we should ever tie a Government—I do not believe in the principle of ruling something out of such a policy. We have to examine events as they come and see what develops.
	I am not going to argue the point about the International Atomic Energy Agency and whether Iran is developing a nuclear weapon. It might be more suitable to have this debate after the inspection is completed and we see the reports from the recent access in Iran. What worries me is what happens after this stage. In the six years that I have done this job in the all-party group, I have never met an official in the United States Government, in the Foreign Office or in the Israeli Government who privately has not said to me, “If Iran thinks it wants a bomb and is really determined to have one, it will get it.”
	I am also yet to find many officials who say that they think sanctions will work in the long term to prevent Iran from getting what it has desired not for five or 10 years, but since 1968. In fact, the Americans helped the Shah to build the reactor in Iran; General Electric was involved in that. It has been a long-standing ambition of Iran to possess nuclear power for energy and, I suspect, for nuclear weapons to add to its view that it is a superpower in not only the region, but the world. It did not launch a tortoise and an insect up into space a few years ago just for fun; it did so to show that it, too, could enter the space race. Unfortunately, Iran was entering that race about 40 years too late, but that was very much about the psyche of Iran and Iran saying, “We, too, can do it. We, too, can be a superpower.”
	We have to ask ourselves the question: what happens if Iran produces a bomb? Both Pakistan and India produced a bomb, as did North Korea, in isolation. If Iran does produce a bomb or gets close to doing so, we must ask ourselves what the plan B is and what we are to do. That is where the question for the United Kingdom becomes separate from the question for Israel and the United States. The question for Britain and Her Majesty’s Government is: is it in Britain’s interest to take military action? I know what is in Israel’s national interest, and I defend Israel’s taking that action to defend itself, but that is not the same as what is in Britain’s national interest. The challenge for the policy makers and for the Government will be to prove to this House and to my constituents why taking some form of military action, most likely outside the United Nations and perhaps in support of only one or two other countries—Israel and the United States—is in the interests of my constituents and in the interest of the national security of Britain. That is a much further jump to make from today’s situation.
	We need to point out differences between Iraq and Iran. Until recently, Iran certainly ruled by consent—we did not like it and we did not choose the policies, but it ruled by consent. Saddam Hussein never ruled by consent and was a military dictator in the region, and although we should rightly be concerned about Iran’s moving—it is more than drifting—towards being a totalitarian state, we must remember that there are differences.
	We must also remember how things appear from an Iranian point of view. If you are an Iranian, your neighbourhood is not very nice; Saudi Arabia is ideologically opposed to the Shi’a sect and thinks that you are heretics. I come from and live in Lancashire, where in the 17th century puritans and Catholics were hammering each other, and the view is the same in this region. Pakistan developed a nuclear weapon and was rewarded with a seat at the top table. That part of the world is unstable, and the arms race has already started; Israel possesses a nuclear weapon and it refuses to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Iranians will feel that there is an inconsistency in the west’s position. A number of resolutions, both at the IAEA and the UN, have asked Israel to sign up to that treaty, but it is has consistently refused to do so. That consistency is where we have to start.
	We could also try to redouble our efforts on other measures. I congratulate the Foreign Office on the investment that has been made in the past few years to try to double our presence around the world, or to increase it in many embassies. However, we have to know our opponent when we are dealing with Iran. It is full of a separation of powers and full of personalities, because that is how the politics is decided there. The right hon. Member for Blackburn knew that when he tried that communication.

Bob Stewart: My hon. Friend mentions differences within Iran, and there are huge differences of opinion with Ahmadinejad; hundreds were killed after he was elected, five people were hanged last night in Tehran and the middle classes are against him. We may well find in the next few months or years that he cannot stay in power and is replaced. Let us just hope that that happens and sense comes from the people of Iran, because I am not sure that we can do very much from the outside.

Ben Wallace: I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention. He rightly says, first, that Ahmadinejad will not be able to stay in power, because he is term limited; this is the end of his term as President and someone else will emerge in the next elections. My hon. Friend is also right about maintaining the momentum of the Arab spring. We must double our efforts on maintaining the momentum on the street. I approve of BBC Persian and I approve of doing much more work to support, externally and internally, opposition groups on the streets of Iran. I have not forgotten the lesson of the cold war, where Poland and the printing presses made so much difference. We should bring those lessons into Iran as much as possible.
	We need to maintain the momentum of the Arab spring, although Persia is not Arab, and be consistent in Bahrain and Syria. If we unlock Bahrain and Syria, I would pledge that, in that instance, Iran would start to turn and those middle classes and those on the streets would begin to see a difference. In Bahrain, where the Shi’a majority rose up against a Crown prince, we saw a rather lukewarm response from the west, but it was different in Libya and Syria. Let us be consistent, and push that momentum, which will help to make a difference to solving the problem.
	On the diplomatic track, I am delighted that the Foreign Secretary has reiterated that we have not broken off diplomatic relations with Iran. I urge the Foreign Office to examine whether we can send a diplomat back to Iran. We do not have to open up the embassy—we did not break relations. We need to be there. The Union Jack means something to many people on the street, and it means something to the opposition. The embassy is well used to co-ordinated protests, stones, and streets being called Bobby Sands avenue next to it as a reminder, apparently, of British imperialism. The Foreign Office used to stand for the Union Jack around the world, and we should be a bit stronger than that.

Mike Gapes: Is there not a big difference between what happened to British embassies in previous years and what was carried out, co-ordinated by elements in the regime, just a few months ago? It is not just the naming of streets but the ransacking of diplomats’ homes and of the embassy complex.

Ben Wallace: I fully agree that it is very different. I do not propose that we open the embassy as if nothing happened. If we had a diplomat in another embassy, as we have done before, we could provide visas. The strength is to open and maintain transport links to and from Iran so that people can see what is going on in Iran. Iranians could come and see what is going on in the real world outside, away from some of the manipulation. If we could secure a consulate section in another embassy, that would help.
	Every protest outside the embassy was co-ordinated by the regime, and that has been the case for 30 years. It is not new—most of this is not new. In dealing with Iran, we have to know them as well as they know themselves if we are to secure a diplomatic solution. Trying to do that in isolation, or trying to do it with the E3 plus 3 that sometimes works, but sometimes does not, depending on the mood of China and Russia, is one of our biggest challenges. Most of the sanctions that have been mentioned are unilateral, and are not
	United Nations sanctions. It would be worrying to set off down that path if we did not remember that, at the end of the day, if we were going to take the next step to military action, we did not have UN sanctions. I urge the Government, who are doing the right thing—the Foreign Secretary made the position clear—to ensure that we never stop the effort to achieve a peaceful resolution to this problem.

Bob Ainsworth: I apologise, Mr Deputy Speaker, for any mix-up that may have occurred.
	There are two people to whom the House ought to be grateful including, first, the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron). I attended the Backbench Business Committee with him to push for this debate. I made it clear that I did not agree with the motion he had drafted, but that it was important that it should be tabled. He has come to the Chamber to express an unpopular point of view. Long may people do so, because challenging the consensus in the House, as elsewhere, is enormously important. He has done so tonight to good effect, although I disagree with the motion and will not vote for it. I will vote for the amendment tabled by the other Member who has made a particularly important contribution tonight: the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind).
	We ought to be grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman because I have the greatest respect for his knowledge and experience, and for a Member with such knowledge and experience to reveal that he believes that an American military intervention in Iran would have temporary, limited consequences is of great value. It reveals—and he is not alone in this—that there is, both in America and in this country, what can only be described as a war party. That justifies the motion tabled by the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay in the first place: the notion that American could intervene militarily in yet another Muslim country with only limited, temporary consequences is believed, but it is complete and utter nonsense.
	The consequences of an American military intervention, let alone an Israeli intervention, in Iran would be profound and long-lasting, as has been said by many other Members, and it should be avoided. That is not to say that we should take the option of military intervention off the table. We are dealing with a police state. Iran is a proud country with a rich culture, a strong middle class and a young population, but they have been repressed by a bunch of paranoids. Yes, those people put a religious connotation on that, but we are dealing with a police state. History surely teaches us that we do not deal effectively with a police state by telling it before we even talk to it that, in the final analysis, if all else has failed, we will do nothing about it.
	Let us be equally wary of the people we are dealing with who are repressing the people of Iran, and of the war party, which is happy, whether it does it in the tones of the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington or in the more belligerent tones of some American politicians who are pushing us towards an end that we are all—one would hope that people in Iran wish this too—desperate to avoid. Let us voice our desperation at the same time as our determination to find a reasonable
	solution that suits the Iranian people as well as peace in the region and peace in the world. That is enormously important.

Bob Stewart: We are already doing as much diplomatically as we can, but we have to put as much effort as we can into encouraging the growth of democracy and encouraging those people who are against the Iranian Government so that somehow they have the courage and support from outside to break out and get rid of the hoodlums who are running the country and causing so much chaos throughout the world.

Bob Ainsworth: That is exactly the point that I want to come on to: the limitations of soft power on its own when dealing with a regime such as Iran.
	There are two issues that I want to raise: first, satellite communications to the people of Iran have been jammed locally, with possible health consequences because of the powerful jamming equipment that is used, and they have been jammed at source as well. We are effectively doing nothing about that. The victims have been punished, but not the perpetrators. The Iranian regime has jammed those signals, but when Eutelsat and other providers raised that with the Iranians, they were told, “Oh, dreadfully sorry, there’s not a lot we can do about it.” Then we wind up the BBC Persian service, with Farsi1, Asia News Network and Voice of America being taken off those satellite platforms, which would effectively be shut down if that did not happen. We are depriving the Iranian population of access to international opinion. We are allowing those stations to be closed, rather than taking effective legal, international action against the regime, which prevents its own people from listening to world opinion. We have to do something about that. I ask the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the hon. Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt), who is on the Treasury Bench, to take effective action within the European Union and within the international forum of the United Nations to prevent such activity to the maximum extent possible.
	There is one other area in which we can help. Increasing numbers of diplomats and others are defecting from Iran. “Defecting” is a cold war word that has almost slipped out of our vocabulary, but there are people who are so contemptuous of what they are being asked to do by the Iranian regime that they are walking away from their jobs and defecting. We are not making them as welcome as we should and thereby encouraging others to do the same. We are not allowing them access. We are not giving them visas or platforms to tell us what is going on within the system to the extent that we should do in order to expose the iniquities of the regime.
	I appeal to the Government to consider how those defectors can be encouraged. Yes, I know there is a political imperative to deal with the immigration regime, but let us look at visas for that category of people so that we can be educated about what they are being asked to do that is against the interests of their own people. Those are two areas of soft power that we ought to make work.
	Although I do not support everything he said tonight, I totally support the amendment of the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and the tone and content of the speech from the Foreign Secretary. That is absolutely the right policy, which we must stick to.

Martin Horwood: It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth). I agree with a great deal of what he said. I am pleased to support the amendment that stands in his name and in the names of the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) and many others.
	I also agree with quite a lot of what the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) said in his opening remarks. It is rather a shame that in the wording of the motion and in some of his emphasis on the nature of the evidence that we have, he has almost extracted disagreement from potential agreement. In particular, he gave the unfortunate impression at times that he was searching for excuses for the Iranian regime, when none should be given. He concentrated a great deal on the difference between circumstantial and actual evidence, when the difference is between evidence for the existence of nuclear weapons, which I do not think anybody is asserting, and the clear evidence, which I think is in the IAEA report, of intent to develop nuclear weapons. The IAEA is pretty clear about that and produces convincing evidence for that.

John Baron: May I correct the hon. Gentleman, for the record? He is wrong to suggest and almost alone in believing that I was trying to make excuses for the Iranian regime. I was making the point that mistakes have been made by both sides and opportunities have been missed by both sides, as has been acknowledged by speakers on both sides. As for his point about the report, there is a world of difference between nuclear capability and developing nuclear weapons and a decision to do so—something that is not recognised enough by the hon. Gentleman.

Martin Horwood: I agree with the hon. Gentleman about that important point, to which I shall return. He is right to emphasise the importance of evidence and that the international community on this occasion acts in response to and with proper observation of the evidence, in contrast with what has happened on other occasions. However, if we are going to trust the evidence of the IAEA, two things follow. First, we must believe the IAEA when it says that there are elements of the nuclear programme in Iran that can only be contributing towards the development of a nuclear weapons programme. If we are trusting the IAEA to produce the evidence, we must believe it when it says that. Secondly, there is the contrast with the situation before the war in Iraq, when we did not spend long enough listening to the evidence from the weapons inspectors, Hans Blix and his colleagues. In effect, military action pre-empted the end of the weapons inspection process. With hindsight, we know that there were no weapons of mass destruction present at that time, and we went to war, in my view, on a false prospectus. That is an important contrast to make.
	There are other contrasts with what happened in Iraq and the more recent military action on Libya. The Foreign Secretary said there were three important characteristics to the military action that the international community took in respect of Libya: first, it had a clear legal and humanitarian justification; secondly, there was clear regional support; and thirdly, there was explicit
	UN sanction. All those features were present in the intervention in Libya; none of them was present in the intervention and the invasion of Iraq, which is why I am still proud that Liberal Democrats opposed that at the time; and those conditions are not present now in the case of Iran, either. That is why we should be clear that we should not be talking about an attack on Iran.
	There is a further parallel with Iraq which is extremely important: that is, just how unpredictable military action can be. We all remember George Bush on an aircraft carrier in the Gulf rather prematurely celebrating victory in the war in Iraq, whereas as we know, it turned into an incredibly complex, costly and painful conflagration and insurgency, where allied troops ended up embroiled in an almost interminable series of interlocking and violent episodes. We must hesitate before we get embroiled in anything similar in the case of Iran.
	The Foreign Secretary’s remarks over the weekend, which were clearly intended to discourage others from getting involved in such a potential conflagration, were well made. His clear messages to our friends and allies in the United States and in the region were similarly well made. It might well be that a military attack to get rid of a potential nuclear programme is impossible in practice. It might require a sustained campaign of bombing over a number of sites across the entire country. We know that the nuclear programme has been dispersed in Iran, so it would be a very dangerous undertaking in any case.
	The hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay was right: we should go the extra mile for peace. I want to make it clear that the Liberal Democrats believe that a preventive attack on Iran would probably be illegal and quite possibly be unsuccessful, and it could destabilise the entire region and lead to the ignition of a war over which we would then have no control. As the right hon. Member for Mid Sussex (Nicholas Soames) said, it might well boost the likes of Hamas, Hezbollah and even al-Qaeda in the region and could undermine the fledgling democracies of the Arab spring and any potential for an equivalent Persian spring in Iran.

John Baron: Do I take it from my hon. Friend’s comments that he will stay true to the Liberal Democrat manifesto promise to rule out the use of force when it comes to Iran?

Martin Horwood: I wondered whether that would come up. That is the phraseology in the hon. Gentleman’s motion today, but it is not the phraseology that we used. We talked about opposing military action against Iran. That was written before—[Interruption.] No, it is not weasel words. It is about moving with events. It was written before the attack on the British embassy and before Iran, in effect, threatened the use of military force to close the straits of Hormuz. It would have been better to say clearly that we opposed preventive military action against Iran. That is why I do not support the motion, which rules out the use of force, apparently in any circumstances. We have minesweepers in the Gulf: if those came under attack, would we really rule out the use of force?

Alec Shelbrooke: Is not the real point about the Liberal Democrat manifesto that one simply cannot rule anything in or rule anything out in what is always a moveable feast?

Martin Horwood: Yes, I think I agree with that. Moreover, it is not always wise to say that one rules something out even if one would not actually do it. I still support the instinct of the Liberal Democrat manifesto pledge. We can say that we still oppose preventive military action against Iran and that we should pursue every possible option. The Foreign Secretary expressed exactly those sentiments. He said that we are not seeking, advocating or calling for military action. One might be able to quote that to him in a few months’ or a few years’ time and ask if he still sticks to that, in the same way that hon. Members quote the Liberal Democrat manifesto at me now. The instinct expressed is that that is the absolute last resort; that is not something that one should risk bringing about. The objective must be a peaceful and negotiated settlement. We must also avoid bringing about such an eventuality by accident. We must be careful not to box Iran into a situation where war or military action is the only action that it can take and retain what it regards as its national pride.
	Sanctions do have to be imposed and they have to be robust, otherwise Iran would be able to act with absolute impunity; but we also have to explore every possible avenue to de-escalate tension, to reduce tension and to engage diplomatic channels to try to address this crisis. That could include support for the work of the weapons inspectors or support for a regional conference on non-proliferation, which might allow Iran a pathway out, but it could also include diplomatic action that does, as the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay said, draw a distinction between nuclear capability and the actual possession of nuclear weapons. That is a situation that we have tolerated in Japan for many decades quite happily. We must not talk ourselves into a war in the area of Iran, and we must seek every possible avenue for peace. I think that that is the Foreign Secretary’s instinct, and I was very happy with his words today. I am happy to support the amendment.

Nigel Dodds: It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood). We can certainly say that the next Lib Dem manifesto will be categorical in not ruling anything out for certain or ruling anything in. It will be fairly open. A lesson has been learned, judging by what he has said.
	It is a pleasure to take part in this timely debate, which deals with one of the most important issues facing the world today, and I congratulate the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on securing it, along with others. I pay tribute to the Backbench Business Committee, which has again demonstrated its great worth in providing time for this important debate. I will be voting in favour of the amendment tabled and so eloquently proposed by the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind).
	The regime in Iran is undoubtedly the major threat to peace and security in the world, and while some—not necessarily in the House today—have sought to minimise the threat that Iran poses, it is becoming clear that Iran is determined to acquire both the capability to build its own nuclear weapons and to develop the weapons themselves. In the past week, we have had clear reports that Iran has completed the preliminary work that would allow the rapid expansion of its uranium enrichment programme at its mountain facility near the holy city of
	Qom. Like others, I believe that no nation has the right to deny other countries the right to develop their nuclear capabilities for domestic and non-military purposes, but it is clear that Iran is intent on developing a nuclear weapon, and that must be stopped. Not only would a nuclear-armed Iran mean great regional instability, but it would lead to other countries in the region wanting to acquire nuclear weapons. The proliferation of nuclear capability in a region as volatile as the middle east is something that we should all be concerned about, and we must do what we can to stop that happening.
	Clearly, the No. 1 threat is directly posed to Israel, first and foremost. The regime in Iran has made its views on Israel absolutely clear. I do not intend to repeat some of the quotes from President Ahmadinejad, but it is clear that he not only denied the holocaust, but on the 60th anniversary of the state of Israel he made it clear that
	“the reason for the Zionist regime’s existence is questioned, and this regime is on its way to annihilation.”
	In 2010, he said;
	“The nations of the region are able to eliminate the Zionist regime from the face of earth,”
	adding that the Israeli
	“regime has no future. Its life has come to an end.”
	Anyone who suggests that the use of the word “regime” refers to a particular Government as opposed to the nation state is stretching credulity.
	In November 2011, as reported in Reuters, he said:
	“This entity”—
	that is Israel—
	“can be compared to a kidney transplanted in a body that rejected it… Yes it will collapse and its end will be near.”
	There are many other examples of such statements, both from him and other senior Iranian figures. They demonstrate the thinking of the regime towards Israel and its people, and that should be a cause of great concern in the House. While such language may appear abhorrent and so over the top to many of us here in the west that they can be almost dismissed, the tragedy is that many people who say these things, in Iran in particular, really mean them. That can be seen in the fact that there is so much support in Iran for terrorism and in the clear evidence of the way in which Iran is exporting terrorism across the world.
	Clearly the threat is not only against Israel directly, but against the west in general. The most immediate threat is more of an economic threat—the threat to close the straits of Hormuz. That will affect oil prices, which will affect everything from food prices to energy costs and travel costs. The idea that a nuclear-armed Iran could exist without posing a long-lasting and permanent threat to energy supplies to the west is simply not credible. Last Friday, oil reached $120 a barrel, and it is clear that in the event of Iran getting nuclear weapons, the price of oil would go through the roof, with all that that means for the west and elsewhere.
	Iran is a threat on a number of fronts. It is a threat not only to Israel directly and to the west, but to its own citizens. Members on both sides of the House have highlighted the vicious nature of the Iranian regime as seen in its treatment of its own citizens, particularly but not only religious minorities. Whole sections and sects have been targeted and there are restrictions on freedom
	of worship and religion. We in the west have no particular selfish interest in that—this is not about our citizens. It is, however, about the right of people to practise religion and worship as they want to, regardless of their ethnic background, and their right to speak out and to have freedom of speech.
	What position should we in the United Kingdom adopt? Clearly, we need to continue to support the Government in their view that the way forward is sanctions and co-ordination at an international level to bring about a diplomatic solution, but it is vital that sanctions are effective. It is clear from some press reports today that some countries—Turkey and China have been mentioned—are working to undermine sanctions. I would be grateful to know how effective the Government think sanctions are. It is vital that sanctions are made to work. The financial restrictions order imposed by Parliament last year rightly targets those who seek to use British financial institutions in their quest to fund the nuclear weapons programme, and we support such sanctions.
	We support the twin-track approach, but it is essential that the sanctions work. They will be judged effective only if they actually stop Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Hon. Members have already described the vista we might see if the plan does not work—we have to face up to the fact that it might not work. The idea of living with an Iran with a nuclear weapon is simply unthinkable, not only for Israel and people in the west, but for the world as a whole, the countries in the middle east and the citizens of Iran themselves. It is absolutely essential that we face up to these issues.

Martin Horwood: The right hon. Gentleman says that living with a nuclear Iran is simply unthinkable, yet we have tolerated a number of states developing nuclear weapons, including North Korea, which was a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty. A laborious process is going on to try to denuclearise that country, but no one has suggested invading it.

Nigel Dodds: We have learned in recent years that each country is different and has different circumstances. Some of us might like to go back in time and take different approaches. We have seen different approaches to intervention in Libya and Syria, for instance. We are dealing with Iran, and I believe that there is an opportunity to do something to prevent Iran getting hold of nuclear weapons, but I believe that Iran, given its dire and direct threats against the state of Israel and its particular threat to the people of the entire world, poses a unique threat. We should be conscious of that and we must be prepared, if necessary, to do something about it.
	I commend the bravery and courage of the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay in proposing the motion, but I am afraid that its terms remind me of the motion that was once proposed in the Oxford Union—that this House will in no circumstances fight for its King and Country. The word “appeasement” has been used. I think that the motion, if passed, would smack of appeasement. It is vital that we send out a strong message.

John Baron: I am giving the right hon. Gentleman an extra minute to wind up his speech, so I hope that he will smile upon me accordingly. The word “appeasement” has been used several times. A number of us in this House are former soldiers and have medals to prove
	that we are not appeasers. There is no doubt about that. We believe in the case for a just war. I have seen comrades killed by the enemy. The right hon. Gentleman must surely accept that the policy of sanctions and sabre-rattling that has characterised the west’s approach has failed. Iran will not step down, so is this not the right time for a fresh approach that recognises her regional status?

Nigel Dodds: I am glad that I was able to give way to the hon. Gentleman just before the time limit. It remains to be seen whether the policy of sanctions and negotiations has failed, because we are in the middle of that process. I have the utmost respect for him and others who have served in Her Majesty’s forces and I fully respect his personal position, but that in no way detracts from the ability of others to describe the policy they enunciate in the terms we have used. The significance of the famous debate in the Oxford Union was the message it sent out to those in Nazi Germany who were following the policy. If the motion is carried tonight, this House will be sending a strong signal to the Iranian regime to carry on and aim for nuclear weapons, because we will do nothing about it. We need to send out a clear message that is the reverse of that, which is that we will not stand for that kind of approach.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I felt like intervening on the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds) to give him a fourth minute of extra time, but I restrained myself. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on securing the debate, but that is as far as I can go, because I disagree with almost every word he said. I strongly agree with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), who moved the amendment. We need to be very careful about how the tone of the debate comes across and ensure that it is not bellicose. I agree with almost everything he said, with one exception: I think that any military intervention in Iran would not be a short-term matter and would become a longer-term matter, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex (Nicholas Soames), who is no longer in his seat, made clear.
	Having said that, the Iranians—the Persians—are a proud nation with a very ancient history. They have a very educated middle class, and I doubt very much that they approve of what the Iranian leadership is doing. Nevertheless, they do have such a leadership. There will be elections on 22 March for the legislative assembly and next year for the presidency. As has been said, President Ahmadinejad cannot stand again, so there will inevitably be a change of regime. As we heard from the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), a change of regime can bring about a change of policy, so we do not know what will follow in Iran when President Ahmadinejad retires. We do know that Iran has defied six UN Security Council resolutions. President Ahmadinejad recently said that he will secure an important nuclear achievement, and we know that he is trying to achieve the 20% threshold. I appreciate the semantics my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay used, but I am in no doubt that the regime is trying to acquire the capability to
	produce nuclear weapons. If it manages to acquire that capability, I am pretty certain that it will use it. I do not think that we disagree thus far.
	I am sorry that the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd) is no longer here, because in the debate in this House on 24 September 2002 on whether to go to war with Iraq I said that I doubted whether the dodgy dossier was true and whether there were any weapons of mass destruction. I went on to say that if we weakened Iraq we would have problems with Iran, and that is exactly what we are seeing today—Iranian interference in Iraq on a huge scale. It is trying to destabilise the schools, and I doubt whether President Maliki can do very much without authorisation from his Iranian paymasters.

Brian Binley: indicated assent.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: As my hon. Friend, who is often spot on, will know, Iraq is virtually a proxy state of Iran. That is a hugely important step for the world, because both countries combined have 19% of the world’s proven oil reserves, so instability in the region will lead to a real problem. That compares with a figure of about 7% in Kuwait and about 2% in the United Arab Emirates. To put it into context, the figure for the proven oil reserve in the hands of Iran and Iraq is very significant indeed.
	The Iranian regime not only promotes instability and terror in its own country—the example was given of five executions only last night—but is one of the greatest exporters of terror around the world. I have always been a supporter of Israel, but I would shudder to live in Israel today, with Hezbollah from the Syrian state and Hamas from the Palestinian state. The Israelis are in a very difficult position. If war were to break out in Iran, I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex that the proxies in the region, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, would become even more active than they are at present.
	I agreed with my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary when he said at the weekend that Iran acquiring nuclear weapons could trigger an arms race in the middle east. One or two Members have disputed that, but we should look at history and the example of Pakistan and India. The moment one got nuclear capability, the other had to have it. If Iran acquires a nuclear capability, Saudi Arabia will probably do so, the Syrian regime, if it survives, will certainly want to, and perhaps other states in the middle east will, too.

John Baron: Given that Israel’s acquiring nuclear weapons has not led to its Arab neighbours acquiring them, why does my hon. Friend believe that Iran’s Muslim neighbours would have a greater urgency to do so?

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I knew somebody was going to make that point to me, so I anticipated it. Of course Israel, although never acknowledged, has a nuclear capability, but the difference between Israel and Iran is that Israel is a stable democracy and Iran is an unpredictable country—under its current regime. That is not to say that under a future regime it will not change, but under its current regime I should not predict the circumstances in which it might or might not use such nuclear capability.
	The whole essence of the cold war—Russia, America, Britain, France—was that none of us dared use nuclear weapons even if we had the inclination, which I am sure we never did, because we knew the destruction that they would cause, having seen it in Japan during the second world war. It is a huge thing to press the nuclear button, so, despite my hon. Friend disagreeing with me, I think that we have to be very careful about reaching such a situation with Iran.
	The other point that I wish to make, in the rapidly shrinking time that I have this evening, is that I wholly support the efforts of my right hon. Friends in the coalition to bring about a diplomatic solution. That solution has to be backed up with sanctions, and I wholly believe that we must have the military option available to us when we go into the diplomatic negotiating chamber. I profoundly disagree with my hon. Friend and the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd), because if we rule out that option before we have even completed diplomatic negotiations we will be in a considerably weaker position.
	Of those three legs to the stool, we need to concentrate on sanctions, and the greatest role that the British Foreign Office—our Government, our Ministers—can play is to get some of our allies on side: to get Russia, China, Turkey and India all on side to make those sanctions effective. If the reports in the newspapers today are to be believed, and Turkey, China and India are participating in barter deals to get around our banking sanctions, that very considerably weakens them. I hope that my hon. Friends on the Front Bench take that point well and truly on board.
	This country has always been very good at soft power. Our diplomatic service has always been the best and our British Council has always been the best, but in this situation one of the greatest contributions we can make to resolving the problem without the necessity of going to war—I cannot stress enough that I do not advocate war, which is the last thing we want to see—is, as the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) said, to look very carefully at the BBC World Service. The BBC’s Farsi service can contribute a huge amount to the situation, and we should go the extra mile to ensure that it is not jammed, that we do not cut the service and that we broadcast the optimum number of hours on shortwave, over the internet and on television, for those middle class people in—

Lindsay Hoyle: Order.

Mike Gapes: It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for The Cotswolds (Geoffrey Clifton-Brown), and I endorse entirely what he said about the importance of the BBC World Service. I congratulate the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), a fellow member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, on initiating the debate, but I will not support him in the Lobby. I will support the well drafted and measured wording of the amendment, not because I believe that we should be engaged in military action against Iran, but because I want to stop military action against Iran and a war that would be a precursor to a conflagration in the region.
	I am concerned about the potential consequences of the current crisis. I recently held discussions with a senior figure in the Pakistani Government, who said
	that the consequences for Afghanistan and Pakistan of a conflict involving Iran would be dire. Anybody who has been, as I have, to Herat, the Afghan city close to Iran, and seen how calm and peaceful the area is will recognise that it is no accident; it is because that border between Afghanistan and Iran is stable and calm, and that would not necessarily be the case if there were a conflict involving Iran.
	Similarly, Iran’s borders are very complicated. Reference has already been made to some Gulf states, including Bahrain, but other neighbours such as Qatar and Kuwait are in range of Iranian missiles, and the Iranians would not even need to send missiles; they could send people with bombs in bags or in suitcases.
	Reference has been made also to Iraq.

Alec Shelbrooke: rose —

Mike Gapes: I will give way in a moment.
	With the Defence Committee several years ago, I visited the KBOT terminal at the top of the gulf of Hormuz, just south of Basra, from where, along with the ABOT terminal, most of the Iraqi oil from Basra leaves. That was a few weeks after motor launches from Iran had set off bombs underneath the terminal to try to destroy it. The area is now much more strongly protected, but the potential for a conflagration involving Iran, leading not necessarily to a blockage of the strait of Hormuz, but at least to attacks on facilities, urban centres or bases in the area, is great. We as an international community therefore need to be careful and measured and to send out clear signals, whether in relation to mad speeches by Newt Gingrich or to the Israeli Government, that the use of language referring to military action is not necessarily the best solution to the crisis.
	I can understand why politicians in Israel are worried. I would be worried if not just the President of a country but a succession of its leaders had said that they wanted to wipe out my state, which they regarded as a cancer, but we need also to point out, as senior figures in Israel have, that military action by Israel will not be in its own long-term interests regarding its relations with the Arab world.

Bob Stewart: Military action would be extremely difficult. There are at least 10 different nuclear sites in Iran, and trying to obliterate them would be almost impossible for Israel alone, so military action by Israel alone is probably very unlikely or, at the very least, unwise.

Mike Gapes: I agree, and that allows me to move on to what I think is actually happening.
	Somebody once said that war was diplomacy by other means, but we have a third way, which is Stuxnet, targeted assassinations and unexplained events. I am not sure whether we can attribute blame or responsibility in any particular direction, but it is quite clear that over recent months and years various things have happened to aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, and events have occurred which might indicate that, without having a war, attempts are being made to delay the nuclear programme, the development of centrifuges and other things.
	If the Iranian regime is really determined to get nuclear weapons, and I fear that elements of it are, it will do so at whatever cost, but others in Iran, including
	some in the regime, recognise that there are benefits to be gained not by acquiring nuclear weapons but by saying, “We are a proud country and we want to be noticed, so we will give the impression that we are moving in that direction so that people notice us, states in the Gulf region become fearful of us and the rest of the world says, ‘Iran is a country that matters.’”
	The Foreign Affairs Committee went to Iran in 2007. Mention has been made of its chief nuclear negotiator, Mr Jalili. I was involved in an hour-long exchange with him in a meeting. It was a fascinating exchange, because he started off by explaining that having a nuclear weapon was un-Islamic and forbidden. We went on to have a long discussion about the additional protocol, the non-proliferation treaty and various issues to do with the IAEA. I came away realising that he was very intelligent and calculating. He must be a tough person to negotiate with. I was not involved in real negotiations. Speaking with me was like practice for him before he dealt with the Ministers. It was apparent that Iran is clear in the way that it uses the arguments.
	I suspect, as the Foreign Affairs Committee said in 2007, that Iran will at some point get to breakout capability. However, as was said earlier, that does not necessarily mean that it will have a nuclear weapon. It will have the capability to get a nuclear weapon quickly when it gets to that technological position. However, it might choose not to go that far, but to have just the potential, because that will make people notice it. Iran is a country that wants to be noticed.
	The tragedy is that Iran has a young, dynamic population that wants to engage with the rest of the world. Anybody who has been to Iran knows that. People come up to visitors in the street and talk to them openly. They criticise their Government openly in a way that does not happen in all other countries in the region; and yet, at the same time, Iran has a theocratic regime at its cap. I do not think that it matters who succeeds Ahmadinejad, because he is not the power in Iran. The power is Ayatollah Khamenei, who is the supreme leader. It is he who rejected the approach from President Obama. It is he who determines where the political process goes, including who can run as a candidate and who can stand for election. Iran has a quasi-pluralistic and quasi-democratic system, but with a theocratic cap. Somehow or other, that system will have to change. Revolutions run out of steam. At some point, the voice of the Iranian people will come through. We have to be clever and not undermine that in the way that we handle this crisis.

Patrick Mercer: It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes), who, as ever, made some perspicacious and penetrating points.
	I congratulate my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron). I regret that he had to defend himself against the charge of appeasement from the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds). I resent that charge on my hon. Friend’s behalf. This is a motion not of appeasement, but of courage. I may not agree with it and other Members may not agree with it,
	but this is a courageous and necessary debate. Perhaps it flies a kite—I do not say that with any disrespect to my hon. Friend. By golly, it is a kite that needs to be flown. This situation has been referred to as white-hot dangerous by distinguished analysts in the United States and other parts of the world.

Nigel Dodds: I think that I made it very clear that I admire the courage of the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron). I made it clear that I laid the charge not against those who proposed the motion, but against the argument. I hope that the hon. Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) will accept that and see what I was saying in a different light.

Patrick Mercer: Of course I do. I was trying to make a point. The right hon. Member for Belfast North has made his point. In defence of my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay, I know his record and his background. I watched the 3rd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers in action in the native city of the right hon. Member for Belfast North and they never appeased anyone. It is a fine battalion and he is a fine officer.
	Some fascinating statements have been made tonight. I cannot support my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay, despite my admiration. I find the amendment interesting. I found the comment from my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) that American action might be acceptable or amenable—forgive me, I am paraphrasing and have not quite got the right phrase—in the short to medium term wholly remarkable in the light of what has happened in Iraq and what is happening in Afghanistan on the Pakistani border. I really do not accept that.

Malcolm Rifkind: Perhaps I can explain to my hon. Friend what I was saying. I think that it will be clear from the record, if he reads it tomorrow. I was saying that there would of course be serious consequences from a military intervention by the United States, which could last weeks, months or even one or two years—who knows? However, if the alternative is Iran having a nuclear weapon on a permanent basis, which would mean a massively enhanced threat from a nuclear weapon state, one cannot simply dismiss the military option because there would be a significant downside for one or two years.

Patrick Mercer: I am most grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend. However, the words still sit uneasily with me. I do not believe that we are in the business of tinkering with world peace.
	I found Defence questions earlier today very depressing. The right hon. Member for Belfast North said in this debate that this situation is the biggest threat to world peace. We are already involved in a regional war in this area. As my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds (Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) made so very clear, the country that we are talking about borders Afghanistan, and the regional war stretches through Afghanistan, into Pakistan and touches nuclear-tipped Russia at one end and the potentially nuclear-tipped Iran at the other. We cannot afford any ill-judged military action.
	I do not want to sound like a stuck record and to go through all the points that have been made about Iran’s hideous rhetoric; the fact that she may be working on a weapons programme; the fact that, as we speak, she has troops involved in an exercise in southern Iran, called in support of the military leadership; the fact that she is threatening to close the strait of Hormuz; and so on. However, I will say this. When I visited Tehran, some interesting things came to mind. For instance, until I was taken down the boulevard of Bobby Sands—there is a boulevard of that name in the centre of Tehran—I had not realised that Great Britain, and Iran’s relationship with Great Britain, had such high relevance in Iranian and Persian thinking. I had not realised that Great Britain punched above its weight in Iranian thinking. I had not realised that Iran saw Britain as being perfidious Albion—I am generalising hugely, of course.
	Much of the west’s foreign policy is seen, obviously wrongly, as being dictated by ourselves as a tiny but important nation. I had not realised that a Tehranian might say, “Heavens above, it’s raining again. It’s typical British weather.” All the ills of the world seem to be laid at this country’s door. That puts us in an extremely important position in negotiating with Iran. Many of the Foreign Secretary’s comments therefore give me heart.
	When I was in Iran, the Iranians said to us, “Are you honestly suggesting that we support al-Qaeda? Please demonstrate.” Of course, we said, “Well, we have the evidence.” “Do you?” “No, we only have circumstantial evidence.” Of course, we are used to hearing misinformation and black propaganda—we need look no further than our intervention in Iraq under the last Government, in the second Gulf war. In Iran, we said, for instance, “We have heard that the central shura of al-Qaeda is resident here in Tehran”. The reply was, “Please point it out, because it is not. There is no evidence to suggest that that is the case.”
	Similarly, we asked British troops in Afghanistan whether they could demonstrate whether any of the weapons being used against them had come from Iran. The answer was yes, but there were also weapons that had come from France, the USA, Germany and Britain herself. There was nothing to indicate a relationship between al-Qaeda and Iran, despite everything that we were hearing from the western press.
	Here is the rub: the single most important thing I heard in Iran was that the current generation of leaders there fully understand what it is like to be involved in a war of national survival. Many of the individuals who are now of political maturity were young men of military age during the Iran-Iraq war. One Member—forgive me, I cannot remember which—said earlier that nuclear weapons had only ever been used once. That is true, but let us not forget that in the Iran-Iraq war, when hundreds of thousands of men were killed in action and millions of people died, weapons of mass destruction were used willingly.

Bob Stewart: I am sure my hon. Friend would agree that that war was started by Iraq and, to the best of my knowledge, Iran has not started a war.

Patrick Mercer: I thank my hon. and gallant Friend and entirely agree. My point is that many of the current generation of decision makers, if that is the right phrase in Iran—we cannot look at them as one cohesive political
	body—have experienced war at first hand. They understand what weapons of mass destruction are like, and my opinion is that if they are allowed to get hold of such weaponry, they will probably use it.
	That puts us in an exceedingly difficult position on the one hand and an exceedingly powerful position on the other hand. I say to the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary that if we want our military position to be credible, let us make it so. Let us not have instances such as we had in the past of the Royal Navy being embarrassed in the Gulf. Let us ensure that our operations are above reproach. We cannot be anything less than credible.
	In the current white-hot and dangerous situation, we have the opportunity to negotiate. When it comes down to it, no side really wants to fight. Let us therefore take the opportunity for Great Britain to prove that she is not perfidious, and to speak to her friends in Israel and America and lead the way. We can use our influence, to use an awful aphorism, to punch above our weight. Although we have the military option, let us pray that we never, ever have to use it.

John McDonnell: I join other Members in commending the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron). I say to him that being in a minority does not necessarily mean that someone is not right, and that when the House is unanimous, it is invariably wrong. I will support his motion.
	Like the hon. Gentleman, I find it important when we have these debates to have a prologue condemning the theocratic regime in Iran. I am one of the Members who consistently table motions supporting human rights campaigns in Iran, most recently on the Tehran bus workers and on the persecution of the film director Panahi, whose release we have been successful in securing. I agree with the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd). I am fearful of again treading down the path that starts with rumours of weapons of mass destruction, goes on to sanctions, sabre-rattling and covert operations, and then develops a momentum that carries us into military action, death and destruction, and increased terrorism and instability. My right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) is not in his place, but I, too, worry about the approach whereby we try to negotiate peace by threatening war; it does not work that way.
	Hon. Members need to be very clear about the decision that they take tonight. Those who vote against the motion and for the amendment will be sanctioning the threat of military action. In my view, if one threatens something. one has to ensure that one understands the full implications of acting on the threat, and I am not sure that there is clarity in the House about why this threat is being made. The notion of Iran being close to having nuclear weapons is open to doubt as there is no solid evidence, but as the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay said, the issue is really about nuclear capability. Nuclear capability is a threat only if one believes that nuclear weapons will be used. Even in Israel, people do not believe that there will be a nuclear strike, and that is true of wise heads around the world. I cannot find any advisers in the US who are recommending to the President that action should take place on the basis of a nuclear threat. Like the hon. Gentleman,
	I have listened to some of the spokespeople in Israel. I have also listened to a former head of Mossad, Efraim Halevy, who said that it is all about scaremongering and that there is no threat to the state of Israel as a result of this supposed escalation.
	Why are we being implicated in the threat of military action? First, as the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) said, the threat is based on the danger not of a military attack but of Iran becoming a regional superpower. At the moment, the implications of that are not, by any means, sufficient to justify the threat of military action. Secondly, there is the argument about nuclear proliferation. If we are anxious about nuclear proliferation, we have to start with the root cause, which is Israel illegally gaining nuclear weapons. Unless we attack that root cause, the issue will not go away. Thirdly, it is about Israel’s own domestic political agenda: the crisis atmosphere suits Netanyahu and the hawks who surround him.
	Fourthly, as the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington said, we are being blackmailed by Israel to the effect that if we do not support military action, it will. After Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the midst of the global economic crisis, there is no appetite in the US for war. That is why the Americans sent General Martin Dempsey to Tel Aviv in January to let the Israelis know that there was no such appetite. It is now time for us to face down Israel and ask what sanctions we are willing to exercise against it if it seeks to threaten military action. I fear that the debate is gaining the momentum for a military strike, which will make matters worse, not better.
	We are already at war by proxy in undermining the potential for peace and change in Iran. The sanctions are a siege of Iran. Its currency is collapsing, imports of grain staples are drying up, and people are becoming impoverished. That is not undermining the regime but hardening support for it by giving it the excuse that an external enemy is causing the impoverishment and hunger. The covert military actions carried out by organisations and individuals whom we now know, as a result of exposés in Der Spiegel, were trained by Mossad, have prompted more terrorism around the world through Iran-sponsored attacks in India, Thailand and elsewhere. The cyber-war that was launched under Stuxnet, with the worm or bug that was put out to undermine Iran’s industrial complexes, has provoked even more retaliation, which has undermined some of the ability of Iran’s freedom movement to communicate with the outside world. I would welcome information on that extremely complicated cyber-attack. Did Israel sponsor it or its development? Was GCHQ alerted to it?
	The actions that have taken place have escalated the potential for conflict, and they are strengthening the hard-liners in Iran and hurting the Iranian people, who are desperate to throw off the yoke of that theocracy. The way forward was spelt out by our former ambassador, Richard Dalton, who said that we needed multilateral negotiations to secure a nuclear-free zone across the middle east. Unless we tackle the issue of Israel holding nuclear weapons, we cannot confront Iran sensibly or creatively.
	I reiterate that we cannot negotiate peace by threatening war, and I fear that we are again on a path that we have witnessed time and again in the House. We are threatening
	military action, which gains momentum that results in loss of life, including the loss of British soldiers and military personnel.

Stewart Jackson: I pay tribute to the gracious stance taken by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) and to the articulate and sincere way in which he put his case. That is as much as I can say to him, because I will vote not for his motion but for the amendment moved by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind). I share much of my hon. Friend’s analysis, but unfortunately from his point of view I reached an entirely different conclusion.
	I should like to focus on the political background in Iran, which was touched on by my hon. Friend, and to test the efficacy of sanctions, if they are plan B. It is not too fanciful or exaggerated to say that we might be in a similar moment to Europe in the mid-1930s. Iran is a state that presents an existential threat to its neighbours and has designs on regional and possibly global hegemony. The Foreign Secretary was right at the weekend to describe it as having the potential to set off a chain reaction cold war in the proliferation of nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other states. Iran also has a record of significant lack of compliance with IAEA inspectors and an appalling human rights record, which was mentioned in a Westminster Hall debate last month in which I was fortunate enough to participate.
	We are at an historic juncture, and the Foreign Secretary is right to point out the dangers to the world of a nuclear Iran. However, unlike, for instance, North Korea, Iran is not a monolithic regime. It has varied centres of power and influence. There is institutional conflict within the regime and among the dominant conservative strain within the elite, particularly between the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and President Ahmadinejad. There is a battle between theocracy, republicanism, nationalism and clericalism. As I mentioned in an intervention, there is a chance that President Ahmadinejad will be impeached or removed before or in 2013.
	One important factor in the development of a jihadist, militarist theology is the impact that the revolutionary guards could have on parliamentary elections and in suppressing the green movement, as we saw in 2009. There is also an ongoing power struggle between the President and Parliament over political appointments.
	We should bear in mind in all decisions we take—particularly any decision to remove the option of military action from the table, or decisions on the current sanctions regime and the positions we lay out in Israel, Europe and the United States—that we could still see the consolidation of the power of hard-line clerics, the revolutionary guards and their militia, the Basij. The starting point could be that a candidate much more extreme than Ayatollah Khamenei is in place by the end of 2013. A military regime with a theocratic basis would threaten the greater middle east region and the world. We face that prospect.
	No one seriously thinks that Iran has not developed a nuclear capability. Its enrichment of uranium to 20% of the threshold can be for no other reason than military use—it has no plausible civilian use. The IAEA has previously said that Iran has 5 tonnes of low-enriched
	uranium of 3.5% and if enriched to 90% this would be enough fissile material for four to five nuclear bombs. Experts have predicted that once Iran acquires more than 150 kg of uranium enriched to 20%—by, say, early 2013—it would need just two weeks to produce enough fissile material for a bomb.
	In short, the regime has the knowledge, technology and resources to create a nuclear bomb. Specifically, it has the high-explosive test site at Parchin, computer models, precision detonators and—most importantly—missile delivery systems. If plan B is sanctions, will they work, given that Iran has set its face against the west and a more peaceful negotiated settlement of this issue? People make much of the EU oil sanctions, and it is true that 18% of Iran’s exports are oil to the EU—450,000 barrels a day. Severe disruption to the oil industry would be problematic for the state, given that oil revenues are 60% of the Iranian economy, 80% of exports and, more importantly, 70% of government revenues. We know, however, that other countries would take up the slack. South Korea and Japan each take 10%, and China and India take 34% of Iran’s oil exports between them and would surely step in to buy the oil rejected by the EU.
	Iran may discount oil prices, but it is estimated that even with a 10% drop in shipments, the reduction would be just $24 billion in a $480 billion economy. Sanctions will undermine state spending and perhaps cause a deficit of up to 2% of GDP, but Iran has a low debt to GDP ratio—only 9%, as against well over 100% for some EU countries, as we know. Raza Agha of the Royal Bank of Scotland says:
	“The public finance impact seems manageable in the immediate future…given the bulwark of public sector deposits and other domestic financing options”.
	Iran has also put its interest rates up for long-term bank deposits, so it has plenty of foreign reserves to see it through the difficulties of short and medium-term sanctions.
	We can take options, including military action, off the table only if we are absolutely certain that sanctions will work and will force Iran back to the negotiating table. Sanctions may serve to destabilise the existing political regime in Iran. The west faces the most profound foreign policy problem since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and for that reason we have to have courage, firmness of purpose and intellectual coherence in facing down this problem. Israel will perhaps attack Iran before the end of June. None of us wants war, but the alternative of a militaristic, jihadist country threatening its neighbours may be a lot worse.

William Bain: Iran is a historic nation with a proud and brave population. Many hon. Members will, like me, have friends in Iran and know of the hospitality of its people. There is little doubt, however, that the Iranian regime is one of the most oppressive anywhere in the world. It is a sponsor of terrorist activities, is involved in systematic persecution of the opposition and minorities, and is attempting to isolate its people from the outside world.
	The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2008 democracy index ranked Iran 145th out of 167 countries and listed it among 49 countries considered authoritarian. Amnesty International has reported regularly that trial hearings are often heard in private and that political detainees
	are being denied access to legal counsel during judicial proceedings despite official assurances to the contrary. A 2007 US Department of State report pointed out that although in theory defendants had the right to a public trial, a lawyer of their choice and the right of appeal, in practice these rights were not respected by the regime.
	We know that women and young people were at the heart of the pro-reform green movement in 2009, with young people comprising 40% of the electorate, yet the regime has launched a vicious counter-offensive by resorting to the mass detention of young activists and expulsions from universities, and by widening the powers of its youth paramilitary forces. Many Iranian women have resisted the imposition of a religiously justified patriarchal structure that systematically discriminates against them.
	From extensive interviews with men and women inside and outside Iran, Human Rights Watch has documented widespread patterns of arbitrary arrest and torture based on sexual orientation and gender identity. As the UN discovered in 2010, the regime’s failure to meet young people’s socio-economic expectations is a major cause of its internal unpopularity: about 70% of the unemployed in Iran are young people; youth unemployment has doubled in the past 20 years; and even graduates take on average about three years to find a job.
	Abhorrent though the regime is, pre-emptive military action, whatever its origin, would be as wrong as it was in Iraq a decade ago. But we must not take the options off the table. The attitude of the young people of Iran will shape its future in the coming decades, which is why we should stand with them, attempt to engage with those parts of Iranian society that believe in co-operation with the rest of the middle east and the west, while being firm in our opposition to the regime’s internal repression, its state sponsorship of terrorism elsewhere in the middle east and its belligerence over the status of Israel.
	Following the attacks on the Israeli embassies in Tbilisi and New Delhi last week, the Government of Iran and their agent, Hezbollah, are increasingly isolated in the middle east, as many of their traditional supporters have been alienated by a perceived pro-Shi’a favouritism in Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain and Iraq. Syria acts as a prime channel to Hezbollah in Lebanon, as a base for Hamas leaders running Gaza, as a front-line ally in the confrontation with Israel and the United States and as a political and commercial pathway into the Arab world.
	The Iranians know, however, that in Syria the political balance between the minority Alawi Shi’a regime in Damascus and the Sunni majority has shifted to Iran’s distinct disadvantage, and that their main regional ally could soon fall. The Iranian regime knows that if the Arab spring topples the Assad regime in Syria, its greatest threat will be from revolution from within.
	The true purpose of Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme is difficult to establish comprehensively, which leads to suspicions about its motives. The RAND Cooperation think-tank published a paper recently stating that Iran would be able to acquire the threshold capabilities to build a weapon within the decade, but its view was that Iran did not yet have the will to develop nuclear weapons. Analyses by those such as the Royal United Services Institute, Stratfor and even the IAEA concur that there is no conclusive evidence, as yet, that Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon. Rather, they believe
	that Iran’s aim is to reach a stage where it can let the international community know that it has the ability and resources to have the option of acquiring the bomb rather than to actually do so. Nevertheless, last November’s IAEA report remains suspicious of the regime’s intent given its concealment of the third enrichment facility near Qom.
	There is evidence that sanctions that focus on Iran’s central bank might secure a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The new restrictions, announced by the US Administration last week, target banks that handle proceeds from the sale of Iranian oil imports if the country that they belong to has not significantly reduced the volume of oil that it imports from Iran by the end of June. The sanctions complement the EU embargo on Iranian oil imports, to be introduced by 1 July. As Dennis Ross, President Obama’s special assistant on the middle east between 2009 and 2011, wrote in The New  York Times last Tuesday, through Iran’s backing of the Assad regime in Syria there are signs of diminishing support for Iran in the middle east, and it may be seeking “a way out”. Iran cannot obtain credit or do business with any reputable international bank. It cannot insure its ships or find energy investors. Its currency has dramatically declined in value against the US dollar in recent months. All this has led the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, to indicate that Tehran will seek to resume negotiations with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, as well as to discuss Russia’s proposals for resolving the dispute, which it point-blank refused to consider when they were first drawn up last year.
	A diplomatic solution is best for the stability of the entire middle east. Although all options should remain open, constructive dialogue should be the aim of the policy of this Government and the United Nations. In the event of a military attack on Iran’s nuclear capabilities, the Iranian leadership could use its connections and regional influence to cause regional breakdown, and deploy its paramilitary allies elsewhere in the region, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and insurgent groups in Syria and Afghanistan to create mayhem. As Colin Kahl, the former US deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for the middle east said last month,
	“force…should remain…a last resort, not a first choice.”

Brian Binley: I, too, congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on his courage. I fear that my conclusions might mean that I cannot go through the Lobby with him, which is saddening. May I also pay tribute to Lord Corbett of Castle Vale, who sadly died very recently? He was a great contributor to debates on Iran, and I know that many Members of this House would wish to join me in saying how greatly he will be missed.
	This is an opportune moment to consider Iran. The conduct and ambitions of the Government of Iran run counter to our interests and to the peace and security of the region. We must not lose sight of that fact. We therefore need a credible and sustainable response, and our actions should be based on the most up-to-date information and analysis. To my knowledge, that has
	sadly not been the case in the Foreign Office over the past 15 years—indeed, at a meeting with a previous Minister, who has now left this place, I was assured that the People’s Mujahedin of Iran had not renounced its pledge to give up weapons and fight for peaceful internal change in Iran. The fact that the Foreign Office was not in control and that it had that information in its hands six years after that position was stated and agreed is very worrying indeed. My hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) made the point that much misinformation has been accepted as information by the Foreign Office, which has been harmful to our cause.
	I wanted to talk at length about the Iranians’ human rights record, but many others have paid heed to that problem. It is indeed a scar on the face of humanity, as we all know. We also know that the Iranian regime is not one that we can do business with as a trusted ally, and it never will be. We should, however, strive for robust and honest relations with Iran. There are Iranians who share that appetite for positive dealings. Sadly, until a few months ago our approach to them was variable. Our dealings with the PMOI and with Camp Ashraf are symptomatic of that weakness. As I said, the PMOI stated in 2002 that it was working for a peaceful transition to a democratic Iran, but that aim was not recognised. Ministers need to make decisions based on the best and most reliable information, but there have been serious concerns about the quality of analysis and the currency of the information available.
	I remind Members that Camp Ashraf is home to 3,500 Iranian dissidents, including 1,000 women, living in Iraq. All members of the PMOI, they originally opposed the mullahs’ regime. The PMOI is the largest opposition group and the greatest thorn in the side of the present Iranian regime, as proved by the fact that more than 90% of the 120,000 political prisoners executed by the regime have been members of the PMOI. It is that group’s success in harnessing widespread support that engenders the hatred directed towards it by the regime. That is why the blacklisting of the PMOI was an initial Iranian precondition for participation in international talks in 2002. The right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) sadly acceded to that request as a result of attempting to appease Iran. The talks, of course, never happened.

Edward Leigh: No one doubts the courage of members of the PMOI, but how will attacking Iran help them?

Brian Binley: I will explain. My hon. Friend asks how looking at the case of the PMOI will help to resolve the Iranian situation. The truth is that cruelty and inhumanity have been visited on Camp Ashraf residents as a matter of routine by the Iraqis at the behest of Iran—the Iraqis have acted as Iran’s proxies. Ensuring that the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mr al-Maliki, and the Iraqi Government change their attitude, as they should do, would diminish Iran’s position in the middle east and weaken its role in the wider world. That is how changing attitudes towards the PMOI and to the people who live in Camp Ashraf can be of help.
	This is not just a matter of a few thousand Iranian dissidents in Camp Ashraf, however. The situation raises fundamental questions about the entire region, and beyond. The al-Maliki Government’s flagrant disregard for human life, universal rights and international laws
	should ring alarm bells. When people see that the depth of cruelty and inhumanity following western intervention is not much better than it was under Saddam Hussein, is it any wonder that they are cynical about our motives and actions? When they see that the al-Maliki Government’s actions present him as a western-supported puppet of the Iranian regime, are they not entitled to ask why we sacrificed so much blood to achieve that objective? If we are to find an effective way to tackle the crisis of intransigence and hostility from the Iranian Government, it will not be done through examples of that kind.
	That is why I call on the Government tonight to promise to act to ensure the removal of Iraqi forces from the perimeter of Camp Ashraf, to end the siege and to lift the ban on journalists, parliamentary groups, lawyers and families of residents entering the camp. Residents, particularly those who have been wounded, must be given immediate access to medical services in public hospitals. There must be an independent inquiry by a panel of jurists into the actions perpetrated at the camp. Residents should also be entitled to the return of their personal belongings. Such actions would, I repeat, immediately undermine al-Maliki’s role and position as a proxy of the Iranians, which would be in the interests of us all.
	We have heard some bold attacks by the Minister of late, and they are most welcome, but I regret the fact that we have not pressed the United Nations to take action on Camp Ashraf. I look to the Minister tonight to say that we will do so, if for no other reason than respect for the lives lost in Iraq, which we should honour and can honour, by protecting the very people now under attack by the Iraqi regime. If we are to overcome the real threat of Iran, we must stop appeasing the regime as we are in relation to Camp Ashraf and the PMOI.
	Following the failed adventures in Iraq, Iran is much more powerful. Threatening it with military adventures is not the answer, but we need to stop being weak in the face of the Iranian bullies and work with those best placed to bring about positive change for Iran, in Iran and by Iranians themselves—many of them young people who have a vision far more positive than Ahmadinejad and his supporters.

Paul Flynn: This House engaged in a war with Iraq that was based on non-existent weapons of mass destruction, and 179 of our brave British soldiers died along with an uncounted number of Iraqis. We remained in Afghanistan and went into Helmand on the basis of a non-existent terrorist threat to the United Kingdom from the Taliban. When we went into Helmand, two British soldiers had died in warfare and five more in other ways; having gone into Helmand, however, the figure is now 398. We are now in a position of stumbling into another war on the basis of non-existent nuclear weapons and non-existent missiles.
	Some of us present when those decisions were taken vividly remember how the decision on Iraq went through this House—not on the basis of truth or evidence, but because this House was bribed, bullied and bamboozled into taking a decision that many thought was wrong. The hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) was one Member and the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) another who opposed that decision because the evidence was not there.
	We should look at the evidence before us now of the threat from a missile in Iran with a range of 6,000 miles. Members will recall that we heard of this threat three or four years ago when America wanted to set up missile sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. The Russians were quite rightly angry about this, but the pretext for it was the protection of the Russians and the Poles from missiles from Iran. It was a wholly implausible threat and we have not heard much of it since, but now that an election is coming up in America, the myth has been resurrected.
	I claim some pedigree in opposing nuclear weapons and nuclear technology in Iran. I raised the subject in December 1992 in parliamentary questions—I shall not bore the House with the details—to the then Minister, Michael Heseltine. At that time, we were told that it was absolutely right to hand over nuclear technology to our ally at the time—the Shah of Persia.
	One Conservative Member said, “We must still punch above weight.” Why? Punching above our weight means dying beyond our responsibilities. A young soldier from south Wales died last month, but he will not be counted among the 398 dead in Afghanistan. He was shot twice there and was slightly injured in two further incidents involving improvised explosive devices, but the event that destroyed him was watching his virtually limbless best friend die in his arms. He came back broken in mind, and last month he took his life.
	We have lost 398 and at least 1,000 others are also broken in mind and body because we as a House decided that we wanted to punch above our weight in the world. That was our decision, and we cannot escape from it. The present Government and previous Governments have tried to minimise the extent of the bereavement and the loss. Those who have suffered because of this, the loved ones and the bereaved, will face an awful situation in the future. When the death toll reaches 400, which it surely must, although we all regret it, all the grief will be churned up again and there will be attention to it. To get the list of the dead on to the Order Paper requires 24 early-day motions, but what we should look at is what those people will see. Many of them were consoled by the belief that their loved ones died in a noble cause—that they died preventing terrorism on the streets of Britain. What conclusion will they reach when, in a few years’ time, we hand over the government of Afghanistan to the very people whom we said we were fighting against, to the very same threat? We will be handing it back to the Taliban.
	The hon. Member for Northampton South (Mr Binley) was absolutely right. The effect of our intervention in Iraq was to replace one rotten, cruel, oppressive regime with another rotten, cruel, oppressive regime, and the result in Afghanistan will be the same. A bad regime, the Taliban, will go out, and we will replace it with what? With the Taliban again. It seems extraordinary that we have to behave as though we were still in the 19th century and that Britannia still rules the waves. We do not have to take on these situations. We do not have to be the Little Sir Echo to American policy.
	There is an unsolved riddle in the House about how we have been represented. There was an investigation of the conduct of the last Defence Secretary that was alleged to constitute a breach of the ministerial code, but the investigation itself constituted a breach of the ministerial code because it was not carried out by the sole enforcer of that code, Sir Philip Mawer. He has
	resigned within the last couple of months and someone else has been put in his place. There is great concern that the person involved in this matter, Adam Werritty, who was the adviser to—

Lindsay Hoyle: Order. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is about to return to the subject of Iran. I am sure that that is where he is heading next.

Paul Flynn: This is precisely about Iran, because it has been claimed that Adam Werritty and the former Secretary of State were in meetings with Israelis—indeed, it is a proven fact that at least five meetings took place—and that the subject of those meetings was Iran. That has been reported in many of our national newspapers. However, the investigation has yet to be carried out. We have seen a brief investigation by a civil servant who was not entitled to carry it out, and we have seen the resignation of the person who is the sole enforcer and who told a Select Committee that he believed that he, not Gus O’Donnell, should have conducted the investigation.
	We have yet to find out what on earth was going on. Did we have a Secretary of State who was conducting his own foreign policy on Iran and perhaps bringing us to closer to war? The Select Committee has yet to finish its report, but a fortnight ago I asked Philip Mawer’s successor, “If the Committee decides that you are not a fit person to take on this job”—because he has not shown the robust independence that is necessary to the job—“what will you do?” He said that he would relinquish his position. That has yet to be decided.
	Finally, let me say that the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay deserves great praise for introducing the debate. He has already succeeded—

Lindsay Hoyle: Order. I call Mr Edward Leigh.

Edward Leigh: The hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) knows that I followed him into the Lobby to vote against the war in Iraq, doing so because I place great belief in the traditional concept of deterrence. I have never been a unilateral disarmer, but I have always been a multilateral disarmer and I always assumed that deterrence would work with Iraq. I must admit that I was not that prescient and that I, like everybody else, assumed that Iraq did have some sort of weapons of mass destruction and was astonished when none were discovered. But I did oppose that war and I have since visited Iraq, when I saw the agony of the country and of the mothers who had lost their sons; it is not just British troops who, sadly, lost their lives, but tens of thousands of people there. So I am with the hon. Gentleman on Iraq and I am also with him, to a certain extent, on Afghanistan—I have, again and again, questioned that. There is no doubt in my mind that the Taliban are remaining there and that there is a great danger that after the terrible loss of life of British troops we will end up with another Taliban Government. I believe that it was and is possible to keep their heads down.

Stewart Jackson: We are neglecting to acknowledge that Afghanistan was the incubator for a violent jihadist, Islamist ideology that resulted in the deaths of 3,000 men, women and children on 11 September 2001, and we should not casually disregard that.

Edward Leigh: Not for a moment does anyone in this House casually disregard it. I have always argued that there had to be a means, through special forces or even through the limited use of air strikes, to have controlled a Taliban Government. However, I am with the hon. Member for Newport West so far and, to an extent, I am also with him and with others who opposed the Libyan conflict. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), and I also accept the argument that we should not assume that deterrence would break down if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon. However, Iran’s having a nuclear weapon would be of a different geopolitical order from what we were confronting in Iraq. Iran with a nuclear weapon would be a calamity, but a pre-emptive strike at this stage would be calamitous. Therefore, we are in an extraordinarily dangerous position. I do not need to do this, because it is so obvious, but as a Government we need to urge our American and Israeli allies to proceed with extreme caution.
	There has not been a great deal of debate so far about what is actually happening on the ground. I do not accept the argument that all the evidence is circumstantial. The Fordow site has enriched uranium to 20%. Enrichment of 90% to 95% is required for weapons, whereas only 5% is required for less sophisticated civil reactors and more sophisticated reactors run on 3% or less. There is no doubt that this enrichment is for military purposes. I am not necessarily arguing that Iran would take the final step to acquire a capability to deliver these nuclear weapons, but I believe that we are in a very dangerous position.
	An attack would be extraordinarily difficult. It would not be simple like the Israeli attack on the Iraqi Osirak reactor in 1981. As we have heard, the Iranian programme is geographically, as well as functionally, extensive. It includes not 15 sites, as was mentioned earlier, but up to perhaps 30 sites, which could not be destroyed in a single attack—it would likely take an air war lasting several weeks to do that. In addition, as we know, the Qom facility was kept secret. I do not believe that Israel alone could stop Iran’s nuclear progress; only America could reliably destroy the nuclear capability. The conclusion must be that Israel does not have the capability to attack effectively; it could wound but not kill, which might be the most dangerous thing of all. Israel does not have the capability and America does not have the will, and if Israel were to attack, it is plausible that Iran would retaliate against not only Israel, but, much more worryingly, Saudi Arabia.
	Saudi Arabia is only 150 miles from Iran at its closest point and shares a maritime border with Iran along the length of the Gulf. There are only 258 troops from US central command in Saudi Arabia at the moment. General Hossein Salami, the deputy commander of the elite revolutionary guard, has threatened retaliation, stating:
	“Any place where enemy offensive operations against the Islamic Republic of Iran originate will be the target of a reciprocal attack by the Guard’s fighting units”.
	There is no doubt in my mind that if there were an attack on Iran it would elicit an immediate and perhaps devastating response against Saudi Arabia. Israeli planes would experience problems, even in attack, and would have to overfly a combination of Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia just to reach Iran.
	Will economic sanctions work? We have to proceed on that basis, but they may not, which is why I come on to the second part of my speech. I am sorry that there is not a simple solution, but I cannot follow the hon. Member for Newport West in saying that we can do nothing—that we can accept the motion and rule out force and that somehow things will be all right. Yes, it is calamitous to attack, but it is even more of a calamity if that country acquires nuclear weapons.

Paul Flynn: Does the hon. Gentleman think that it would be better if he followed the example of Harold Wilson in Vietnam, rather than the example of Tony Blair in Iraq?

Edward Leigh: That is a very different situation, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me for saying so. I am not sure that what was going on in Vietnam was a direct threat to us or to the whole region.
	What happens if Iran acquires nuclear weapons? We cannot just dismiss that and say that deterrents would work. It is widely believed—and I think that it is true—that Saudi Arabia would acquire nuclear weapons very rapidly. Could we forgive it for doing so, if Iran developed a nuclear weapon? Saudi Arabia is reported to have made a deal with Pakistan on buying nuclear warheads in exchange for the substantial assistance that it gave Pakistan during its nuclear development in the 1980s. If the Israelis attacked, there would doubtless be a response from Hezbollah. Iran is perhaps the worst governed country in the region, because of strong ethnic identities and the opaque system of government we have heard about. No doubt there would be a confused and difficult response.
	What is my conclusion from all those difficult conundrums? As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) said, there is no good solution, there is only the least bad solution. I believe that any attack on Iran would have negative consequences for stability in the middle east in general, and would directly affect our allies in the region. Iran is extremely volatile, and it could easily overreact to provocation, so an attack at this stage would be disastrous. Any attack without American support would hinder but not stop the Iranian nuclear programme. My right hon. and learned Friend is right, however, that taking the possibility of an attack off the table would make Israel more likely to act unilaterally to retard Iran’s programme.
	So what do we do? The only thing that we can do is continue with economic sanctions and be realistic about their likely impact; we must recognise Iranian concerns, and not engage in sabre-rattling; and we must recognise that it is a proud nation that feels that it is surrounded. All of that is very wise. We should try to take the issue off the boil and keep them guessing. That is why I am sorry that I cannot support the motion tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay, as it would be wildly dangerous to remove from the table the threat of military action. It is not necessary to
	do so. As I said, when dealing with tyrannies—surely, this is the verdict of history—we have to keep them guessing.
	The Foreign Office had a policy of keeping our potential enemy guessing in the 1930s, but ultimately that policy, too, was disastrous, because there was no certainty about our intent, which brings me to my conclusion that there should be no pre-emptive strike. We should keep talking, and keep them guessing. Ultimately, the Iranian regime must know that if it is on the brink of acquiring nuclear weapons, the west—namely America and Israel—will act at that stage, and must do so to defend all our freedoms and to defend stability in the entire region.

Chris Bryant: I was with the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh) for much of his speech until he reached the very end. The same is true of the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron). I confess that I began the day rather sympathetic to his motion, largely because the preferred profession for many people in my constituency, as has been shown in many opinion polls—and this is true across many former mining constituencies—is the armed forces. I do not want to send more British armed forces—young people from the Rhondda—to go to fight in a war a long way from home that may have no discernible goal, and may have a very uncertain future. However, I did not find his argument persuasive. In fact, I found it the opposite of persuasive. I found it deeply unpersuasive and I will not be able to support him tonight.
	This is not about whether we like or dislike the Iranian regime. I do not think there can be anybody in the House who likes the Iranian regime, perhaps because of its phenomenal and extraordinary use of the death penalty. It owned up to 252 cases last year but the figure is far more likely to be 600, which puts Iran second only to China, which is a much larger country. There are currently 143 people under the age of 18 on death row in Iran. It is a security state, in the way that the former Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple, described the term in the late 1930s. It has laws against harming national security, against disturbing public order and also against insulting public officials. The regime uses them whenever it wants to repress dissent.
	I found the hon. Gentleman’s argument about Israel to be naive. I would rarely use that term in the House, but a pedantic argument about the semantics of what Ahmadinejad said or did not say is neither here nor there. The truth is that there is a powerful body of opinion within the leadership in the Iranian regime which is wholly inimical to the success of the Israeli state. Whatever criticism I may have about Israel and its failure to adhere to United Nations resolutions and the rest, I believe that Israelis have the right to self-determination and to believe that they can live in their country in security.

John Baron: The hon. Gentleman should be a little careful with his words. I did not argue for one moment that there are not those within Iran—many within Iran—who loathe the state of Israel. There are many Arabs and Jews within the state of Israel who disagree with their own Government on many issues, but that cannot justify military intervention. He needs to be careful when he talks about naiveté. I would suggest to him that it is naive to pursue failed policies.

Chris Bryant: The hon. Gentleman has not heard the rest of what I am going to say. Perhaps he will be less unhappy with some of that. I would argue back to him that the theocratic argument that is used by many in Iran, including very senior figures in the regime and those who have direct access to military power there, may at some point lead to direct assaults on Israel. It would be understandable for the Israelis to want to protect themselves. In that set of circumstances, Ahmadinejad could easily have said, “I’m terribly sorry. I gather there’s been a terrible misinterpretation of what I said which has gone around the world, and I would like to correct it because I did not mean that Israel could be wiped from the map.”
	There are other reasons why I hate the regime. Its record on lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender rights, which I have referred to in many speeches over the years, is shocking, but it is getting worse. In September last year three young men were executed for homosexuality. In the past the regime has tried to maintain that such cases were non-consensual homosexuality. On this occasion it owned up to the fact that it is executing people for consensual homosexuality.
	I would also highlight what the regime has done to the Ahwazi Arabs. Those are a people who are often forgotten because they do not fit into many people’s understanding of what Iran must look like, and certainly do not fit into what Ahmadinejad’s version of Iran looks like. In September last year four Ahwazis were sentenced to death for “enmity against God”. Likewise, a 19-year-old, Naser Albushoka, another Ahwazi, recently died under torture. The repression of the Ahwazis has gone on for many years.
	This is also not about whether any of us believe that Iran should have nuclear weapons. I do not think there is anybody in the House who would support Iran having nuclear weapons. It is about the potential justice or injustice, rightness or wrongness, of possible military intervention.
	There is a series of questions that we always need to ask ourselves before we engage in military action. First, is the action of the aggressor certain? Are we certain that it is either doing this or going to do it? At this moment it is not absolutely certain. I am fairly convinced about what the Iranian regime intends to do with its military capability, but it is not absolutely certain that it intends aggression.
	Secondly, is this a grave ill or a major act of aggression? Thus far, it is not as grave as many of the other things that have happened in other countries, not least Syria.

Glyn Davies: I am very engaged with everything that the hon. Gentleman says. Does he agree that no one wants to go down the road of action against Iran? Does he take the same comfort as I do from the first line of the amendment that what we all want to see is the British Government and the Governments of the world doing everything that they can to secure a peaceful resolution to the issue that we face, and that all we are discussing is keeping on the back burner, as distant as we can, any idea of military action?

Chris Bryant: Yes, sort of. I will come back to the hon. Gentleman’s point in a moment. We must analyse whether there are better means of achieving the end that we want. As the Foreign Secretary and the shadow
	Foreign Secretary said, there clearly still are better means that we have not yet exhausted and that we need to pursue to their logical end.
	Would there be a clear goal if military action were to be taken against Iran? It is difficult to see what that clear goal would look like. Similarly, would it be achievable if we knew what that goal was? As the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh) said, it is difficult to see how it would be possible to achieve that secure goal. Would it be proportionate, not only to the aggression being shown, but to the action that we choose to take in other cases, because otherwise we might be accused of hypocrisy? That is undoubtedly true for many countries when they look at how we choose not to force the implementation of UN resolutions in relation to Israel but force their implementation in relation to others. Similarly, is there a danger that the outcome of military action might be even worse than the result of not engaging in military action? That is always the toughest question. We look at what is happening in Syria at the moment, and our heart goes out to the people there, but would military intervention from the west make for a better or a worse situation? It is still uncertain whether our intervention in Libya and elsewhere will produce the goods that we always hoped for.
	I have a real worry about what I would call the ratchet effect. Today we are forceful in our language. Tomorrow forceful is not enough, so we have got to be assertive. The next time we have got to be aggressive, then we have to be pugnacious, then belligerent, then bellicose, and then we find ourselves at the doorstep of war. That is in part what happened in relation to the step up towards military intervention in Iraq. We have to be careful. The Foreign Secretary is a very persuasive man in many cases, but sometimes he is so eloquent that his language ratchets things up.

Martin Horwood: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Chris Bryant: I will not, if the hon. Gentleman does not mind, because I have taken two interventions and others wish to speak.
	I worry that like a spanner that one can use to ratchet up but not down, if we use language that is exorbitant and goes too far, we will end up in a situation where, from no real decision of our own, we may be at the doorstep of war. [Interruption.] I understand that they ratchet up as well, but this is true also of the Falklands. The Argentines can huff and puff for all they want, but quite often it is best to leave them huffing and puffing, rather than to rattle the sabre back at them.
	I would say two things in closing. First, we must put considerable trust in the European Union process. This is one of the areas where going it alone for the UK is unlikely to achieve great success. Not that anyone is proposing that. Just going it alone with Israel and the United States or a coalition of the willing, or whatever one wants to call it, would not be a good idea. Binding in the E3 plus 3 has thus far been an extremely successful process and has avoided war.
	Finally, I believe that the Israelis, contrary to what the hon. Member for Gainsborough said, would be wholly wrong to take unilateral action. I do not think that they would be able to do so or that they would be successful if they tried. If they were to take from our decision tonight the message that we believe that they should take military action, they would be wrong.

Alec Shelbrooke: I welcome and congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron). I am glad that we have had the chance to have this incredibly important debate. If I had been asked about this subject 12 months ago, I would have spoken out in favour of the motion that my hon. Friend has tabled. That was my original position, and it stems from a simple fact: I want us, as politicians, to do everything we possibly can in this place to try to ensure that we do not kill innocent people. All politicians need to start from that position.
	When we talk about a campaign in Iran, we wonder what we would actually do. Would we drop bombs from 36,000 feet in built-up areas? Would we put troops on the ground? The Iran-Iraq war led to a million deaths, but only one mile was covered in eight years, and that was with the full backing of a landlocked country with western support. We wonder what we would do, but we have to look at the bigger picture. I believe that my sentiments back then were naive, to use the word the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) used. It was a naive position for me to take, because a country does not actually need to use a nuclear weapon to have a devastating effect on the region if it so wishes. The Iranians would like to believe that they have a right to some of the United Arab Emirates. They could walk into those islands and occupy them through the use of totally conventional forces, but what can we do about it if there is the threat of a nuclear weapon in the background? What will we do if they are at that stage with a nuclear weapon? What suffering will be meted out to the people in those states?
	Much has been said tonight about a proxy war, which I believe could only be ratcheted up if Iran had a nuclear weapons capability. I fear that organisations such as Hezbollah and Hamas would be empowered by the fact and would be bolder in their terrorist activities and the steps they take against the state of Israel simply because they would know that they had such a powerful ally behind them. What will be planted out on those organisations if a nuclear weapon lies behind them?
	I was elected in 2010, but I remember clearly watching the debates in this House on the Iraq war a long time before the war began. I remember listening to Tony Benn, who stood on this side of the House and said that war with 24-hour news coverage is too sensationalist and that too many people out there would revel in the fact that bombs would be falling on Baghdad. I think that we have a problem with the 24-hour news cycle, because it is almost as if it wants military action because it makes such great television pictures. It appeals to people and entertains them, but the reality is far more harsh.
	Equally, I remember the speech my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley (Kris Hopkins) made when the House debated the Libya campaign. He graphically described the reality of war and the photographs, brought back to him by colleagues he had served with in the armed forces, of burned and dismembered bodies. The hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) described how one of his constituents took his own life as a result of the mental trauma he had suffered in Afghanistan. It is never an easy decision to talk about military action. I have said in the House before that war is the failure of politicians—of people like us, in the safety of this House, in this country—to work within an organisation,
	but does that mean that we should hamstring ourselves at the start and say, “No matter what you do, there will be no military action”?
	Military action could simply be provoked in the strait of Hormuz. If that waterway were closed, if British or any shipping were attacked, we would have no choice but to react. We have minesweepers and other ships in the area. If we pass the motion today and say that we will take no military action, we will send out an even worse signal to the world, but, even though I shall support the amendment in the name of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), it does not mean that I do not sympathise with the motion that my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay has tabled.
	This has been an intelligent, heartfelt and engaging debate, and the one message from every speaker, whether they have been for the amendment or for the original motion, has been, “We want to avoid military action,” but I am slightly concerned that at times the debate has appeared to be about military action tomorrow. Military action tomorrow is simply not on the agenda, and if next week the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister came to the House and said, “We are going with the Americans to attack Iran because we can’t go any further,” I do not think that the House would be supportive. I do not think that at this stage of events the mood of the House would be to support such military intervention.
	I return to the point, however, that that is not what we have been discussing today. We have been discussing whether we remove the option completely from the table, and I do not believe that we can. We need to work hard diplomatically and with countries such as Russia and China. We must have far better diplomatic negotiations with Russia to try to push Iran away from nuclear proliferation and ensure that it focuses on energy needs, because I am quite sure that the Russians do not want a nuclear-armed Iran and, then perhaps, an escalation in the middle east, just as much as everybody else does not, but unfortunately they are not prepared for other reasons to support the United Nations and the west in those areas.
	I have absolute faith in this Foreign Secretary; I really do. This Foreign Secretary and this Foreign Office have moved the Department to a new standing in the world, something that had declined in recent years, and the Foreign Office and the people in it are well respected. As the Foreign Secretary said in his speech today, an entire section of the Foreign Office is engaged purely in negotiations with Iran and in diplomacy in the area, and that is to be applauded. I imagine that that is where all Members want the situation to move to, but, as much as none of us actually wants to use the military option, it does not mean that we can take it off the table.

Robert Halfon: I congratulate again my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on securing the debate. Although I disagree with everything that he has said, I am grateful to him for challenging my views and those of others who oppose his motion.
	I have three fundamental points to make. First, my hon. Friend said that there is no smoking gun, but I shall argue that there is a big smoking gun and that Iran is building a nuclear bomb; secondly, the nuclear programme
	is not a response to sanctions, as it was happening already; and, thirdly, we cannot be sure that if Iran had a bomb it would not use one either directly or through one of the many terrorist organisations that it supports.
	It is worth examining those points in turn. First, is Iran building a nuclear bomb? The International Atomic Energy Agency report of November 2011 states clearly that Iran has acquired the knowledge, technology and resources to create a nuclear bomb within months. Its main findings, to quote section G, paragraph 43, are that Iran has procured
	“nuclear related…equipment and materials”;
	acquired
	“nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network”;
	and worked
	“on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components”.
	Putting that aside for one minute, what do Arab nations in the region say? They are in no doubt about what the Iranians are planning. As far back as 2008, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia urged the United States to
	“cut off the head of the snake”
	by halting Tehran’s nuclear programme. Last week, I was in Kurdistan in northern Iraq. The Kurds know all too well what a nuclear Iran would be like and are incredibly concerned about the implications. That is what is at stake in the region.
	Nuclear ambition was not a response to sanctions; Iran already had it. We cannot appease Iran or hope for moderates to emerge within the regime. The United Nations sanctions began in 2006 in response to Iran’s refusal to suspend uranium enrichment. As far back as 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran revealed Iran’s secret nuclear programme, much of which was later admitted to by the Iranian leadership on state television. Iran has repeatedly dismissed calls to negotiate. President Ahmadinejad now insists that his nuclear programme is unstoppable.
	The only time when Iran suspended uranium enrichment, co-operated with the UN and signed the full non-proliferation treaty was in October 2003. Why did it do that at that time? Because a quarter of a million western troops had just toppled Saddam Hussein in Iraq and were close to Iran’s western border. As soon as that threat diminished, Iran returned to its nuclear programme, which has led us to the point that we are at today.
	Thirdly, we cannot be sure that Iran would not use a nuclear bomb. Iranian leaders have made numerous statements calling for the destruction of the state of Israel and the Jewish people. Just last week, the Iranian website Alef published an article by Khamenei’s strategy chief, Alireza Forghani, detailing plans for the extermination of Israel. As British newspapers have reported, the dossier even pinpoints the housing estates with the highest concentration of Jewish people. That piece, which is now being run on most state-owned sites in Iran, states that because of the United States’ presidential election, the time for Iran to strike is now.
	Last week, Iran’s Ministry of Defence announced that it had tested a two-stage ballistic missile that could deliver a nuclear bomb. Earlier this month, the Deputy
	Prime Minister of Israel said that he had intelligence showing that that missile has a range of 6,200 km—enough to hit the United States and the United Kingdom.
	I have described Iran before in this House as the new Soviet Union of the middle east: it represses its people at home and has expansionist aims abroad. It is widely recognised as the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. It provides support to insurgent groups in Iraq and Afghanistan that have attacked and killed British troops. A nuclear Iran does not just mean a nuclear Iran; it means a nuclear Hezbollah, a nuclear Hamas and so forth. As the former Iranian President, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, said, the
	“application of an atomic bomb would not leave anything in Israel”.
	The extremists in charge of Iran see their conflict as not just with their neighbours, but with the west. That is why they threatened to bomb Turkey last year. In 2006, Hassan Abbasi, the head of the Iranian doctrinal centre for strategic studies, said:
	“Britain’s demise is on our agenda”.
	He added:
	“We have a strategy drawn up for the destruction of Anglo-Saxon civilization…we must make use of everything we have at hand to strike at this front by means of our suicide operations or by means of our missiles.”
	In conclusion, the Foreign Secretary has described the Iranian nuclear threat as the new cold war. The situation may be worse than that because in the past, nuclear deterrents worked because of mutually assured destruction—MAD—and the clear lines of communication. However, for MAD to work, one has to be sane and the Iranian regime has shown itself not to be with its constant human rights abuses, its attack on the British embassy and its support for terrorism. Let that be a lesson for the free world.
	As I have mentioned, I was in Kurdistan last week near the Iranian border. I met Iranian Kurds who are persecuted by the Iranian regime. They knew the reality of a nuclear Iran, and they said that the only way that things would change was if there was regime change there. They asked why the west had not done more to support democratic and opposition movements, which would have made some difference and perhaps helped to facilitate regime change.
	Finally, I wish to quote Niall Ferguson, who wrote recently in Newsweek:
	“War is an evil. But sometimes a preventative war can be a lesser evil than a policy of appeasement. The people who don’t yet know that are the ones still in denial about what a nuclear-armed Iran would end up costing us all.”

Several hon. Members: rose —

Mr Speaker: Order. I intend to call the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) to wind up the debate no later than 9.56 pm.

James Morris: I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) for securing the debate.
	We need to be clear about the danger that the world would face from a nuclear-armed Iran. As other Members have said, it is a state widely recognised as the world’s
	leading sponsor of international terrorism. It funds, trains and arms groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Harlow (Robert Halfon) has just said, it would be a grim prospect for the cause of peace in the middle east if those terrorist groups gained the protection of an Iranian nuclear umbrella.
	The belligerence of the regime is perhaps explained by its expanding conventional missile programme. The Iranian regime has a large arsenal of missiles with a range of 1,300 km, which are capable of threatening Gulf states. As other Members have said, a nuclear-armed Iran would spark a nuclear arms race, as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and perhaps Egypt all sought to counter its regional hegemony.
	Some argue, as some Members have tonight, that the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran is exaggerated, and that in any case we would be able to contain the threat. I believe that those people are living in a dream world. Containment of a nuclear-armed Iran would require overwhelming force and huge military deployment in the middle east, and we would need to confront its terrorist proxies. With the current conditions in the middle east and the instability of the region, that is not a realistic long-term option.
	We have a responsibility to prevent Iran from ever becoming a nuclear-armed power, and the Foreign Secretary and other Members are right to say that all options must be left on the table. The Foreign Secretary is right to pursue an aggressive sanctions policy. There is a lot of evidence that the sanctions regime is beginning to bite, but I believe it could go further. The assets of the Iranian central bank have been frozen in Europe, but there are limited exemptions to permit some legitimate trade. US sanctions do not include those exemptions. I believe that EU banking sanctions must be tightened up to bring them more in line with those imposed by the United States.
	We should also examine the shipping industry more closely. Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines has been renaming and reregistering cargo ships to avoid sanctions. It has renamed 90 of its 123 ships since 2008. Given that Britain is a hub of shipping insurance, we need to work to ensure that the legal loopholes that the Iranian regime is exploiting are closed.
	I believe that, as other hon. Members have said, we must do everything we can to prevent Iran from achieving its nuclear ambitions. The Foreign Secretary is right to work with our international partners across the European Community and the world to ensure that the sanctions that have been agreed, which are beginning to bite, will continue to do so. As I have said, I believe that more needs to be done to tighten up the sanctions regime that has been imposed on Iran. It poses a major threat to peace and stability in the middle east, and it must not under any circumstances be allowed to get a nuclear weapon.

John Baron: I think it can safely be said that I have been in a very small minority in today’s debate, but I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for participating in it. The extent of the interest shown, particularly with a one-line Whip, has proved that it has been worthwhile, and there have been many interesting contributions. I remain of the view, though, that Government and
	Opposition Members have failed to address various points and have missed opportunities to better relations between Iran and the west.
	The current policy of sanctions and sabre-rattling has failed. Iran will not be deterred, and yet the policy has brought us to the brink of military conflict. As most people accept, a military strike by Israel would be a disaster. It would unite Iran in fury behind the hard-liners in the country, it would not work because it would merely delay matters for perhaps a year at most, and it could lead to a regional war. Those who think otherwise are very wrong. Yet the Government and the Opposition keep the option of force on the table despite the fact that it would be disastrous, despite the fact that Iran ignores it, and despite the fact that it increases tensions and makes a peaceful outcome less likely. My contention is that by ruling it out we would reduce the tensions, bring ourselves back from the brink of military conflict, and give diplomacy a greater chance.
	There has been no answer to my suggestion that the time has come for a fresh approach that recognises the status of Iran as a regional superpower. We need better to understand and engage with Iran. The precedent for this new relationship is Nixon’s rapprochement with the Chinese during the 1960s and 1970s; after all, China and the west had been at war in Korea just a decade before. The US needs to make it very clear to Israel that military action will not be acceptable. I saw no appetite for that in the House today, and I believe that we are missing a defining moment.
	I hope that most of us, if not all, can accept that war should be the measure of last resort to be used only when all other avenues have been exhausted. My belief, in contrast to many of those who have spoken, is that we have not yet reached that point. I shall therefore oppose the amendment to my motion.

Question put, That the amendment be made.
	The House divided:
	Ayes 285, Noes 6.

Question accordingly agreed to.
	Main Question, as amended, put and agreed  to .
	Resolved ,
	That this House supports the Government’s efforts to reach a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue through a combination of pressure in the form of robust sanctions, and engagement led by the E3+3 comprising the UK, US, France, Germany, China and Russia; and recognises the value of making clear to Iran that all options for addressing the issue remain on the table.

FUTURE OF BIOMASS

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—(Greg Hands.)

Graham Stringer: I start from the assumption that biomass is a promising technology that could, if handled correctly, help to reduce our net carbon emissions in the context of Government policy. My reservations relate to the air pollution emissions from biomass and to whether we have sufficiently robust sustainability criteria.
	In response to a parliamentary question that I tabled, the previous Government revealed in a written answer on 26 September 2009, at Hansard columns 695-96, that the then target of 38 TWh of biomass risked causing £557 million of annual social costs. In blunt terms, that means people dying early because of polluted air. That was supplemented by a written answer to the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) on 10 November 2009, at Hansard column 219, that made it clear that the mortality bill would be 340,000 life-years in 2020 alone. By my maths, using those figures, I reckon that a small, 20 MW, biomass plant running at 85% efficiency would kill roughly 17 people a year—and that is just the mortality impact. The Government have made no estimate of the cost of ill health consequent on polluting the air. If the Minister or his Department can find fault with my figures, or perhaps find more precise ones, let us hear them. However, I do not think that one can get away from the central, appalling fact that unabated biomass emissions will kill significant numbers of our fellow citizens, and this as a result of deliberate—or, if not deliberate, negligent—public policy.
	A recent report by the Committee on the Medical Effects of Air Pollutants, “The Mortality Effects of Long-Term Exposure to Particulate Air Pollution in the United Kingdom”, published on 21 December last year, estimated that the 2008 burden of particulates cost
	“an associated loss of total population life of 340,000 life-years…a greater burden than the mortality impacts of environmental tobacco smoke or road traffic accidents.”
	That figure is remarkable: it is exactly the level of extra burden to be inflicted on the UK atmosphere by 2020 under originally intended biomass targets. It cannot be right that public policy risks effectively doubling existing mortality rates. In contrast, currently at least in the UK, the mortality and morbidity caused by carbon emissions is presumably nil.
	Near my constituency, at Barton, we have had planning permission turned down for a biomass plant that would have contributed significant amounts of particulates—ammonia, oxides of nitrogen and arsenic—to an area already under stress as an officially designated air quality management area. To be fair, the amount of arsenic to be emitted would have been restrained, because the amount of CCA—chromated copper arsenate—wood would have been limited to small quantities contained in demolition rubble. I doubt that constituents were greatly reassured on that count, but why are we allowing such toxic material to be burned in biomass at all? The bigger point is that if we can improve automotive exhausts supposedly to the extent that they can be “cleaner than the air we breathe”, it should not be beyond the wit of man to design a biomass burner that
	screens out the majority of particulates and therefore does not bring early death and disease to the population at large.

Kate Green: The proposed biomass plant to which my hon. Friend refers would have been in my constituency. Does he agree that it is of great concern that there seems to be no drive to use the best available technology, which is what really ought to underline any decisions about such plants?

Graham Stringer: That is the point that I am making.
	There is another trap to avoid. It is important to make the distinction between biomass that is good and biomass that is bad for the carbon balance in our atmosphere. Otherwise, the danger is that biomass will be tarnished in the same way that first-generation biofuels were, creating a wall of cynicism about biofuels in general. Installing bad biomass plants around the UK rather than good ones would not only be a prodigious waste of taxpayers’ money, but embed into our electricity generation system for years to come a significant proportion of unsustainable electricity production.
	I was drawn to the opinion of the European Environment Agency scientific committee on greenhouse gas accounting that was published on 15 September 2011, a copy of which I have submitted to the Minister’s officials. It knocks on the head the assumption that biomass combustion is always inherently carbon neutral, and points to the “double counting” that causes that error. The report explains that the assumption
	“ignores the fact that using land to produce plants for energy typically means that this land is not producing plants for other purposes, including carbon otherwise sequestered.”
	If biomass production replaces forests or reduces forest stocks or forest growth that would otherwise sequester more carbon, it can increase net carbon concentrations. If biomass displaces food crops, as biofuels did, it can lead to hunger if crops are not replaced, and to emissions from land use change if they are. The committee concluded that to reduce carbon in the air, bioenergy production must increase the net total of plant growth, or must be derived from biomass wastes that would otherwise decompose.

Therese Coffey: The hon. Gentleman is making an eloquent contribution. Another unintended consequence could involve the cost of crops. Biofuels have already been mentioned, but my farmers are also concerned about straw and about raising costs when they could be subsidising a biomass plant.

Graham Stringer: The hon. Lady makes an important point.
	The committee warns that the danger of that error is “immense”, stating that
	“current harvests…have already caused enormous loss of habitat by affecting perhaps 75% of the world’s ice- and desert-free land, depleting water supplies, and releasing large quantities of carbon into the air.”
	On that basis, it urges that European Union regulations and policy targets should be revised to allow bioenergy use only from additional biomass that reduces net greenhouse gas emissions without displacing other necessities such as the production of food and fibre. It advises that accounting standards should fully reflect
	all changes in the amount of carbon stored by ecosystem, and that energy production from biomass should be based on by-products, wastes and residues rather than on stem wood that would otherwise continue happily to grow as forest biomass.
	The implications of that analysis were explored by Atlantic Consulting in “Biomass’ Forgotten Carbon Cost”, published on 8 November 2011. I have sent a copy of that paper to the Minister’s Department, as well. Atlantic Consulting looked at the pattern of typical biomass plants in the UK and found that 58% of their fuel tonnage derived from wood. Some of that is waste, such as end-of-life furniture and arboreal cuttings, and some is residue, such as that from sawmills. Unfortunately, however, the largest fuel component of biomass power is stem wood—that is, tree trunks harvested with the intent of using them for boiler fuel.
	Atlantic Consulting proceeded to estimate the carbon footprint of a typical UK biomass plant. Interestingly, its footprint is 690 grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per kWh, which is well above the current UK average footprint of 520 grams per kWh and the lowest-carbon conventional gas-fired combined cycle at 401 grams per kWh. It also far exceeds the eligibility hurdle of 285.12 grams per kWh set for renewable obligation certificates from 2013. In that light, more than half of biomass-powered capacity would not qualify for credits under the renewables obligation. That could be a shock to the owners if they found that they did not benefit, and it would certainly be a shock to taxpayers if they found that they were subsidising higher-carbon power generation than the existing average.
	Will the Minister provide the owners and the taxpayers with a measure of reassurance, because it appears that the current sustainability criteria for biomass are not stringent enough? If the European Environment Agency scientific committee or Atlantic Consulting are wrong in their thinking, will he please explain the situation, so that we can get this right for all concerned? The interests of the economy and of the environment demand clarity.
	In October last year, the Scottish Government published a consultation that proposed removing all subsidy from large-scale woody biomass electricity plants. Large-scale electricity-only biomass was, in their view, inefficient and required more wood than the UK could produce. Although current plans are to import wood, there is no guarantee that biomass plant operators will look exclusively abroad for their wood, and the overseas supply might not be stable or secure. The current subsidy means biomass providers will be able to afford more than the current market rate for wood, which might push prices up and price out traditional wood industries such as sawmills, wood panel mills, furniture manufacturers and construction, which in turn, the Scottish Government said, puts hundreds of skilled rural jobs at risk. What is the Minister’s view of the Scottish policy stance? Are the Scottish Government wrong, or are they ahead of the game?

Graham Jones: In the past five years we have seen wood prices rise by 55% because of biomass subsidies. An employer in my constituency, the furniture manufacturer Senator, which employs about 1,000 people has to compete against rising wood prices simply because of the biomass subsidy. Should not the
	Government consider the impact of biomass subsidies on employment in furniture manufacturers and other wood-using companies, as well as the impact on the environment?

Graham Stringer: My hon. Friend makes exactly the same point as I did in a different way.
	I think that biomass deserves a place in the renewable energy mix of the future, but we need to get the rules of the game straight in advance, so that society is not left picking up the pieces of an impetuous policy.

Gregory Barker: I congratulate the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) on conducting this timely and important debate. I recognise the real concern and knowledge he has brought to it. Many serious issues relating to our future energy strategy were raised, albeit briefly, including the potential impacts on human health and the sustainability of biomass feedstocks. These are issues that my Department takes extremely seriously.
	The hon. Gentleman argued passionately and with genuine conviction, so I welcome the opportunity to explain the Government’s policy on the issues raised. Above all, I seek to reassure hon. Members of the coalition’s commitment to protecting human health and the wider environment.
	The coalition is building an economy that counts and cuts our carbon emissions. We are making our energy secure in a volatile world and helping to create more green jobs and a more sustainable economy. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said, we are determined to make this coalition the greenest Government ever. That pledge has many strands, but an increased use of sustainable biomass is clearly an important element of it. Sustainable biomass is extremely versatile; its efficient use will play a key role in helping to meet the many challenges of decarbonising our economy. This is true not just for energy, but right across the thriving bioeconomy we want to develop.
	I understand the concerns—very important ones—expressed about the effect on air quality, on the natural environment and on the wider health of communities. I recognise that these are crucial issues and not just for those in the immediate vicinity of biomass power plants. Hon. Members will be aware of the Environmental Audit Committee’s ninth report, “Air Quality: A follow-up report”. I am unable to pre-empt the Government’s formal response to that report, which is yet to be published, but I would certainly acknowledge that there are significant health and environmental benefits from reducing air pollution.
	I believe that the hon. Gentleman has erred in his calculations on mortality linked to biomass emissions. I am happy to correct some misapprehensions. Larger-scale industrial and commercial plant do not have the same properties as domestic boilers; they are very different indeed. Plant of this scale is more likely to have chimneys appropriately sized to allow emissions to disperse much more easily into the immediate atmosphere. This reduces the impact of the emissions on ground-level concentrations very significantly indeed. Larger-scale plants operate better and are more efficient, and I can also reassure the
	hon. Gentleman that all modern biomass plants here in the United Kingdom are subject to stringent pollution controls. Indeed, emissions from waste incinerators are more strictly regulated than those resulting from any other form of thermal power generation.
	The hon. Gentleman referred to Peel Energy’s proposed new plant at Trafford, Greater Manchester. I am, of course, unable to comment specifically on that particular project, but the Minister of State, Department of Energy and Climate Change, my hon. Friend the Member for Wealden (Charles Hendry), discussed similar issues in Westminster Hall in 2010.
	Let me remind the House of the extremely rigorous permitting process to which a 20 MW biomass plant will need to be subjected. Developers must produce an environmental statement covering transport, social and environmental issues. It may be necessary to comply with the waste incineration directive, which sets strict emission limits for pollutants. The Environment Agency will not grant the requisite permits for a waste incinerator if it does not comply with the directive, and the plant would be likely to be subject to the environmental permitting regulated by the agency.
	The legislation sets strict environmental standards for thermal plant, which cover a range of pollutants including nitrogen oxides, sulphur dioxide, heavy metals and dioxins. If the Environment Agency were to issue a permit, it would cover such issues as limits on emissions to air, water, sewer, land and groundwater; the disposal of ash; operating conditions such as temperature, oxygen and polluting gas concentrations; conditions relating to the fuel that can be burnt; monitoring and reporting requirements; and conditions to achieve control of noise emissions and energy efficiency. The agency would then regulate the plant by requiring continuous monitoring of the main pollutants for which strict limits are set and periodic monitoring for other substances, conducting regular announced and unannounced inspections, investigating non-compliance with any condition of the permit, and taking enforcement action if necessary.
	Let me also dispel some myths about emissions from biomass specifically. Emissions from biomass and energy from waste plants have fallen considerably in recent years as a result of new stringent standards. Biomass burning causes only a small fraction of the air-quality impacts in the United Kingdom, most of which are caused by transport. Studies of the health of communities living near energy from waste plants have not established convincing links between emissions and any adverse effects on public health. It is clearly not possible to rule out adverse health effects completely, but any potential damage from modern, well-run and well-regulated incinerators is likely to be undetectable.
	Let me now deal with the reasons for supporting biomass energy, alongside other uses of wood and biomass. There is a great diversity of biomass feedstocks, including energy crops, waste wood and municipal waste. Our future energy landscape will require a mix of technologies, including onshore and offshore wind, solar, nuclear, fossil fuel with carbon capture, and, of course, biomass. There will also be a mix of sizes, from decentralised householder energy to large electricity plants and coal-to- biomass conversions.
	Biomass is one of the most important contributors to the new energy landscape that we are building. Its second defining feature is versatility: it can be used for
	heat, electricity and transport. Moreover, bioenergy can provide significant new business and employment opportunities for the UK. For example, the expansion of biomass heat in off-gas-grid areas in the UK will mean a growing order book for specialist boiler manufacturers and demand for new local businesses to provide installation and maintenance, and will create opportunities throughout the biomass production and distribution chain. Since April 2011, investments totalling at least £1.6 billion have been announced for biomass technologies, and they have the potential to create nearly 5,000 jobs.

Graham Jones: May I take up a question asked earlier? Has the Minister carried out a study of the effects on employment, particularly in the furniture industry? He has spoken of jobs being gained, but what about the jobs that will be lost if wood-making industries are adversely affected?

Gregory Barker: We do not believe that this is a zero-sum game. We believe that the majority of biomass for use in waste or energy plants will be imported; this is not about sucking in the available biomass that, rightly, goes into other industries, and I will address that later.
	Of course, building a low-carbon energy system will not be easy, and we know that substantial changes will be required as we move away from the familiar technologies of today. Decisions taken now will shape our energy future for decades to come, so it is vital that we make the right strategic decisions. We will make sure that safeguards are in place to ensure that technologies are low-carbon, efficient and sustainable.
	I think that we can all agree that biomass, and its use for energy, raises complicated issues, and we have heard several such examples from the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton. That is why the Department of Energy and Climate Change will publish a cross-government UK bioenergy strategy next month, which will recognise the complexity and importance of these issues. Key for the strategy has been understanding the value of the alternative uses of biomass in decarbonising the economy, in terms of both cost-effectiveness and carbon-effectiveness. There are very real questions as to what is the best of use of the world’s limited biomass feedstocks and, indeed, how far bioenergy saves carbon compared with fossil fuels.
	We also want to understand how the growth of bioenergy has an impact on other uses, which relates to the point made by the hon. Member for Hyndburn (Graham Jones). We have considered the availability and price of feedstocks, including for traditional uses of wood, and we have also worked closely with the Committee on Climate Change, which published its own review in December. We are also working closely with stakeholders. I hope that hon. Members will see that this is an extensive piece of work, but the strategy is not yet finished. It is clear that the use of wood and energy crops for energy production can lead to positive carbon balances, and that is true even when accounting for life-cycle analysis. Our evidence shows that wood products are valuable as carbon stores, and they have an important role to play alongside bioenergy in decarbonising the economy. Clearly, we need to take a holistic view of biomass uses in setting bioenergy policy, and that is what we will do in taking policy decisions, for example
	on the renewables obligation banding review. We will also do that when looking at support for renewable heat technologies and renewable transport. We will also ensure that our carbon objectives marry up with our wider energy ones.
	However, it is crucial that we take action on biomass sustainability. We will therefore ensure that bioenergy does not result in the loss of important habitat or release more carbon than it saves. Biomass can be a very low-carbon energy source, but that requires it to be grown, harvested, processed and transported sustainably. That is why we have introduced sustainability criteria into the renewables obligation, which means that only sustainable biomass will be supported in the future. Generators will report on their performance against a target of 60% greenhouse gas emissions savings compared with fossil fuel use and they will also have to report on land use criteria. We have set an ambitious but, we believe, achievable target that will ensure that investment in new bioenergy comes forward to deliver our energy and climate goals. From April 2013 we intend that the payment of renewable obligation certificates will be linked to these standards. Biomass that does not meet these standards will not qualify for financial support, and we expect to introduce similar standards into the renewable heat incentive.
	Using wood and biomass feedstock for renewable energy is a necessary step towards our goals, but it is not the only use of this resource. Wood products and other non-energy uses of biomass are also important in decarbonising and strengthening our economy. The Government are committed to ensuring a strong future for the wood products industry. We recognise that the growth of bioenergy must not be at the expense of the other sectors that serve similar aims, and we are committed to a close and continuing dialogue with biomass-using industries to ensure we understand their needs appropriately.
	We intend that there be competition between sectors, but that competition needs to be positive, sustainable and not destructive. Developing local sources of supply to fuel the growth of renewable heat is another gain, as is using locally produced residues such as straw and waste products at the end of their life. The Government are also very aware of the potential of the global
	market for sustainable feedstocks. We expect much of the growth of bioenergy in this country to be fuelled by imports, particularly from north America and the EU, which are sources of sustainable timber. Expanding imports is an important way to avoid damaging competition for domestic supplies. Wood fuel is increasingly traded as a global commodity, so UK wood supplies can and will be exported for energy use in other countries where that will deliver a better price.

Graham Jones: The Minister is generous in accepting interventions. As I alluded to earlier, wood prices have risen by about 55% in the past five years, which is clearly the result of market forces. Does he not think that that will carry on, thus putting pressure on those other industries that use wood?

Gregory Barker: The hon. Gentleman makes a sensible point, and I understand that friction. Traditional users of British timber and wood waste have legitimate concerns, which we continue to hear. We will continue to ensure that their voice is clearly heard in policy making. The representations that they have made have been reflected in the way in which we have responsibly ensured that the users of biomass are not overly subsidised, which can be seen in the renewables obligation review and the renewable heat incentive. We think that there is a fair balance to be struck. There is a global market, which is one of the main reasons why domestic feedstock prices have been rising—it is not just the result of domestic demand.
	I thank the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton for introducing this valuable debate, which has allowed the Government to put some important data on the record. Our challenge is to build a low-carbon economy that is based on energy supplies that are safe, secure and sustainable; that creates green jobs and sustainable growth; and that delivers economic prosperity. The efficient use of sustainable biomass in all sectors will play a key role in helping us to meet that challenge. We will of course continue to maintain our commitment to the protection of human health and the environment above all things.
	Question put and agreed to.
	House adjourned.